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One of the most classic puzzles in Plato’s metaphysics is how to interpret his 
apparently self-predicational language.  Plato seems committed, at least in his middle 
dialogues, to the view that for all forms, the form of F “is F”.  For instance, he seems 
to say that the form of largeness itself “is large”, and to generalize this claim to all 
forms.  Commentators have struggled to find an interpretation of such claims that is 
consistent with Plato’s text and that attributes to Plato a view with some plausibility. 
One aim of this dissertation is to show that we have good reason to doubt all of 
the most influential interpretations offered by commentators.  The views discussed 
include Narrow Self-Predication, the Tautologous Identity view, two Non-
Tautologous Identity views, the Pauline Predication view, Broad Self-Predication, and 
a view distinguishing different kinds of predication.  It is doubtful whether any of 
these interpretations correctly captures Plato’s self-predicational commitments. 
Another aim of the dissertation is to argue that the textual evidence most often 
thought to commit Plato to the Self-Predication Assumption (SP), that for all forms, 
the form of F is itself an F thing, is insufficient to establish such a commitment.  One 
chapter focuses on Plato’s repeated discussion of the resemblance between form and 
participant.  Other chapters present new interpretations of key arguments: the 
argument in the Phaedo distinguishing the form of equality from “sensible equals” and 
the famous Third Man Argument in the Parmenides.  On a correct interpretation of 
these passages, they do not express a commitment to SP. 
Finally, this dissertation defends a new interpretation of Plato’s apparently 
self-predicational language called the Explanatory Predication view (EP).  According 
 to EP, Plato rejects SP and, when he suggests that for all forms, the form of F “is F”, 
he only means to emphasize the explanatory role of forms.  In such contexts, he uses 
the predicate ‘F’ as shorthand to refer to the property of being F-explaining rather than 
to the property of being F.  EP ought to be favored over other views because it is 
consistent with the textual evidence and avoids any highly counterintuitive 
consequences. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 In the Phaedo, Plato makes claims that seem to commit him to some version of 
a Self-Predication Assumption (SP), that any form of F is itself an F thing.1  In his 
argument at 74b7-c6, intended to distinguish the many sensible equals from the form 
of equality, Plato relies on the claim that the form of equality “is not unequal”.2  But 
underlying this argument is also the assumption that the form of equality “is equal”, a 
claim that Plato makes more explicit immediately after the argument at 74d5-7.  Here 
Plato claims that the form of equality “is equal” whereas sensible equals fall short in 
“being equal”.  And Plato stresses at 75c10-d4 that what he argues in this passage is 
no more about the form of equality than it is about all other forms.  So Plato seems to 
be committed here to the view that any form of F “is F”.  Later in the Phaedo at 
102e5-8, Plato claims that largeness-in-us “is large and is not small”, and that 
smallness-in-us “is not large.”  And Plato again generalizes his claims (at least to those 
forms for which there are opposites), when he argues at 103b4-5 that the form of F and 
the immanent characters of the form of F “are not opposite-F.”3  Plato has argued that 
largeness-in-us “is large and is not small”.  And underlying his claim that both the 
form of largeness and largeness-in-us “are not small” would seem to be the claim that 
not just largeness-in-us but both largeness-in-us and the form of largeness “are large.”  
                                                
1 SP could also be expressed as the view that any form of F is an instance of itself (perhaps but not 
necessarily by way of participation in itself), or that any form of F is a member of the class of Fs, or that 
any form of F is characterized by F-ness, or that any form of F has in it a form-particularization of 
itself.  This latter expression of the view will be explicated later in the dissertation, when I discuss 
immanent characters.  Note that I do not use SP in the same way as John Malcolm does, for example, 
rather I understand SP in the way that Malcolm construes self-exemplification (Malcolm 1991, 1).  He 
takes SP more widely to be the view that “any form of F is F”, with this claim left entirely without 
interpretation.  Instead, as I am treating SP, Plato will only be committed to SP if he holds that the form 
of F is itself an F thing.  If Plato holds that “any form of F is F”, but only because he understands this 
claim such that it does not entail that any form of F is itself an F thing, then he will not be committed to 
SP. 
2 See Chapter Six on this argument in the Phaedo to find a defense of this quick claim I make here 
about the argument and the brief remarks that follow here. 
3 See Chapter Two for a detailed discussion of this passage. 
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Plato seems here committed to the view that the form of largeness “is large and is not 
small”, and that more generally, the form of F “is F and is not opposite-F.”  So in both 
of these passages in the Phaedo, Plato appears to express a commitment to SP, that 
any form of F is in fact an F thing, along with the many sensible Fs. 
 But we ought to be careful about concluding that Plato was committed to SP 
based solely on his use of language that seems to have self-predicational force.4  
Perhaps in some cases when Plato expresses that “the form of F is F”, he means to 
express something other than that the form of F is an F thing.5  How are we to 
determine Plato’s intentions?  How can we decide what Plato is trying to convey by 
this apparently self-predicational language?  And if it is right that Plato often does not 
intend genuine self-predications through his use of this language, what exactly does he 
want to express? 
 Many commentators have argued that Plato’s intention in using this language 
is indeed to express his commitment to SP.  In particular, most of these SP-theorists 
have held that Plato is committed to Narrow Self-Predication (NSP), the view that any 
form of F is an F thing in the same way as the many sensible Fs.6  So, for example, 
                                                
4 On this point, see Wilfred Sellars 1955, 423; K. W. Mills 1957, 147; R. E. Allen 1965, 44; and David 
Gallop 1975, 128.  They all argue that even if Plato is committed to the view that “any form of F is F”, 
this is not sufficient to show that he was committed to SP.  More work needs to be done to show that 
Plato intends these claims as genuine self-predications, to say that the form of F is an F thing.  
Otherwise, the possibility is left open that Plato intends to express something other than self-
predications when he makes these assertions.  
5 Of course, even if Plato sometimes uses these sorts of expressions to convey something other than a 
genuine self-predication, there might be some specific cases in which he does assert that “the form of F 
is F” in order to express that the form of F is an F thing.  The hope would be that Plato provides us with 
sufficient contextual clues such that we can discern his meaning.  
6 I follow Gail Fine in calling this view Narrow Self-Predication (Fine 1992, 25; Fine 1993, e.g. 62; and 
Fine 2003, 314-ff).  I explain what this view means in more detail shortly in Chapter One.  Some 
commentators who appear to have attributed NSP to Plato include: Gregory Vlastos 1965, 248, 287; P. 
T. Geach 1965, 270; G. E. L. Owen 1965, 295, 310, Owen 1986, 231, 235, Owen 2000, 320; Terence 
Irwin 1977, 318 n. 25, 319 n. 29; J. E. Raven 1965, 81-2; Norman Gulley 1962, 28-33, A. E. Taylor 
1936, 187-8; Nicholas White 1976, 67-9, 81 n. 25; F.C. White 1981, 160-1; J. M. Rist 1964, 29; and 
Robert Heinaman 1989, 56-ff.  Many of these commentators also attribute to Plato what I call 
paradigmatic-SP, the view that the form of F is a perfectly F thing.  Sometimes they fail to distinguish 
between the two, but it should be clear that paradigmatic-SP implies SP but SP need not imply 
paradigmatic-SP.  On a possible construal, any form of F might be an F thing and yet might not be a 
3 
just as all sensible equals are equal things by having sameness of measure7, the form 
of equality, on NSP, is an equal thing by also having sameness of measure.  And the 
form of fish, if there is one, would be a fish in the same way that a trout or a carp is a 
fish, perhaps by being a gilled sea-dweller.  Now, many commentators have claimed 
that NSP is an absurd, incoherent, contradictory, fallacious, or crazy view, and some 
of these commentators, after recognizing the implausibility of NSP, have argued that 
we therefore ought not to attribute such a view to Plato.8  However, a great number of 
commentators who have stressed the absurdity of NSP have still attributed the view to 
Plato, and have used this as a means of criticizing him, by claiming that he is 
committed to an obviously absurd view as a result of confusion or lack of awareness.9  
How are we to determine whether Plato is in fact committed to NSP and whether the 
                                                                                                                                       
perfectly F thing.  It seems Fine’s Broad Self-Predication view, which I discuss in Chapter Four, is such 
a view.     
7 Plato suggests that equality is sameness of measure at Parmenides 140b7-8.  
8 Taylor, Allen, Vlastos (in a later paper), and Terry Penner are four examples of commentators who 
argue that because of the contradictoriness and absurdity of NSP, we ought not to attribute the view to 
Plato.  Taylor argues that Plato never made such a nonsensical assumption as NSP (Taylor 1915-6, 253-
5).  Allen asserts that NSP is not only peculiar but it is absurd, and such a “thorough confusion is not 
lightly to be imputed to any man, let alone to Plato” (Allen 1965, 43-4). Vlastos argues that the 
“horrendous”, “logically illicit”, and contradictory results following from NSP (Vlastos 1981, 259-62) 
would be so obvious that it is unreasonable to think that Plato could have missed them (Vlastos 1981, 
262).  And Penner argues that NSP is such a crazy view (Penner 1987, 9, 44-6, 185, 252) that it is not 
even one which Plato “could have had in mind” (Penner 1987, 43-4, 56). 
9 Examples of commentators who have used a commitment to NSP as a means of criticizing Plato are as 
follows: (Note that sometimes as in the case of Owen and N. White their criticisms involve also 
attributing a certain sort of paradigmatic-SP to Plato along with NSP.)  Vlastos, while attributing the 
view to Plato, claims that “[a]bsurdity or contradiction inevitably results” (Vlastos 1965, 240 n. 2) and 
that the view “leads to self-contradiction” (Vlastos 1965, 250).  Owen, while also attributing the view to 
Plato, claims that the instance of NSP in the case of bigness “makes no sense” (Owen 1965, 297 n. 2) 
and the instance of NSP in the case of equality is absurd and paradoxical and involves the 
“mistreatment of ‘relative’ terms” (Owen 1965, 310).  Owen presents a “one-level paradox” which he 
thinks is well-founded and is faced by one like Plato who accepts NSP (Owen 1986, 231) and later he 
points out “an incurable contradiction” which follows from NSP (Owen 1986, 236-7).  Owen also 
claims that NSP is a “fallacy” and “mistake” made by Plato (Owen 2000, 320).   N. White argues that in 
holding NSP, Plato is mistaken and is committed to paradoxical views, Plato’s “line of thought here 
goes astray”, and Plato fails to see clearly enough that the entailments of NSP make “dubious sense” 
(N. White 1976, 67-9).  In a note, White adds that Plato is confused and does not recognize the full 
paradoxicality of his views and White points out an entailment of Plato’s view which White claims 
“makes no sense” (N. White 1976, 79 n. 16).  Also see Geach 1965, 270; Gulley 1962, 33; and F.C. 
White 1981, 143, 154, 160-1. 
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view is indeed absurd?  And if Plato is not committed to NSP, then what does he 
intend to convey by his apparently self-predicational language? 
 This dissertation will be divided into seven chapters.  In the first chapter, I will 
initially attempt to spell out the NSP view in more detail than has been done in Plato 
scholarship.  I will then argue, from both textual and philosophical considerations, that 
Plato is not committed to NSP (at least in the Phaedo).  I will argue that in those 
places in the text of the Phaedo in which Plato might seem to be relying on NSP most 
of all, he is not in fact doing so.  I will also present what I take to be the strongest 
argument to show that NSP entails consequences which contradict assumptions to 
which Plato was obviously committed, and consequences which are perhaps absurd.  
If NSP entails contradictory or absurd consequences, we have very good reason not to 
attribute it to Plato, unless there is overwhelming evidence for thinking he was so 
committed.  But in fact, as I will have argued, the most relevant evidence for NSP (at 
least in the Phaedo) cannot rightly be taken as evidence of a commitment to the 
view.10 
 But if I am right that Plato is not committed to NSP, then how ought we to 
understand his apparent statements of self-predication in the Phaedo?  In the second 
chapter of this dissertation, I will examine Plato’s views on immanent characters or 
what I call form-particularizations, which he briefly discusses at 102b-ff, and which 
have been discussed often in the secondary literature.  I will argue that if we consider 
how Plato understands form-particularizations and what he writes about them in this 
passage of the Phaedo, we can see a good reason for doubting many of the 
interpretations offered by commentators of Plato’s apparent statements of self-
predication.  I will argue that what Plato asserts about form-particularizations provides 
                                                
10 Later in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, I examine further textual evidence in numerous dialogues that 
has led commentators to attribute NSP to Plato in the middle dialogues.  I argue that on a correct 
interpretation, these passages do not provide evidence of a commitment to NSP (or any version of SP). 
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us with good evidence against the following views: the Tautologous Identity view 
(derived from R. E. Allen and H. F. Cherniss), two different Non-Tautologous Identity 
views (one derived from K. W. Mills and one derived from Alexander Nehamas), 
Gregory Vlastos’ Pauline Predication view, and Sandra Peterson’s Pauline Predication 
view according to the “conservative reinterpretation”.  We have good reason for 
thinking that these views do not correctly capture Plato’s commitments, at least in the 
Phaedo. 
 In the third chapter, I will present my positive account of the view to which 
Plato was committed, the Explanatory Predication view (EP), which is a non-SP view.  
According to my view, Plato was not committed (at least in the Phaedo) to any 
version of a genuine self-predication assumption.  I will argue that in the relevant 
passages in the Phaedo, Plato intends his apparent statements of self-predication to be 
understood as “explanatory predications”.  For example, when Plato claims that “the 
form of equality is equal”, what he means is only that the form of equality is equal-
explaining, or that it explains things’ being equal.  I will set out my view, provide 
some textual evidence for it, and I will show how my view appears to be consistent 
with what Plato asserts concerning form-particularizations, unlike the other views I 
will have surveyed in the previous chapter. 
 However, my view (EP) is not the only view which seems immune to the 
argument from the second chapter based on form-particularizations.  In the fourth 
chapter, I examine some other views which also seem immune to this attack and 
consistent with Plato’s claims regarding form-particularizations.  These views include 
two that attribute a genuine Self-Predication Assumption (SP) to Plato, and one main 
view that does not.  The two versions of SP views are Peterson’s Pauline Predication 
view according to the “expansive reinterpretation” and Gail Fine’s view developed 
from this one, Broad Self-Predication (BSP).  The remaining non-SP view considered 
6 
here is the one defended by Michael Frede and Constance Meinwald.  I will outline 
these views and explain how they may seem to be consistent with what Plato says 
about form-particularizations in the Phaedo.  But I will argue that we have good 
reason to favor EP over any of these views.  At this point, the hope is that I will have 
provided some positive defense for EP, and have provided good reason for doubting 
all of the influential interpretations of Plato’s apparently self-predicational language. 
 In Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, I examine textual evidence that has often 
been thought by commentators to express Plato’s commitment to SP in the middle 
dialogues.  As I will argue, on the correct interpretations, these passages do not 
express such a commitment, and can and should be read consistently with EP.  In the 
fifth chapter, I address what has been taken as the main objection facing any views 
that attribute the rejection of SP to Plato.  It seems that Plato is committed to the view 
that the participation relation between a form and its participant is some sort of 
resemblance relation.  But some commentators have argued that one cannot make 
sense of Plato’s talk of the resemblance between form and participant if one rejects SP 
and holds that it is not the case that for all forms, the form of F is an F thing.  
According to the argument, if there is a case in which the form of G is not a G thing, 
then the relation between the form of G and the many Gs that participate in it cannot 
be a resemblance relation.  But this would directly conflict with Plato’s commitment 
to a resemblance between form and participant. 
I will respond to this argument by examining how participants are resemblers 
of forms.  I argue that this is a complex resemblance relation involving a more direct 
resemblance between the form and the form-particularization in the participant.  
Because of this, even though it is right to attribute to Plato the view that participation 
involves resemblance, there is no good reason to think that this resemblance entails 
SP.  But if it is not in being F that F-ness-particularizations resemble the form of F to 
7 
which they correspond, then what is the nature of the resemblance between them?  I 
will end the chapter by specifying what I take to be the nature of the resemblance 
relation between form and form-particularization.  We will see how the form of F 
remains as a paradigm with respect to F-ness-particularizations, even though the form 
of F need not be an F thing. 
 In Chapter Six, I examine textual evidence from the Recollection Argument in 
the Phaedo from 72e-77a, which has been thought to provide clear evidence of a 
commitment to SP.  I focus on the vexing argument at 74b-c, in which Plato has been 
thought to be relying on the claim that the form of F is F and is not opposite-F.  I 
argue against the most popular interpretations of this argument, and I defend a new 
interpretation.  According to my interpretation, no commitment to SP is involved in 
the argument, and therefore it is consistent with EP and with the rejection of SP. 
Further, I discuss the passage from 74d-75b that follows this argument, in 
which Plato claims that sensibles “fall short” of forms and are “inferior” to them.  
Commentators have often thought that sensible Fs fall short and are inferior precisely 
because they are deficiently F, while the form of F is F non-deficiently.  I argue 
against this interpretation.  Because the contrast between sensibles and forms 
discussed here should be understood as the same contrast drawn in the argument at 
74b-c, and since that contrast does not involve a commitment to SP, neither does the 
one at 74d-75b.  I explain what the relevant contrast here between sensibles and forms 
consists in.  Throughout the Recollection Argument in the Phaedo, on the 
interpretations I defend, we do not find evidence of a commitment to SP, and so this 
passage is consistent with EP. 
 In the seventh and last chapter, I discuss Plato’s famous Third Man Argument 
(TMA) in the Parmenides at 132a-b.  Commentators have often taken Plato to be 
relying on some version of SP in this argument.  Further, they have claimed that 
8 
Plato’s purpose in presenting the TMA is to point out that SP, to which they say he 
was committed in the middle dialogues, must now be rejected in order to avoid 
disastrous regresses for forms.  In this chapter, I argue that even if Plato is relying on 
some version of SP in the TMA, this is not sufficient evidence that he was actually 
committed to such a view in any of his dialogues.  Further, I point out that we have 
good reason for thinking that Plato was not using the TMA to emphasize that SP must 
now be rejected, since the rejection of SP would only be an inadequate response to the 
TMA.  To avoid all of the disastrous regresses that follow from the TMA, the rejection 
of SP will not suffice.  Instead, I argue that Plato responds to the TMA by rejecting a 
different premise, Non-Self-Explanation (NSE).  And we have ample textual evidence 
showing that Plato was never committed to this premise. 
At the end of the dissertation, the hope is that I will have shown that the textual 
evidence that is most often used by commentators to defend the view that Plato is 
committed to SP in the middle dialogues, fails to establish that point.  And we have 
good reason to doubt all of the most influential interpretations of Plato’s apparently 
self-predicational language, because of their textual inconsistency or their 
implausibility.  On the other hand, all of the textual evidence is consistent with EP, 
and EP avoids attributing anything highly implausible to Plato, with the result that it is 
a view that Plato “could have had in mind”.11  We ought then, I think, to adopt EP as 
the correct interpretation of Plato’s apparently self-predicational language. 
 
 
                                                
11 Here I am echoing a phrase of Penner’s.  He argues that we should strive to attribute to Plato a 
position he “could have had in mind” (Penner 1987, 43-4, 56).  What Penner means is that we should 
not attribute to Plato positions which have immediate implications that “are so crazy he could only have 
arrived at those positions as a result of some grammatical error or some seriously misleading analogy 
suggested by our language…” (Penner 1987, 44).  Penner’s admirable goal is to remove the idea that all 
we can learn from Plato’s metaphysics is what mistakes we should try to avoid (Penner 1987, 56). 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE REJECTION OF NARROW SELF-PREDICATION 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 Narrow Self-Predication (NSP) is one version of a genuine Self-Predication 
Assumption (SP).  This is the case because according to NSP, any form of F is an F 
thing.  But NSP says more than this.  NSP is the view that any form of F is an F thing 
in pretty much the same way as the many sensible Fs are F things.  So according to 
this view, the form of largeness is large in a way very much like the way in which the 
many sensible large things are large, by, let us suppose, exceeding in measure.  Now, 
while it seems fairly easy to have an intuitive grasp of this view and the view has been 
discussed quite often in Plato scholarship, it seems that a detailed description of the 
view has not been provided, and to do so is no easy task.  And although NSP has been 
criticized numerous times by commentators, a sufficient account of why it should not 
be attributed to Plato has not been provided.  In this chapter, I will first attempt to 
explain NSP in more detail than has been done previously.  Then I will argue that 
based on textual and philosophical considerations, we ought not to attribute NSP to 
Plato. 
 
 
II. What is NSP? 
 
 In explanations of NSP provided by scholars, and even in the account I have 
just quickly sketched, NSP is expressed as the view that the form of F is F in the same 
way (or in roughly the same way) as the many Fs are F.  What this suggests is, first of 
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all, that there is one single way in which all of the many sensible Fs are F.  It then 
suggests that the form of F is also F in this one way (or in a way very close to this 
one).  For instance, Terry Penner describes the view by saying that “the Form of F-
itself is itself F in just the same way that sensible instances of F-ness are F…” (Penner 
1987, 91, my emphasis).  For Peterson, from NSP, the form of justice would be just 
according to a use of ‘just’ that has a very narrow extension.  On such a use, x is just 
“if and only if x is just in the way appropriate to non-forms…” (Peterson 1973, 462 n. 
18, my emphasis).  This suggests that there is one way in which things ordinarily 
considered just are just.  Fine often refers to “the way in which sensible particulars are 
F” (Fine 1993, 62) and argues that according to NSP, the form of F and sensible Fs are 
F “in essentially the same way” (Fine 1992, 25).  These scholars seem to suggest that 
there is a single way in which all sensible Fs are F and, according to NSP, the form of 
F is F in this way as well. 
 But now this view seems counterintuitive, and not for the reason that most 
commentators have suggested, (namely that numerous absurd cases or ones 
contradicting Plato’s commitments will follow if every form self-predicates in this 
way).  Does it even seem plausible to suggest that there is one single way in which all 
sensible Fs are F?  In fact, there appear to be numerous ways in which F things are F.  
For instance, Myron’s Discobolos and the Grand Canyon may both be beautiful, but it 
seems they are beautiful in different ways.  Of course it is difficult to specify the ways 
in which both are beautiful.  For our purposes, it is sufficient to recognize that things 
are beautiful in many different ways, by displaying symmetry or by having a bright 
color, for example.  And two things might be equal by having the same three inch 
length, or by having the same five pound weight.  And a trout and a carp are both fish, 
but they appear to be fish in different ways, because they are different kinds of fish.  
One is a fish by being a trout and the other by being a carp.  The specifics of these 
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examples are unimportant, but the point is that it appears to be obvious that there are, 
at least in most cases, numerous ways in which sensible Fs are F.  It seems that all 
sensible Fs are not F in one and the same way.  And so it appears to be impossible for 
the form of F to be F in the same way that sensible Fs are F. 
 However, the matter is more complicated than it might at first seem.  While it 
is true that there are (usually) numerous ways of being F, one can also count the 
number of ways differently based on the level of specificity or abstraction in which 
one is operating.  For example, things might be equal by having the same three inch 
length, by having the same seven inch length, and so on.  On this level of specificity, 
there are an infinite number of ways of being equal.  But one could move to a higher 
level of abstraction and characterize fewer ways of being equal, under which the more 
specific ones are subsumed.  For instance, things can be equal by having sameness of 
length, by having sameness of weight, and so on.  Note that ‘having sameness of 
length’ is a way of being equal that includes all of the more specific ways of being 
equal that specify particular lengths.  Now at this higher level of generalization, one 
can specify fewer possible ways of being equal, and still cover all cases of sensible 
equals.  But one can abstract even further.  All of the sensibles which are equal by 
having sameness of length or by having sameness of weight or by being equal in some 
other way, are equal by having sameness of measure.  This way of being equal, 
namely ‘having sameness of measure’, is one that contains within it all of the more 
specific ways of being equal.  So, once we reach a certain level of abstraction, it seems 
to be true that all sensible equals are equal in one single way, by having sameness of 
measure.  Perhaps we can say that in all cases of an unambiguous term ‘F’ for which 
Plato posits a form, at a certain level of abstraction, there will be one single way in 
which the many Fs are F. 
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 In fact, I think it is reasonable to attribute such a view to Plato based on his 
acceptance of what is called the Unity Assumption.  Plato is committed to the view 
that, at least in cases of an unambiguous term ‘F’ for which a form exists, there is one 
single form through which all sensible Fs are F and one single way in which they are 
all F.  For example, in the Euthyphro, Plato claims that “the pious is the same in every 
action” (Euthyphro 5d1-2) and all pious things are pious through one form (Euthyphro 
6d11-e1).  In the Meno, Plato argues that “even if virtues are many and various, they 
all have some one form on account of which they are virtues” (Meno 72c6-8).  He also 
argues that all bees do not differ at all in the way in which they are bees (Meno 72b8-
9).  And there is one form of health which is the same in all cases (Meno 72d8).  And 
Plato goes on to make analogous claims in the cases of largeness and strength (Meno 
72e4-9).12  So Plato seems committed to the claim that there is one and the same way 
in which all sensible Fs are F.  Through Plato’s commitment to the Unity Assumption, 
he holds that, although there may often be many different specific ways in which 
sensible F things are F, at some level of abstraction one can specify a single way in 
which all sensible Fs are F. 
 Now we are in a position to give a more thorough expression of NSP.  We 
have seen that, for Plato, it is possible to specify one way in which all sensible Fs are 
F, (at least in any case of an unambiguous ‘F’ for which a form of F exists).  For 
instance, in the case of equality, the way in which all sensible equals are equal seems 
to be by having sameness of measure.  So it seems that there will be a least abstract 
way of characterizing the way in which all of the sensible Fs are F, such that all 
sensible Fs are F in this way.  Let us call this specification of a way of being F “the 
general narrow way of being F”.  And we can call all more specific ways in which 
sensible Fs are F, which are subsumed under the general narrow way of being F, 
                                                
12 Also see Laches 192a-b, where Plato makes the same point about speed. 
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different “narrow ways of being F”.  So NSP is the view that any form of F is F in the 
general narrow way, which is rightly called the way in which all sensible Fs are F.  We 
can see now that the commentators who describe NSP as the view that the form of F is 
F in “the same way” as sensible Fs were not incorrect, but now we have a better 
understanding of why.  It is because, although there are numerous specific ways in 
which Fs are F, at a higher level of abstraction we can see that all sensible Fs are F in 
the same way. 
 
 
III. Rejecting NSP: “The form of F is not opposite-F” 
 
 So is it correct to attribute NSP to Plato, the view that any form of F is F in the 
general narrow way?  Is it true for Plato that any form of F is F in the way which is the 
least abstract specification of the way in which all sensible Fs are F?  For instance, is 
the form of equality equal by having sameness of measure, is the form of largeness 
large by exceeding in measure, and so on for all forms?  In fact, Plato does not hold 
such a view.  First, let us look at the passage in the Phaedo which might be taken as 
the best evidence for the claim that Plato was committed to NSP.  This includes the 
argument intended to distinguish the form of equality from sensible equals starting at 
74b6 and the text that immediately follows the argument.  In this argument, Plato 
asserts that there is no time when the form of equality “appears unequal” to Simmias 
(Phaedo 74c1).  What Plato is arguing here is that the form of equality never “appears 
unequal” or is thought to be unequal by someone like Simmias, who is in a privileged 
epistemological position with respect to equality.13  Plato has just pointed out that 
                                                
13 Again, see Chapter Six on this argument in the Phaedo to find a defense of the interpretation of the 
argument I favor here. 
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Simmias (and Socrates) are in this privileged epistemological position with respect to 
the form of equality, when he asserts that they know it itself, what it is (Phaedo 74b2).  
Plato is relying on the claim here that the form of equality in fact “is not unequal”, but 
further that it indeed “is equal”.  He makes this further point that the form of equality 
“is equal” more explicit right after the argument, when Plato argues that the sensible 
equals do not “appear to us to be equal” like the form of equality itself “appears to be 
equal” (ἆρα φαίνεται ἡµῖν οὕτως ἴσα εἶναι ὥσπερ αὐτὸ τὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἴσον) (Phaedo 74d5-7).14  
Again, what appears “to us” (i.e., what we think is true) about the form of equality is 
the truth, since we have knowledge of the form.  And so Plato seems committed here 
to the view that there is at least some reading according to which it is true that the 
form of equality “is equal”.  In this passage from 74b6-d7, Plato tells us that the form 
of equality “is equal and is not unequal”.  And shortly after this passage Plato 
generalizes his claim to all forms, (at least those for which there are opposites) 
(Phaedo 75c10-d4).  So Plato suggests here that any form of F “is F and is not 
opposite-F”. 
 But can it be correct to read these claims as an expression of a commitment to 
NSP?  It seems we ought to apply the same reading to Plato’s claim at 74c1 that the 
form of equality “is not unequal” as we apply to Plato’s claim underlying the 
argument and expressed shortly after it at 74d5-6, that the form of equality “is equal”.  
Can these claims be read according to NSP?  Can Plato be taken to mean that the form 
of F is F in the general narrow way of being F and is not opposite-F in the general 
narrow way of being opposite-F?15  This cannot be the case, at least for the reason that 
                                                
14 As Gallop notes, the text here is “very uncertain” (Gallop 1975, 229 n. 24).  But as Gallop explains, 
according to any of the possible textual variations, whether it is explicitly stated or not, “ἔστιν ἴσον has 
to be understood as completing the ὥσπερ clause.”  Plato must be asserting that with respect to how the 
form of equality “is equal”, sensible equals fall short of “being equal”. 
15 Note that if something is not opposite-F in the general narrow way of being opposite-F, then it is not 
opposite-F in any narrow way of being opposite-F.  This follows from the definition of these terms 
above.  If something is F in any narrow way of being F, then it is thereby F in the general narrow way 
15 
Plato does not accept that no form of F is opposite-F in the general narrow way.  In 
other words, there will be numerous cases for Plato in which the form of F is opposite-
F in the general narrow way.  As Fine recognizes, some forms will suffer this sort of 
compresence: “some forms of F are also not-F” (Fine 2003, 313-4).  And Fine clearly 
has narrow ways of being opposite-F in mind.16  In some cases, it is true for Plato that 
the form of F is opposite-F in a narrow way.17 
What are some examples of the forms for which it will be true that the form of 
F is opposite-F in the general narrow way, and is Plato clearly committed to the 
existence of such forms in the Phaedo?  Two such forms are the form of sameness and 
the form of difference, two of the most important forms discussed in the Sophist 254d-
9c.  Plato holds that the form of sameness is different, in so far as it is different from 
other forms (Sophist 256d12-e2).  Also, as the argument at Phaedo 74b6-c6 would 
show in the case of the form of sameness, the form of sameness is not the same as 
sensible sames and so is different from them.  Likewise, the form of difference is (the) 
same because it is identical to itself.  While Plato does not explicitly mention the 
forms of sameness and difference in the Phaedo, sameness and equality are closely 
related, as Plato makes clear in the Parmenides, since equality is characterized there as 
sameness of measure (Parmenides 140b7-8).  Therefore, it is unlikely that Plato 
accepts the existence of the form of equality but not the form of sameness.  And if he 
                                                                                                                                       
of being F, since the general narrow way of being F is an abstract specification which covers all of the 
more specific narrow ways of being F. 
16 Fine argues that some forms suffer compresence with respect to narrow ways of being F.  But, on her 
view, with respect to the broad explanatory way of being F, the form of F does not suffer compresence.  
I discuss Fine’s view in detail in Chapter Four. 
17 The point here could also be applied to the interpretation of the passage at Symposium 211a.  Plato 
seems to claim there that the form of beauty “is not both beautiful and ugly”.  But we ought not to 
generalize this as the claim that no form of F is both F in the general narrow way of being F and 
opposite-F in the general narrow way of being opposite-F, (nor should we generalize this as the claim 
that no form of F is both F and opposite-F in any way).  And we should not do this because of the fact 
that Plato is committed to cases in which the form of F is F and opposite-F in some narrow ways.  
Generally speaking, the form of F does escape some sort of compresence, but it is not with respect to 
being F in a narrow way that it does this.  
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posits the existence of the form of equality, inequality, and sameness, it seems he must 
also accept the existence of the form of difference.  And it would seem that even 
according to commentators who try to restrict the set of forms that Plato posits in the 
Phaedo (to the forms of opposites and numbers for example), the forms of sameness 
and difference would be included as ones he does accept.  Since he thinks that the 
form of sameness is different in the general narrow way—the way that all sensible 
differents are different—and the form of difference is (the) same in the general narrow 
way, Plato does not accept the universal claim that for all forms, the form of F is not 
opposite-F in the general narrow way.18  And so Plato’s claim that “the form of F is 
not opposite-F” should not be interpreted according to NSP.        
 As I have noted, in this passage of the Phaedo, Plato seems to rely on the claim 
that “the form of F is not opposite-F”, and he appears to generalize what he argues 
here to all forms (Phaedo 75c10-d4).  But one might argue that, even though sameness 
and difference are closely related to equality and inequality, and sameness and 
difference are two of the most important forms discussed in the Sophist, Plato may not 
have posited the existence of these forms in the Phaedo.  Perhaps “the form of F is not 
opposite-F” can be true for Plato interpreted according to NSP once it is restricted 
only to forms (of opposites) that Plato actually posits in the Phaedo.  However, there 
                                                
18 Malcolm employs a strategy to try to resolve apparent contradictions that follow from NSP, which 
one might think could be used here.  Malcolm makes use of the distinction between qualities that a form 
has qua form and the qualities that it has qua the particular form that it is (Malcolm 1991, 89-90).  One 
might try to argue that while some form of F might be opposite-F qua form, no form is opposite-F qua 
the particular form that it is.  Then one can say that when Plato asserts that “the form of F is not 
opposite-F”, he does mean this to be interpreted as saying that the form of F is not opposite-F in the 
general narrow way, but the claim should be qualified: The form of F is not opposite-F in the general 
narrow way qua the particular form that it is.  But I think this can be quickly shown to be false as well 
for Plato.  For instance, the form of difference is the same even qua the particular form that it is, since it 
is “the same as the form of difference”, and it is the only form which has this quality.  “Being the same 
as the form of difference” is a quality which the form of difference has qua the particular form that it is, 
not qua form.  So even qua the particular form that it is, it will not be true for Plato that the form of F is 
not opposite-F in the general narrow way.  This distinction cannot be used to rescue the NSP reading 
here.  
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are examples of forms discussed explicitly in the Phaedo for which it will be false that 
the form of F is not opposite-F in the general narrow way. 
For instance, consider the form of evenness.  First of all, Plato is committed to 
the view that every form is one and a unity.  Vlastos explains that every form in 
Plato’s system must be “unitary” (Vlastos 1981, 259) and that Plato would have found 
it absolutely unacceptable for a form not have “unity” and so not to be “one Form, one 
number, one being, and so forth” (Vlastos 1981, 337).19  In the Phaedo, Plato argues 
that all forms are noncomposite (ἀσύνθετον) (Phaedo 78c1-9) and uniform (µονοειδὲς) 
(Phaedo 78c10-d7, 80b2).  In the Republic, he asserts that the beautiful and the ugly 
are each one (ἓν) (Republic 476a2), and he immediately generalizes this claim to all 
forms (πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν) adding that each of them is itself one (ἓν) (Republic 476a4-
6).  Later in the Republic at 507b6-7, Plato again claims that each form is one (µιᾶς).20  
Now Plato clearly posits the existence of a form of evenness in the Phaedo, calling it 
“the even” (τὸ ἄρτιον) in numerous places from 104b3-e9 and more explicitly “the 
form of the even” (ἡ τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέα) at 104d14, e1, and 105a6.  Since the form of 
evenness is one of the many forms, it will itself be one (ἓν).  He argues in the Phaedo 
at 101c2-7, that whatever is one (ἓν) must share in oneness (µονάδος).  It follows that 
since the form of evenness is one, it shares in oneness.  Further, Plato claims that 
oneness (µονάς) is such that it always brings with it oddness (105c4-5).21  So, since the 
form of evenness shares in oneness and is one (in number), it follows that the form of 
evenness is odd (in number).  But being odd by being one (in number) is a narrow way 
of being odd, and so it falls under the general narrow way of being odd, (which is 
                                                
19 Also see Malcolm 1991, 89, on this point that every form must be one. 
20 Also see Philebus 15a1-b8, where Plato suggests that forms are unities (ἑνάδων and µονάδας) and 
repeatedly suggests that they are one (ἓν).  And see Timaeus 35a1-2, where Plato suggests that forms 
are indivisible (ἀµερίστου). 
21 See Denis O’Brien on this point, who takes Plato to be asserting here that “oneness entails oddness” 
(O’Brien 1967, 224-5). 
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perhaps ‘being of a number that is not divisible into two equal parts’—see Euthyphro 
12d7-10).  Therefore, the form of evenness is odd in the general narrow way, the same 
way as sensible odds. 
Another example of a form explicitly mentioned in the Phaedo, for which it 
will be false to claim that the form of F is not opposite-F in the general narrow way, is 
the form of plurality.  Plato mentions this form at 101b6 (πλήθει καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος).  
Again, since all forms are one (in some narrow way), plurality will be one, which is its 
opposite.  So plurality will also be an example of a form such that the form of F is 
opposite-F in the general narrow way. 
 So Plato cannot consistently accept that no form of F is opposite-F in the 
general narrow way.  We then have good reason not to interpret the claim underlying 
his argument at 74c1, that “the form of F is not opposite-F”, along the lines of NSP.22  
This is because, if so interpreted, it would obviously contradict what Plato is clearly 
committed to (in the middle dialogues and the Phaedo itself) in the case of numerous 
forms, (at least two of which are explicitly posited in the Phaedo itself).23  Within this 
argument from 74b6-c6, Plato is relying on the claim that “the form of F is not 
opposite-F” and the further claim that “the form of F is F”, a claim that Plato makes 
more explicit at 74d5-7.  Since we have good reason not to read “the form of F is not 
opposite-F” along the lines of NSP, the further claim involved here that “the form of F 
is F” also ought not receive this reading.  When Plato suggests in this argument and 
shortly after it the general claim that “the form of F is F”, he does not intend to say 
that for all forms, the form of F is F in the general narrow way of being F or that it is F 
                                                
22 The same could be said about Plato’s analogous claim at 103b4-5 that “the form of F cannot be 
opposite-F”.  I examine this claim and the passage in which it is found in the next chapter in which I 
discuss immanent characters.  
23 There are other relevant forms than the forms of sameness, difference, evenness, and plurality.  For 
instance, it seems Plato would accept that the form of change is at rest, although this is perhaps a 
controversial case. 
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in the same way as sensible Fs.  He does not mean to express a commitment to NSP.  
We have found at least one good reason to hold that commentators are incorrect to 
find a commitment to NSP expressed in this passage. 
 
 
IV. Rejecting NSP: In some cases, the form of F cannot be F 
 
 As I have noted above, many commentators argue that NSP leads to numerous 
absurdities and contradictions.24  If it is true that NSP leads to obviously absurd results 
or ones that obviously contradict views to which Plato was clearly and consciously 
committed, then I think we have very good reason not to attribute NSP to Plato.  
Remember that according to NSP, any form of F is F in the general narrow way, 
which is the same way in which all sensible Fs are F.  Commentators have quickly 
suggested many examples of forms such that, if the form of F is F in the same way as 
sensible Fs, an absurd result follows, or one that Plato clearly rejects.  Vlastos lists 
numerous cases in which he thinks Plato simply cannot consistently accept NSP: The 
form of whiteness cannot be white since it cannot be colored, visible, or extended 
(Vlastos 1981, 337 n. 8).  The form of plurality cannot be plural nor can the form of 
motion be in motion, since all forms must be unitary and immobile (Vlastos 1981, 
259).  The form of animal cannot be (an) animal because all animals are moving, and 
again, forms must be immobile (Vlastos 1981, 262).  And Vlastos claims that NSP 
cannot be true in the case of the forms of change, becoming, perishability, sensibility, 
corporeality, imperfection, or any other forms which are “contrary to those which 
define the conditions of Platonic being” (Vlastos 1965, 251).  Penner focuses on the 
form of largeness and argues that since Plato takes all forms to be non-spatial objects, 
                                                
24 See footnotes 8 and 9. 
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and only spatial objects can be large (in the same way as the sensible larges), Plato did 
not think that the form of largeness is large (in the same way as sensible larges) 
(Penner 1987, 9, 44).  F.C. White points to the cases of the form of man and the form 
of triangularity, arguing that the form of man cannot be a man nor can the form of 
triangularity be a triangle (F. C. White 1981, 154).  G. E. L. Owen cites the example 
of the form of death, which he says seems to be entailed by Phaedo 105, as a form that 
Plato cannot consistently hold is F in the same way as sensible Fs (Owen 1986, 228 n. 
20).25    
 I will not examine all of these examples in detail.  Perhaps for some of them, 
there is some way to explain how Plato can claim that the form of F is F in the same 
way as sensible Fs, without absurdity or inconsistency.  Instead, I will focus on one of 
the strongest cases in which Plato could not have held that the form of F is F in the 
same way as sensible Fs, without committing himself to inconsistency and perhaps 
absurdity.  I have in mind the form of visibility.  Before I explain why Plato could not 
accept that the form of visibility is visible in the same way as sensibles, I want to deal 
with an initial objection to my argument here.  The objection is that Plato never 
explicitly mentions the form of visibility, and so perhaps it is incorrect to even 
attribute the existence of such a form to him.  Did Plato posit the existence of a form 
of visibility, and did he do so when he wrote the Phaedo and other middle dialogues? 
 Vlastos asserts that the form of sensibility is one that Plato never mentions, but 
it is one “which his Theory would require him to recognise” (Vlastos 1965, 251).  If 
Vlastos is correct that Plato is required to recognize the existence of the form of 
sensibility, then he would also be required to posit the form of visibility.26  But why 
                                                
25 And see Gallop 1975, 127-8: “Equality cannot itself be equal; no more can smallness be small, or 
largeness large.  Forms, as universals, cannot, in general, have the characters that they are.” 
26 Note that my entire argument here dealing with the form of visibility could also be applied in the case 
of the form of sensibility or perceivability, which Vlastos claims Plato is required to recognize (Vlastos 
1965, 251).  And it seems that often when Plato refers to visibility as in the Affinity Argument in the 
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exactly does Plato’s theory commit him to the existence of such forms?  David Ross 
argues, by referring to Republic 596a6, that Plato posits the existence of a form 
“answering to every common name” (Ross 1951, 24).  Ross again claims that 
according to Plato’s “doctrine of Ideas”, “for every set of individuals called by a 
common name there must be an Idea” (Ross 1951, 36).  If Ross is correct that Plato 
posits a form corresponding to every common name, then it would follow that Plato 
posits a form of visibility, since there is such a common name as ‘visible’.  However, 
Plato provides us with evidence even within the middle dialogues that he does not 
want to posit the existence of a form corresponding to every common name.  In the 
Phaedrus at 265e1-2, Plato claims that forms cut things up according to the joints in 
nature (κατ’ ἄρθρα ᾗ πέφυκεν).  So Plato will not posit the existence of a form 
corresponding to those common terms that do not cut things up at natural joints.  In 
the Politicus, a later dialogue, he makes his view more explicit.  There at 262b-e, Plato 
argues that not all divisions pick out forms.  For example, although there is a term 
‘barbarian’, there is no form corresponding to this term, whereas ‘even’ and ‘odd’ are 
terms with corresponding forms, because they cut up number according to a natural 
joint.  The divisions that successfully pick out forms must be explanatory and must 
pick out the genuine divisions in nature (Fine, 1993, 111; Allan Silverman 2002, 24).  
Now it is true that it does not follow from what has been said that all terms which cut 
things up according to joints in nature must have corresponding forms, but Plato does 
seem to be suggesting a commitment to this view.  And even if Plato is committed in 
the Phaedo to a restricted set of forms that only includes opposites and numbers, for 
                                                                                                                                       
Phaedo, he could very well be understood as having sensibility and not merely visibility in mind.  This 
is the case because his argument seems to be picking out a more general distinction between sensibles 
and forms than one having to do only with the sense of sight. 
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example, and so not all forms which cut at natural joints27, this would not rule out a 
commitment to the form of visibility.  This is the case because ‘visible’ is a term 
which is usually discussed in contrast with its opposite, ‘invisible’.  So contrary to 
Ross, we cannot simply conclude on the basis of the fact that ‘visible’ is a common 
term, that Plato posits the existence of the form of visibility.  But if the form of 
visibility does cut things up according to a joint in nature, there seems to be some 
good reason for thinking that Plato posits its existence. 
 What reason is there for thinking that the form of visibility would cut things up 
according to a joint in nature?  In the Affinity Argument in the Phaedo at 78b-80b, 
Plato suggests that reality can be genuinely divided into the visible (τὸ ὁρατόν) and the 
invisible (τὸ ἀιδές).  Plato refers to the visible and the invisible as δύο εἴδη τῶν ὄντων, 
two kinds or forms of beings (Phaedo 79a6-7).  Even if he does not mean to explicitly 
posit these as forms here, he does indeed suggest that they reflect genuine divisions in 
nature.  Plato is clearly aware here of a joint in nature between the visible and the 
invisible, and he seems to hold that there are forms corresponding to natural divisions.  
Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that Plato posits the existence of forms 
corresponding to these common terms ‘visible’ and ‘invisible’, even though he does 
not posit forms corresponding to all common terms.  And it also seems reasonable to 
suppose that he is aware of being so committed. 
 But supposing that I am right to say that Plato is committed to the existence of 
the form of visibility, why is it the case that Plato cannot consistently adhere to NSP in 
this instance?  Why can’t the form of visibility be visible in the same way as the many 
visibles are visible?  Plato is very clear in repeatedly affirming that, contrary to 
sensibles, all forms are invisible.  For instance, within the Affinity Argument, Plato 
                                                
27 According to this view, Plato would not be committed in the Phaedo to the existence of a form of 
fire, man, or finger, for example, even though the terms ‘fire’, ‘man’, and ‘finger’ presumably cut 
nature up at the joints, and ‘finger’ does this quite well. 
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asserts that it is possible to grasp forms only through reasoning, and he emphatically 
adds that forms are not visible but are invisible (ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ἀιδῆ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ οὐχ ὁρατά) 
(Phaedo 79a2-4).  Earlier in the Phaedo, Plato argues that there is no way (οὐδαµῶς) in 
which one can see the forms with one’s eyes (Phaedo 65d9-10).  He adds that the 
forms are never grasped by any of the senses (Phaedo 65d11-2).  And in the Republic, 
Plato claims that forms are intelligible but not visible (ὁρᾶσθαι δ’ οὔ) (Republic 507b8-
10), invisible (τὸ ἀόρατον) (Republic 529b5), and only graspable without all sense 
perceptions (ἄνευ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων) (Republic 532a5-b2).  Plato seems to be 
committed to the view that forms are not visible or sensible in any way whatsoever.  
At least we can be sure that Plato thinks forms are not visible in any way in which the 
many visibles are visible, in any narrow way.  But then the form of visibility simply 
cannot be visible in any narrow way and so it cannot be visible in the general narrow 
way.  Plato rejects the claim that narrow self-predication is true of the form of 
visibility, but since NSP is a view that is supposed to hold for all forms, we have good 
reason to hold that Plato rejects NSP. 
 But perhaps this is too quick here.  John Malcolm suggests a strategy for 
dealing with blatant inconsistencies that seem to follow, in some cases, from the form 
of F’s being F in the same way as sensible Fs.  He argues that in interpreting Plato we 
might be able to exploit the distinction between qualities that a form has qua form and 
qualities that it has qua the particular form that it is (Malcolm 1991, 89).  For instance, 
all forms must be one qua form, and so the form of duality must be one qua form.  
And the form of duality is one since it is a single unified form.  However, the form of 
duality might also be two (in a narrow way) qua the particular form that it is, by being 
a set of two units.  So the form of duality might be one in a narrow way that respects 
the formal properties (or the properties that all forms must have), and yet also two (or 
dual) in a narrow way such that is consistent with NSP.  Malcolm suggests that this 
24 
sort of strategy might resolve all of these potential cases of inconsistency, and perhaps 
by making use of this distinction, Plato could consistently hold NSP.  But while this 
move might work in the case of the form of duality, it simply will not do in our case of 
the form of visibility.  As I have noted, Plato is insistent in his claim that forms are 
invisible beings.  Further, he suggests that there is no way in which forms are visible.  
But beyond what he claims in the text, it also seems simply impossible for an invisible 
thing to be visible in a (narrow) way.  It seems to be absurd to claim that the form of 
visibility is an invisible being and is invisible qua form, and yet it is visible in the 
general narrow way—the same way as sensibles—qua the particular form that it is.  
Since it is an invisible being, it cannot be visible in any (narrow) way.  And so we 
ought not to attribute to Plato the view that forms are invisible beings and yet the form 
of visibility, while an invisible being, is visible in some narrow way.  As we have 
seen, this would be to attribute an absurd view to him.28  In the absence of good 
                                                
28 My argumentative strategy concerning the form of visibility could also, with very little modification, 
be applied in the case of other forms such as the form of corporeality or body.  This is another form that 
Vlastos argues Plato would be required to recognize (Vlastos 1965, 251).  Incorporeality is another 
formal property, a property that all forms must have.  In the Sophist at 246b7-8, Plato describes the 
friends of the forms as holding that all forms are bodiless or incorporeal (ἀσώµατα).  Once again, it 
seems impossible for the form of corporeality to be incorporeal and an incorporeal being qua form, and 
yet to be corporeal (in a narrow way), qua the particular form that it is.  An incorporeal being cannot be 
corporeal in any narrow way.  Since it seems that Plato is committed to the existence of the form of 
corporeality, at least in the middle dialogues, and this form cannot be corporeal in the same way as the 
sensible corporeals, Plato cannot without inconsistency and absurdity accept NSP.  Therefore, we have 
good reason not to attribute NSP to him.  A distinct sort of argument might be raised concerning the 
form of life mentioned explicitly in the Phaedo at 106d5-6 (αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος) and its opposite, the 
form of death (θανάτου), which Owen notes as a form to which Plato was committed that is problematic 
for NSP (Owen 1986, 228 n. 20).  Can Plato really be taken to have thought that the form of life is alive 
and the form of death is dead, in narrow ways?  First, it seems impossible for forms to be alive in any 
narrow way.  Second, since all forms are deathless or ἀθάνατον (Phaedo 79d2, 80b1), it seems 
impossible for the form of death to be dead in any narrow way.  Similarly, since being dead (in a 
narrow way) seems to imply having once been alive for Plato, it seems impossible again for the form of 
death to be dead in any narrow way.  Since Plato is explicitly committed to the existence of the forms of 
life and death and fairly obviously could not have consistently thought that these forms self-predicate in 
narrow ways, we have good reason not to attribute NSP to Plato.          
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evidence which might show a commitment to NSP in the Phaedo, we ought to assert 
that Plato was not so committed, at least in this dialogue.29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
29 In Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, I further examine textual evidence often thought to show a 
commitment to NSP in the Phaedo and middle dialogues more generally.  I argue that properly 
construed, these passages do not provide evidence for NSP (or any version of SP for that matter).  
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CHAPTER TWO 
IMMANENT CHARACTERS AND THE B-REQUIREMENT 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 As I argued in the introduction to the dissertation and in the previous chapter, 
Plato appears in the Phaedo to be committed to the view that for all forms, the form of 
F “is F”.30  What I argued in the previous chapter is that we ought not to interpret this 
commitment along the lines of NSP.  Plato does not intend to express a commitment to 
the view that for all forms, the form of F is F in the general narrow way, the way in 
which all sensible Fs are F.  But if Plato holds that the form of F “is F”, and does not 
intend this as an expression of the view that the form of F is F in the same way as 
sensible Fs, then what view are we to attribute to him?  How should we understand 
these apparent statements of self-predication that we find in the Phaedo?  Even if 
Plato is not committed here to NSP, is he committed to some other version of a 
genuine Self-Predication Assumption (SP)?  Perhaps he still thinks that the form of F 
is F, but in some way other than sensible Fs.  Or when Plato claims that for all forms, 
the form of F “is F”, does he want to express something entirely different from the 
view that the form of F is an F thing?  What else might he intend? 
 Scholars have suggested many different ways of understanding Plato’s 
apparent statements of self-predication.  In this chapter, I will argue against certain 
influential interpretations including: the Tautologous Identity view (derived from 
Allen and Cherniss), two different Non-Tautologous Identity views (one derived from 
                                                
30 The strongest evidence for such a commitment is found at 74b7-75d4 and 102d6-103c9.  At 74d5-7, 
Plato claims that the form of equality “is equal”, and he clearly intends this claim to be generalized to 
all forms (Phaedo 75c10-d4).  In the later passage, which I will examine in detail in this chapter, Plato 
suggests that the form of largeness “is large” and that this claim should again be generalized.  
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Mills and one derived from Nehamas), Vlastos’ Pauline Predication view, and 
Peterson’s Pauline Predication view according to the “conservative reinterpretation”.  
These five views are all non-SP views, in that they hold that Plato is committed to the 
view that for all forms, the form of F “is F”, but he is not committed to the view that 
for all forms, the form of F is an F thing.31  All these views introduce different 
interpretations of the claim that for all forms, the form of F “is F”. 
 In this chapter, my strategy will be first to examine what Plato writes in the 
Phaedo about what have been extensively called “immanent characters” in Plato 
scholarship.  Examining Plato’s views on immanent characters will be useful for my 
overall strategy of showing that we have reason to avoid attributing certain views on 
self-predication to Plato.  But as we will see, this examination will also help to clarify 
Plato’s views on what it means for particulars to have properties and to undergo an 
alteration of properties.  In particular here, I will argue that Plato intends immanent 
characters to be understood as what I will call form-particularizations32, which are 
immanent in particulars.  I will then adopt and further develop an argument from 
Robert Heinaman’s “Self-Predication in Plato’s Middle Dialogues” about the 
relationship between what Plato writes about forms and what he writes about 
immanent characters.  I will argue that based on the nature of form-particularizations 
and on what Plato asserts about them in the Phaedo, we have good reason to doubt all 
of the five views above.33  We ought to be skeptical of these views about how to 
interpret Plato’s apparent statements of self-predication in the Phaedo. 
                                                
31 The possible exception here is Peterson’s Pauline Predication view according to the conservative 
reinterpretation.  According to this view, any form of F is an F thing, but it is an F thing in a different 
sense of ‘F’ than the sense in which sensible Fs are F.  For a view to be a version of SP, it perhaps 
ought to hold that any form of F is an F thing in the same sense of ‘F’ as sensible Fs.  I discuss 
Peterson’s view in detail later in this chapter.     
32 Here I follow Mark McPherran’s use of the term in both McPherran 1984 and McPherran 1988.  
33 Note that my argument against these five views in this chapter relies on the interpretation of 
immanent characters that I argue for in Section II of this chapter, that immanent characters are entities 
ontologically distinct from forms.  If one does not accept my interpretation of immanent characters as 
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II. The F-nesses-in-us 
 
 Before I argue for how we should understand immanent characters, let us look 
at what Plato actually writes about them in the Phaedo.  Unfortunately, he only very 
briefly discusses them.  At Phaedo 102b4-6, as Plato begins his final argument in the 
Phaedo for the immortality of the soul, he asserts that when Simmias is larger than 
Socrates and smaller than Phaedo, there is both largeness (µέγεθος) and smallness 
(σµικρότητα) in Simmias (ἐν τῷ Σιµµίᾳ).  Simmias is larger than Socrates by the 
largeness which Simmias happens to have (τῷ µεγέθει ὃ τυγχάνει ἔχων), and because of 
the fact that Socrates has smallness in relation to the largeness of Simmias (ὅτι 
σµικρότητα ἔχει ὁ Σωκράτης πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνου µέγεθος) (Phaedo 102b8-c6).  And Simmias 
is smaller than Phaedo because Phaedo has largeness in relation to the smallness of 
Simmias (ὅτι µέγεθος ἔχει ὁ Φαίδων πρὸς τὴν Σιµµίου σµικρότητα) (Phaedo 102c7-10).  
But what is this largeness and this smallness that is said to be in Simmias, Socrates, or 
Phaedo?  Plato has just been arguing in Phaedo 100c-102b that it is the form of F that 
makes things F.  Is this largeness and smallness in Simmias, for example, supposed to 
be identical to the forms of largeness and smallness, or is Plato discussing something 
distinct here? 
Shortly after Plato has introduced this talk of the largeness and smallness in 
Simmias, Plato goes on to distinguish between largeness and smallness themselves 
and the largeness and smallness in us.  At 102d5-103a2, he writes: 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
ontologically distinct entities, one will not be persuaded by the particular argument I offer here against 
these five views. 
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For it seems to me that not only is 
largeness itself never willing to be at 
the same time large and small, but also 
the largeness in us never admits the 
small nor is willing to be overcome, 
but one of two things happens, either 
it flees and retreats whenever its 
opposite, the small, approaches, or it is 
destroyed when that approaches.  But 
it is not willing to be other than what it 
was, enduring and admitting 
smallness, as I, admitting and 
enduring smallness, also am still who I 
am—I this same man am small.  But 
that34, being large, does not venture to 
be small.  In the same way, also the 
small in us is not ever willing to 
become and to be large, nor is any 
other of the opposites willing at the 
same time to become and be its 
opposite while still being what it was, 
but either it goes away or is destroyed 
in such a circumstance. 
 Λέγω δὴ τοῦδ’ ἕνεκα, βουλόµενος δόξαι 
σοὶ ὅπερ ἐµοί. ἐµοὶ γὰρ φαίνεται οὐ 
µόνον αὐτὸ τὸ µέγεθος οὐδέποτ’ 
ἐθέλειν ἅµα µέγα καὶ σµικρὸν εἶναι, 
ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἡµῖν µέγεθος οὐδέποτε 
προσδέχεσθαι τὸ σµικρὸν οὐδ’ ἐθέλειν 
ὑπερέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ δυοῖν τὸ ἕτερον, ἢ 
φεύγειν καὶ ὑπεκχωρεῖν ὅταν αὐτῷ 
προσίῃ τὸ ἐναντίον, τὸ σµικρόν, ἢ 
προσελθόντος ἐκείνου ἀπολωλέναι· 
ὑποµένον δὲ καὶ δεξάµενον τὴν 
σµικρότητα οὐκ ἐθέλειν εἶναι ἕτερον ἢ 
ὅπερ ἦν. ὥσπερ ἐγὼ δεξάµενος καὶ 
ὑποµείνας τὴν σµικρότητα, καὶ ἔτι ὢν 
ὅσπερ εἰµί, οὗτος ὁ αὐτὸς σµικρός εἰµι· 
ἐκεῖνο34 δὲ οὐ τετόλµηκεν µέγα ὂν 
σµικρὸν εἶναι· ὡς δ’ αὕτως καὶ τὸ 
σµικρὸν τὸ ἐν ἡµῖν οὐκ ἐθέλει ποτὲ 
µέγα γίγνεσθαι οὐδὲ εἶναι, οὐδ’ ἄλλο 
οὐδὲν τῶν ἐναντίων, ἔτι ὂν ὅπερ ἦν, 
ἅµα τοὐναντίον γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ εἶναι, 
ἀλλ’ ἤτοι ἀπέρχεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἐν 
τούτῳ τῷ παθήµατι. 
Just after this passage Plato reaffirms the point that “the opposite itself could never 
become opposite to itself, neither that in us nor that in nature” (αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ 
ἐναντίον οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡµῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει) (Phaedo 103b4-5).  
Plato suggests here that the-F-ness-in-nature or the form of F35 “is not opposite-F” and 
                                                
34 The ἐκεῖνο here at 102e5 seems best understood to have the largeness in us as its antecedent instead of 
largeness itself.  From 102d7-ff Plato has been referring to the largeness in us, and if Plato meant to 
refer to largeness itself here it seems he would have made this explicit.  (And he goes on to discuss the 
smallness in us immediately after this, which might also suggest that he means largeness in us here.)  
See Gallop who argues that the ἐκεῖνο here must refer to largeness in us as opposed to the form (Gallop 
1975, 55, 235 n. 69), and also F.C. White 1981, 56 and Nehamas 1973, 474.  G. M. A. Grube, wrongly I 
think, takes the ἐκεῖνο to refer to the form of largeness (Grube 1997, 88).  However, not too much seems 
to hang on this point because what Plato claims here about the largeness in us he also holds concerning 
largeness itself.  At 102d6-7, Plato explicitly claims that largeness itself is never both large and small.  
Based on Plato’s discussion at 74b-ff, for instance, it seems reasonable to assume that Plato thinks 
largeness itself is never both large and small because largeness is large and is not small (at least 
according to some crucial construal of ‘is large’ and ‘is not small’).  So what Plato claims here at 
102e5-6, that largeness in us is large and does not venture to be small, he would also claim about 
largeness itself.  But what he means by these claims is a further question, which I will go on to discuss.   
35 Burnet argues that when Plato refers to the F in nature he must have the form in mind (Burnet 1911, 
117 n. b5).  There are other places where Plato uses this expression to refer to forms:  At Republic 
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the-F-ness-in-us likewise “is not opposite-F”.  We will have to wait to see how exactly 
these claims ought to be understood, but for now it is clear that Plato seems to draw 
some distinction between the forms and things that are in us which correspond to the 
forms.  But what is this distinction supposed to be?  What sort of things are the-F-
nesses-in-us supposed to be and how are they related to the forms themselves?36 
 Many commentators argue that although Plato does seem to distinguish 
between the-F-ness-in-nature and the-F-ness-in-us, he does not intend to introduce 
new ontologically distinct entities.  These commentators urge that the terminology of 
“immanent characters” is misleading because it suggests a commitment to a new class 
of entities distinct from particulars, such as Simmias or a stick, and forms.  When 
Plato distinguishes between the-F-ness-in-nature and the-F-ness-in-us, all he is doing, 
these commentators argue, is drawing a distinction between the forms as they are by 
themselves and the forms as they are related to things that participate in them.  For 
example, Charlotte Stough claims that Plato is merely distinguishing between “the 
Form as such, just by itself (ἐν τῇ φύσει, αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτό) with the Form as it is shared in 
by (related to) some individual, in its manifestation as a characteristic of (say) 
Simmias (ἐν ἡµῖν)” (Stough 1976, 23).  She argues that Plato is not committed to a 
tripartite ontology and is not adding “a third element to an ontology already 
burgeoning with new entities” (Stough 1976, 23, 23 n. 1).  W. C. K. Guthrie likewise 
                                                                                                                                       
597b5-7, the form of bed is the one ἐν τῇ φύσει.  And at Parmenides 132d1-2, Plato suggests that the 
forms are set ἐν τῇ φύσει like παραδείγµατα.  
36 Note that although I focus here on the Phaedo, commentators have suggested passages in other 
Platonic dialogues in which they claim that immanent characters, or these F-nesses-in-us, are discussed.  
One such example is at Parmenides 130b3-4, where Plato claims that likeness itself is distinct from the 
likeness we have.  O’Brien and Daniel Devereux take this passage to make the same distinction 
between forms and immanent characters as we find in the Phaedo (O’Brien 1967, 201 n. 1; Devereux 
2000, 199 n. 13), but Charlotte Stough and W. C. K. Guthrie disagree and do not see immanent 
characters as being referred to here (Stough 1976, 23 n. 33; Guthrie 1975, 354).  In another passage 
shortly after this in the Parmenides at 133c3-134a1, Plato seems to draw a distinction between the 
forms themselves and things corresponding to the forms which are in us.  Other passages in which 
immanent characters may be present include Timaeus 48e-52c and Symposium 210b6-7, although these 
are perhaps controversial.  In this chapter, I focus my attention on the discussion in the Phaedo. 
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argues for the view that the-F-nesses-in-us are “simply the familiar Forms entering 
into particulars” (Guthrie 1975, 353) and that the forms themselves enter into and 
combine with bodies (Guthrie 1975, 355).  Burnet claims that largeness in us is just 
the form “so far as it ‘is present’ in us or we ‘participate’ in it” (Burnet 1911, 116, 
d7).37 
Perhaps the strongest proponent of the view that the-F-nesses-in-us are 
identical to the forms is R. M. Dancy.  Dancy argues that “Socrates does not tell us 
that there is a third layer of entities between the Forms and mundane objects” (Dancy 
2004, 310).  In fact, Dancy argues, “there are no such animals as ‘immanent 
characters’…” (Dancy 1991, 14).  The contrast between the contrary itself ἐν ἡµῖν and 
ἐν τῇ φύσει: 
 
…is not a contrast between two different entities, but between a single 
entity under two different conditions: the contrary itself, the Form 
tallness or whatever it is, as it is by itself and as it is when it bears 
whatever relationship it does to Simmias, Socrates, Phaedo, or 
whoever. (Dancy 2004, 309-10) 
Dancy relies most of all on the passage at 103b7-8, where Plato claims that “now [we 
are speaking] about those things themselves [from] which, when they are in [them], 
the things named get their derived names…” (νῦν δὲ περὶ ἐκείνων αὐτῶν ὧν ἐνόντων ἔχει 
τὴν ἐπωνυµίαν τὰ ὀνοµαζόµενα) (Dancy’s translation in Dancy 1991, 18).  Dancy argues 
that the “things themselves” here that are said to be “present in” particulars “are 
simply the Forms…” (Dancy 2004, 310).38  If the forms themselves are said to be 
                                                
37 There are some commentators who argue that Plato is committed to the view that the-F-nesses-in-us 
are just identical to the forms themselves, but express reservations about the plausibility of such a view.  
Paul Shorey and Dorothy Tarrant are two examples.  Shorey claims that although the talk of τὸ ἐν ἡµῖν 
and τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει “seems to yield three things” (when taken along with particulars), “there are really 
only two things”, form and particular (Shorey 1903, 41 n. 284).  But Shorey goes on to suggest that the 
way in which the form can be in itself and in particulars is a “mystery”.  Tarrant argues that in claiming 
that forms are themselves immanent and in identifying forms with the-F-nesses-in-us, Plato’s resulting 
position is “curious and impossible” (Tarrant 1928, lvi-ii). 
38 The passage at 102b1-2 might be thought to support Dancy’s reading of 103b7-8.  At 102b1-2, when 
Plato is clearly referring to the form themselves (as opposed to the-F-nesses-in-us), he claims that 
“other things get their derived names by sharing (µεταλαµβάνοντα) in these things themselves (αὐτῶν 
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present in particulars, then they are the-F-nesses-in-us, and we do not have good 
reason to attribute distinct immanent entities to Plato here. 
But here Dancy simply begs the question.  Dancy provides no evidence for the 
claim that ‘ἐκείνων αὐτῶν’ must refer to forms themselves rather than the-F-nesses-in-
us, and the text is somewhat ambiguous.  In fact, it seems likely that Plato is using 
‘ἐκείνων αὐτῶν’ here to refer to the important entities that he has just distinguished in 
the previous sentence, the-F-nesses-in-us (Phaedo 103b4-5).  Now it could be argued 
by Dancy that even if ‘ἐκείνων αὐτῶν’ refers to the-F-nesses-in-us, these are just the 
forms themselves—but some independent argument is required here.  For, of course, 
this is the question at hand.  To be sure, I have not provided a definitive argument here 
showing that Dancy is incorrect, my point is only that the main evidence he provides 
is not enough to support his view that there are no immanent characters as distinct 
“animals” from the very forms themselves.39 
 How are we to decide if these commentators are correct in their claim that the-
F-nesses-in-us are not meant to be new entities distinct from the forms?  A common 
criticism of the identification of the-F-nesses-in-us with the forms is that Plato 
suggests that the-F-nesses-in-us are perishable, and yet the forms are clearly 
                                                                                                                                       
τούτων)”.  Perhaps this suggests that in the similar claim at 103b7-8, Plato is suggesting that things get 
their names by having the forms themselves present in them.  But note the switch from “sharing in” at 
102b1-2 to “being present in” at 103b7-8.  Plato’s point seems to be that sharing in forms is one way of 
specifying the account of how things get their names, and yet another is the presence of form-
particularizations in them.  The use of the different participles in the two claims may go hand in hand 
with the reference to distinct entities. 
39 O’Brien is often considered to be another proponent of the view that immanent characters are just 
identical to the forms, when they are in things.  For instance, see Gallop 1975, 195, and Fine 2003, 306 
n. 7, who both cite O’Brien as holding this view.  But in fact, while O’Brien does reject a tripartite 
ontology, he seems to do so by placing immanent characters together with particulars, and not by 
identifying immanent characters with forms.  He does seem to hold that forms and immanent characters 
are distinct sorts of entities.  For instance, see 201, where O’Brien argues that immanent characters are 
not distinct from what he calls “particularizations of forms” (O’Brien 1967, 201), but this is different 
from the claim that immanent characters are not distinct from forms.  He gives Simmias as an example 
of a particularization of a form.  In his view, immanent characters are “particularizations of forms” just 
like those things which we would normally consider to be particulars, but they are quite distinct from 
forms.    
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imperishable.  Plato suggests that the-F-nesses-in-us are capable of going away or of 
being destroyed (102d9-e2, 103a1-2, 103d5-12, 104b6-c3).4041  Since (at least in some 
cases42) the-F-nesses-in-us are capable of being destroyed and the forms are not, the-
F-nesses-in-us must be distinct from forms.43 
Now if the-F-nesses-in-us are perishable and the forms are not, this may be 
enough to establish that the-F-nesses-in-us are not identical to forms as a whole—the-
largeness-in-Simmias is not simply identical to the form of largeness as a whole.  But 
is this alone sufficient to establish that the-F-nesses-in-us are new entities that are 
completely ontologically distinct from forms?  I do not think so.  This is the case 
                                                
40 Note that while the first two instances are clearly about the-F-nesses-in-us, the latter two cases are 
controversial.  In these passages it seems that Plato may be referring to particulars that have immanent 
characters in them, rather than to the immanent characters themselves. 
41 Some commentators argue that although Plato notes that the-F-nesses-in-us might withdraw or perish, 
he is only listing logical or abstract possibilities and does not believe that the-F-nesses-in-us are in fact 
capable of perishing.  On this suggestion, see Guthrie 1975, 354 n. 1 and Dancy 2004, 310.  But this 
seems like an unlikely suggestion.  Devereux presents a nice argument for the claim that immanent 
characters are indeed perishable (Devereux 2000, 197-9), which goes roughly as follows: Plato argues 
that fire is such that it always brings with it hotness.  Wherever there is fire, it will always have hotness 
in it (Phaedo 106b6-7).  He claims that if the hotness were indestructible, then fire and its hotness 
would always withdraw at the approach of the cold (Phaedo 106b7-c7).  However, fires are obviously 
often extinguished, and while they will never admit the cold, they are not indestructible.  Fires are 
extinguishable and destructible because the hotness in them is itself perishable and destructible. 
42 I think it is correct that Plato distinguishes immanent characters from forms and holds that they are, in 
general, perishable.  But not all immanent characters will be perishable.  In particular, it would seem 
that Plato’s point is that the-life-in-Socrates’-soul is an immanent character that is not perishable, and 
renders Socrates’ soul imperishable.  Also, if Plato allows that forms can themselves have immanent 
characters, which I think he does, then those will be other examples of imperishable immanent 
characters, since forms cannot lose their immanent characters. 
43 Many commentators have relied on the perishability of immanent characters to distinguish them from 
forms.  Robert Turnbull claims that “Socrates’ taking for granted the possibility of a character’s 
perishing is quite enough to show that characters and forms cannot be considered as identical in the 
Phaedo” (Turnbull 1958, 131-2).  R. S. Bluck argues that “the alternative ‘perish or withdraw’ could 
hardly apply to Forms themselves, which cannot move or change, still less perish” (Bluck 1955, 17).  
Devereux focuses on the perishability of immanent characters to distinguish them from forms 
(Devereux 2000, 197-9, 201 n. 18, 202).  David Keyt argues that “the form in nature is indestructible 
(ἀνώλεθρον, Tim. 52a2); but many immanent forms are not…” (Keyt 1963, 168).  Keyt adds that the 
“crushing objection” to one who identifies forms with immanent characters is that forms cannot have a 
“perishable aspect”, which they would have according to this identification (Keyt 1963, 169 n. 1).  
Raphael Demos claims that unlike immanent characters or what he calls “empirical forms”, “ideal 
forms not only do not change, they do not become or perish either: thus they have no temporal being 
whatever” (Demos 1948, 458).  Job van Eck argues that the-F-nesses-in-us and the forms are distinct 
because, for example, the beauty in Miriam can be destroyed but beauty itself cannot be (Eck 2008, 120 
n. 15).  Also see McPherran 1988, 536, 543; Kenneth Dorter 1982, 142; and John Brentlinger 1972, 68.    
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because, as some commentators have argued, the-F-nesses-in-us might be perishable 
parts of forms.44  According to such a view, the-F-nesses-in-us are not simply 
identical to forms as a whole, but they are not exactly distinct from forms either.  In 
“Immanence”, Fine argues for such a position.  The view she defends there is that the-
F-nesses-in-us or immanent characters are perishable parts of forms that come into and 
go out of existence (Fine 2003, 308).  Fine claims that “since each form consists in an 
infinite nondepletable amount of stuff, gaining or losing a part makes no real 
difference” (Fine 2003, 308).  Forms still remain unchanging in the relevant ways that 
are important to Plato, even when they gain or lose parts.  Fine argues that when Plato 
asserts that forms are unchanging, he only means that “forms cannot change in any 
way that would jeopardize their remaining the very forms they are…” (Fine 2003, 
308).  Gaining or losing perishable parts does not jeopardize their remaining the forms 
that they are, and so Plato allows that forms are changeable in this way.  The view of 
immanent characters as parts of forms is consistent with the claim that immanent 
characters are perishable and forms are not.  So the perishability of immanent 
characters does not in fact show that they are completely ontologically distinct from 
forms—for all we have seen, immanent characters might be parts of forms. 
 There are other commentators who also attribute to Plato the view that 
immanent characters are parts of forms, but they go on to criticize Plato for holding 
such a view.  David Scarrow argues that “there is no reason for not reading Plato 
grossly and literally and taking him to mean that things which participate in a Form 
each have a piece of it as people who participate in a pie each have a piece of it” 
(Scarrow 1961, 251).  Since a form does not perish when its pieces perish, the form 
“must be conceived of as an inexhaustible reservoir of such pieces” (Scarrow 1961, 
                                                
44 W. J. Verdenius appears to be an example of one who holds such a view, but what he says is unclear.  
He writes that “in the present passage τὸ ἐν ἡµῖν ἐναντίον is part of αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον” and that there is 
an immanent “aspect” of the forms (Verdenius 1958, 232-3).  
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251).  Scarrow favors the view that, “in the Phaedo Plato conceived of participation in 
the thing-like manner of one thing possessing a part of another…” (Scarrow 1961, 
252).  David Bostock also attributes such a view to Plato.  Bostock “fears” that Plato is 
committed to the view that when someone participates in a form, “some chunk of the 
form is lodged within him” (Bostock 1986, 182).  He goes on to suggest that the view 
is “totally absurd” and “easy to make fun of” and that it is “simply a muddle” 
(Bostock 1986, 182-3).  Still he attributes the view to Plato that immanent characters 
are parts of forms in this “absurd” way. 
 Could it be correct to claim that Plato sees immanent characters as perishable 
parts of imperishable forms?  And if this is Plato’s view of immanent characters, 
would the view necessarily be as absurd as Bostock suggests?  In fact, I think we have 
good reason to hold that immanent characters are entirely ontologically distinct from 
forms, and are not identical to forms as a whole or as parts.  The reasons for 
distinguishing immanent characters from forms or form-parts are (a) the immutability 
of forms and (b) the imperceivability of forms.  As I noted above, Fine argues that, for 
Plato, forms can change by gaining and losing parts, and they must only remain 
unchanging insofar as they remain the very forms that they are.  But in fact, I do not 
think that Plato allows forms to be changing by gaining and losing parts.  In the 
Phaedo, Plato emphasizes the immutability of forms.  At 78d3-7, Plato argues that 
forms never admit of any change whatsoever (µή ποτε µεταβολὴν καὶ ἡντινοῦν ἐνδέχεται), 
that they remain the same according to the same things (ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχει), and 
that they never in any way at all admit of any change (οὐδέποτε οὐδαµῇ οὐδαµῶς 
ἀλλοίωσιν οὐδεµίαν ἐνδέχεται).  More specifically, in the Symposium at 211b2-5, Plato 
makes it explicit that forms are not changed when their participants come to be or pass 
away: 
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All the other beautifuls share in that 
[namely, the form of beauty] in some 
way of this sort, that when the others 
come to be or pass away, that becomes 
in no way at all greater or smaller nor 
is it affected in any way. 
 τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα καλὰ ἐκείνου 
µετέχοντα τρόπον τινὰ τοιοῦτον, οἷον 
γιγνοµένων τε τῶν ἄλλων καὶ 
ἀπολλυµένων µηδὲν ἐκεῖνο µήτε τι 
πλέον µήτε ἔλαττον γίγνεσθαι µηδὲ 
πάσχειν µηδέν. 
Since, according to the view of immanent characters as parts of forms, forms would be 
composed of an inexhaustible amount of parts, perhaps it is consistent with the view 
for forms not to become at all greater or smaller with the gaining or losing of parts.  
But Plato adds here that forms are not affected in any way when their participants 
come to be or perish.  But if immanent characters were parts of forms, it at least seems 
that forms would be affected in some intrinsic way when their participants came to be 
or perished, because the forms would gain or lose perishable parts.  According to this 
view, at one moment the form of largeness would have a part located in Simmias, and 
at another moment, at the death of Simmias for instance, this very part of the form 
would no longer exist.  This would seem to be a real change for the form to undergo at 
the perishing of its participant, which Plato explicitly rules out in this passage in the 
Symposium.  Because Plato is so emphatic in claiming that forms must be completely 
immutable and cannot be changed in any way at the coming to be or perishing of 
participants, it seems that he did not see immanent characters as perishable parts of 
forms. 
 There is also another reason why it seems we ought not to identify immanent 
characters as parts of forms for Plato, and this deals with the imperceivability of 
forms.  As I argued in the previous chapter, Plato is emphatic in holding that forms are 
completely imperceivable.  In the Phaedo itself, Plato argues that there is no way 
(οὐδαµῶς) in which one can see the forms with one’s eyes (Phaedo 65d9-10) and that 
the forms are never grasped by any of the senses (Phaedo 65d11-2).  He claims that it 
is possible to grasp forms only through reasoning, and he adds that forms are not 
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visible but are invisible (ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ἀιδῆ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ οὐχ ὁρατά) (Phaedo 79a2-4).  In 
the Republic, Plato claims that forms are intelligible but not visible (ὁρᾶσθαι δ’ οὔ) 
(Republic 507d8-10), invisible (τὸ ἀόρατον) (Republic 529b5), and only graspable 
without all sense perceptions (ἄνευ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων) (Republic 532a5-b2).  
Although he often focuses on the sense of sight, it is clear that Plato thinks forms 
cannot be perceived at all by any of the senses.  But, as some commentators have 
noted, it seems that (at least some) immanent characters will be perceivable.45  In 
“Participants and Particularizations in the Phaedo”, Mark McPherran gives as 
examples of immanent characters the “sensible equalities in equal things” (McPherran 
1984, 31, my emphasis).  Later in the paper, he argues that “forms have different 
properties from immanent characters”, because for instance, the form of beauty is 
invisible while the immanent characters of beauty are “apprehensible by the senses” 
(McPherran 1984, 34-5).  He seems to suggest here that all immanent characters, as 
opposed to forms, are perceivable.  However, perhaps he just means that in the case of 
                                                
45 Verdenius, who seems to hold that immanent characters are parts of forms, argues that “a direct 
apprehension of the Forms is facilitated by their being present in a sense in the visible world” 
(Verdenius 1958, 233).  He seems to suggest that immanent characters (which he mistakenly, I think, 
identifies with form-parts) are present in the visible world and so are perceivable.  Bluck refers to 
immanent characters, which he calls form-copies, as “phenomenal instances” of forms (Bluck 1956, 
34).  Bluck also claims that immanent characters are “copies of Forms that inhere in sensible objects” 
and that a form-copy “appears in this world of sense” (Bluck 1955, 17-8).  And Bluck asserts that form-
copies which are “in us” are “sensible qualities that represent [forms]” (Bluck 1955, 118).  F. M. 
Cornford appears to refer to immanent characters of equality as instances of equality in sensible things 
and in our perceptions (Cornford 1957, 75).  Owen discusses Aristotle’s argument in the Topics 
113a24-32 that if forms exist in us “they will also be perceptible, since the form in the individual is 
recognized by means of sight” (Owen 1986, 226).  What Aristotle claims is that contraries would be 
true of forms if they were to exist in us—since a form existing in us would be in motion as well as at 
rest, and perceivable as well as thinkable.  If forms exist in us, Aristotle argues, they will be visible, 
because we recognize forms present in things through sight (Topics 113a24-32).  This suggests that F-
nesses-in-us (as opposed to Platonic forms) are themselves moveable and perceivable.  Demos refers to 
immanent characters as “phenomenal forms found in sense-experience…which are immanent, visible 
and concrete”, and he suggests that the perception of them stimulates recollection (Demos 1948, 456).  
He claims that immanent characters, which he refers to as “phenomenal forms”, are “concrete and 
perceptible” (Demos 1948, 457).  All of these commentators appear to suggest that all immanent 
characters are perceivable, which seems incorrect, as I will argue.             
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equality and beauty the immanent characters are all perceivable.46  McPherran is more 
careful in another paper, “Plato’s Particulars”, to point out that immanent characters 
are “possessed by particulars and constitute their sensible and non-sensible 
characteristics…” (McPherran 1988, 536, my emphasis).  Here he asserts correctly, I 
think, that not all immanent characters will be sensible.  Daniel Devereux claims that 
“many immanent characters can be perceived by the senses” (Devereux 2000, 202, my 
emphasis).  As Devereux argues, it is possible to see the largeness in Simmias and to 
feel the heat in the fire (Devereux 2000, 202).  The-hotness-in-that-fire appears to be a 
perfect example of an immanent character that can be felt by the sense of touch.  But 
an immanent character such as the-justice-in-that-law seems to be one that is not 
perceived by the senses.  McPherran and Devereux seem to be correct in the claim that 
some but not all immanent characters are perceivable.  But if even some immanent 
characters are perceivable, then immanent characters cannot be identical to parts of 
forms, since then at least some forms would have some perceivable parts.  But Plato 
does not allow forms to have perceivable parts—they must be completely 
imperceptible. 
 Because Plato appears to hold that many immanent characters are changeable 
(insofar as they are perishable and perhaps moveable) and perceivable, we ought not 
to think that he identified them with forms or form-parts, since forms must be entirely 
unchanging and imperceivable.  Plato’s view seems to be that immanent characters are 
completely ontologically distinct from forms.  Many scholars have held that immanent 
characters are additional entities in Plato’s ontology.47  From what I have argued, I 
                                                
46 Note that even this more reserved claim appears to be false, as it seems that, for instance, the-beauty-
in-the-form-of-the-good or the-beauty-in-the-form-of-beauty would be instances of immanent 
characters that are not perceivable.  And there seem to be non-forms which possess beauty that is not 
perceivable.  For instance, the-beauty-in-that-law may be an example of an immanent character of 
beauty that is not perceivable. 
47 There are numerous scholars who adopt this ontological distinction with little or no argument.  For 
instance, see R. Hackforth 1955, 143-4, 149 n. 4; Vlastos 1981, 83, 83 n. 19, 84, 85 n. 27; Ross 1951, 
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think they are correct that immanent characters are in fact completely distinct from 
forms—the-largeness-in-us for example is completely distinct from the form of 
largeness.  But if immanent characters are not identical to forms or form-parts, how 
ought we to understand them?  I have already discussed the perishability and 
perceivability of at least many immanent characters.  Yet another important feature of 
immanent characters seems to be their “particularity”.  Plato not only refers to the-F-
ness-in-us in general but also refers to the particular largeness-in-Simmias.  This 
makes it seem that an immanent character is the sort of thing that is located in only 
one place at a time, in the thing of which it is an immanent character.  R. S. Bluck 
refers to a specific immanent character as a “particular manifestation” of a form 
(Bluck 1955, 18).  F. M. Cornford discusses “the particular instance of shortness 
which is in Simmias…” (Cornford 1957, 79).  McPherran argues that an immanent 
character is “one particularization out of many of the Form participated in, and whose 
existence depends upon that particular so participating…” (McPherran 1988, 534).  
Job van Eck asserts that when two objects x and y are both F and participate in the 
form of F, “the F-ness x has as a result, the F-ness ‘in x’, and the F-ness y has are two 
different items” (Eck 2008, 119).  As Devereux argues in “Separation and Immanence 
in Plato’s Theory of Forms”: 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
30-1; Gallop 1975, 195-6; Silverman 2002, 18, 21, 102, 313 n. 10; Mohan Matthen 1982, 90, and 
Matthen 1984, 281; Fujisawa 1974, 45, 45 n. 42; Dorothea Frede 1978, 28; Nehamas 1973, 475, 477; 
Rist 1964, 30; and F.C. White 1981, 3, 43, 48, 56, 136-7, 141, 147.  Other scholars provide some 
argument for the distinction: Bluck is more reserved in one paper to claim that the ontological status of 
immanent characters “is left very uncertain” (Bluck 1957, 123), but elsewhere he confidently asserts 
that they are distinct entities which he refers to as form-copies and particular manifestations of forms 
(Bluck 1959, 6, 8; Bluck 1956, 33-4; and Bluck 1955, 17-8, 118).  Also see Cornford 1957, 75-80; 
Dorter 1982, 142; Turnbull 1958, 131-2; Keyt 1963, 168, 169 n. 1; and Brentlinger 1972, 68.  And there 
is more extensive argumentation for the view in the following: Demos 1948, 456-8; Devereux 2000, 
197-9, 201 n. 18, 202-3, 205, 216; McPherran 1984, 31-5, and McPherran 1988, 533-6, 543; and Eck 
2008, 119, 120 n. 15.              
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Socrates’ use of the expression ‘the largeness in Simmias’ suggests that 
there are distinct immanent characters in different objects; 
corresponding to the single Form largeness, there will be many 
immanent characters of largeness—as many as there are participants in 
the Form of largeness. (Devereux 2000, 202)   
And Devereux makes a similar point later when he argues that immanent characters 
are not a “one in many” because they are in only one thing (Devereux 2000, 214).  
These commentators appear to be right about the particularity of immanent characters, 
based on Plato’s distinction between different largenesses in this or that large thing.  
Plato seems to hold that there is a distinct immanent character of the form of F in 
every F thing. 
 But even if immanent characters are (for the most part) perishable and 
perceivable, and have particularity, we still do not have a very clear picture of their 
exact nature.  The most plausible view of immanent characters, given these properties 
attributed to them by Plato, seems to be that they are what I will call “form-
particularizations”, which are property-instances or tropes.  This is the view preferred 
by David Gallop, who refers to immanent characters as “individual instances” of a 
form and as the “property-instances” of a form (Gallop 1975, 195-6).  Silverman 
repeatedly refers to immanent characters as “property-instances” and “tropes” 
(Silverman 2002, 18, 102, 313 n. 10)  And Nehamas’ favored interpretation is that the 
relation between immanent characters and their corresponding form is “the relation 
obtaining between tokens and type” (Nehamas 1973, 477).  He explains that “to 
participate in a universal, a particular would have to possess a property which was a 
token of the type possessed by all similarly qualified particulars” (Nehamas 1973, 
477).  I think there remains a difficult question of what exactly the nature of the 
relation between a type and its tokens is, and for Plato, what exactly the nature of the 
relation is supposed to be between form and its corresponding immanent characters.  
For our present purposes, it is sufficient to recognize that the-F-nesses-in-us are 
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property-instances that are present in each F particular.  All of the-F-nesses-in-us will 
be related to the form of F in some special way in which they are not related to the 
form of G, but for now we can leave the specific nature of that relation 
undetermined.48  For now, it is enough that we have established that immanent 
characters have a particularity such that each is located in a distinct particular.  For 
Plato, in every large thing, there is a distinct largeness-particularization.   
 
 
III. A Requirement on Adequate Interpretations 
 
 Now that we have a better understanding of what Plato means by the-F-nesses-
in-us, we will be able to gain insight into his views on the self-predication of forms.  
We can do this by looking at what Plato asserts about immanent characters in the 
Phaedo, and the accompanying apparent statements of the self-predication of forms.  
In “Self-Predication in Plato’s Middle Dialogues”, Heinaman argues that given 
evidence drawn from Plato’s text, there are four requirements that any adequate 
interpretation of apparent statements of self-predication must satisfy.  Here I will focus 
on the second of these requirements, which deals with immanent characters, and 
which Heinaman calls “the B-requirement”.  He generalizes the requirement in the 
following way (Heinaman 1989, 61): 
 
[I]n statements of the form 
 (B) the F-ness in a (a sensible object) is F 
the predicate ‘is F’ must apply to the immanent character in precisely 
the same way that the predicate ‘is F’ applies to its subject in  
(B3) F-ness is F. 
                                                
48 In Chapter Five, I discuss the exact relation which I think Plato believes holds between a form and its 
corresponding form-particularizations.  I argue that his preferred interpretation is that there is a 
resemblance relation between the form of F and the-F-nesses-in-us, and I discuss exactly what this 
resemblance relation may consist in.  It must be admitted, however, that Plato is not very explicit about 
the exact nature of this relation, especially in the Phaedo.   
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Heinaman’s point is that it is a requirement on a suitable interpretation of Plato’s 
apparent statements of self-predication that the interpretation can consistently be 
applied to similar statements involving immanent characters.  If an interpretation of 
apparent statements of self-predication of forms does not work when applied to the 
statements involving immanent characters, then that interpretation of apparent 
statements of self-predication ought not to be attributed to Plato. 
 But what is the argument for the claim that Plato is indeed committed to the B-
requirement, and what exactly does this requirement entail?  What does it mean to say 
that a predicate must apply to an immanent character “in precisely the same way” that 
it applies to a form?  Let us look at the argument for the B-requirement, and perhaps 
that will shed light on what it means to say that predicates must apply in “the same 
way” to immanent characters and their corresponding forms. 
As we have already seen, at Phaedo 102d6-7, Plato suggests that the form of 
largeness “is not both large and small” (αὐτὸ τὸ µέγεθος οὐδέποτ’ ἐθέλειν ἅµα µέγα καὶ 
σµικρὸν εἶναι).  Immediately after this Plato adds that also the-largeness-in-us “is not 
small” (καὶ τὸ ἐν ἡµῖν µέγεθος οὐδέποτε προσδέχεσθαι τὸ σµικρὸν) (Phaedo 102d7-8).  
Now, Plato believes that both of these claims are true because of his commitment to 
the following claims (although note that how these claims ought to be interpreted is 
still an open question): 
 
(B1) The form of largeness is large and is not small.  
(B2) The-largeness-in-us is large and is not small. 
Plato makes (B2) explicit at 102e5-6 (ἐκεῖνο δὲ οὐ τετόλµηκεν µέγα ὂν σµικρὸν εἶναι).  In 
the case of the form of largeness, Plato does not make the positive claim explicit here, 
although he suggests that the form of largeness “is not small” (Phaedo 103b4-5, and 
see Phaedo 74c1-2).  But it is certainly not a stretch to see this as implied in the 
43 
passage.49  R. Hackforth claims that the fact that the form of F and the-F-ness-in-us 
“are both F” is “evident from 102d6-8” (Hackforth 1955, 153), the very passage in 
which Plato asserts that the form of largeness “is not both large and small” and the-
largeness-in-us “is not small”.  Underlying these claims is the view that both the form 
and the immanent character “are large and are not small”.  If Plato holds (B1), that 
“the form of largeness is large and is not small”, and wants his claim to avoid being 
highly misleading, then as Heinaman puts it, the ‘is large’ and ‘is not small’ must both 
apply in “the same way” to the subject, the form of largeness.  Likewise, in (B2), the 
statement “the-largeness-in-us is large and is not small”, the predicates should both 
apply to the-largeness-in-us in “the same way”.  For instance, we should not take Plato 
to be asserting by (B2) that the-largeness-in-us is identical to largeness and is not 
characterized by smallness.  For now, let us remain silent about exactly what the 
“way” is that Plato does intend. 
 Now at Phaedo 103b4-5, Plato’s claim, as applied to the case of largeness, is: 
(B3) The form of largeness and the-largeness-in-us are not small. 
The general claim applied to the case of largeness is presented as follows: “‘The large 
is not small’ is true of both the-largeness-in-us and the form of largeness” (αὐτὸ τὸ 
ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡµῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει) (Phaedo 
103b4-5).  A reasonable restriction on what Plato could plausibly intend here seems to 
be that the predicate ‘is not small’ is applied to both subjects “in precisely the same 
way”.  So ‘is not small’ is applied to the form of largeness in “the same way” as it is 
applied to the-largeness-in-us.  And from (B1) of the previous step of our argument, 
                                                
49 And Plato does appear to make the positive assertion that the form of equality “is equal” at 74d5-7, 
and intends what he says here to be generalized to all forms (Phaedo 75c7-d4).  This is right after he 
has relied on the claim within the argument at 74b7-c6 that the form of equality “is not unequal”.  So 
Plato is committed in this passage to the view that the form of equality “is equal and is not unequal”, 
and more generally that the form of F “is F and is not opposite-F”.  So in our case here, he holds that the 
form of largeness “is large and is not small”.  For more on these points, see Chapter Six on the 74b7-c6 
argument.   
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‘is not small’ is applied to the form of largeness in “the same way” as ‘is large’ is 
applied to it.  Likewise, from (B2), ‘is not small’ is applied to the-largeness-in-us in 
precisely “the same way” as ‘is large’ is applied to it.  What follows is that since, from 
(B3), ‘is not small’ is applied in “the same way” to both the form and the immanent 
character, then ‘is large’ is also applied in “the same way” to both.  Plato is committed 
to the following claim, with the predicate applied in “the same way” to both subjects: 
(B4) The form of largeness and the-largeness-in-us are large. 
So Plato is committed to the B-requirement, at least in this passage of the Phaedo, that 
the predicate ‘is F’ applies in precisely “the same way” to both the form of F and the-
F-ness-in-x.  It seems reasonable to conclude then that, in the claims “the form of F is 
F” and “the-F-ness-in-x is F”, claims to which Plato appears committed in this passage 
(although the precise correct interpretation of these claims has yet to be established), 
Plato intends ‘is F’ to apply in “the same way” to both subjects.   
 But what exactly does Heinaman mean, or ought he to mean, when he claims 
that Plato intends the predicate to apply in “the same way” to form and immanent 
character?  Unfortunately, Heinaman is not very clear about exactly what he means by 
this.  He suggests that in a statement such as “The F would never become opposite-F, 
neither that in us nor that in nature” (Phaedo 103b4-5), there is “a certain type of 
situation” and “the same type of state of affairs” that is being said to be impossible for 
both the-F-ness-in-us and the-F-ness-in-nature (Heinaman 1989, 60).  A statement of 
this form “cannot be ruling out two radically different types of situation for the two 
subjects” (Heinaman 1989, 60).  Heinaman makes his point a bit clearer when he 
writes that Plato “cannot mean that in one case the opposite does not become identical 
with its opposite and in the other case it does not become characterized by its 
opposite” (Heinaman 1989, 60).  So when Heinaman refers to a predicate applying in 
the same way to two subjects, he has in mind that ‘is’ is not used for a predication in 
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one instance and for an identity in the other.  What Heinaman does not mean, and 
ought not to mean, is that in a statement like this one and in a statement such as “x and 
y are both F”, if ‘is’ is being used predicatively, both x and y must be F in the same 
way.  For instance, there is nothing misleading in the statements “Salmon and trout are 
fish” and “The Grand Canyon and Mozart’s Requiem are beautiful”, even though the 
subjects are characterized by the predicates in different ways.  Salmon and trout are 
not fish in precisely the same way, nor are the Grand Canyon and Mozart’s Requiem 
beautiful in precisely the same way.  But there is nothing wrong or misleading with 
these statements.  Although he does not make it entirely clear, all that Heinaman 
seems to mean is that the ‘is’ in these statements must be being used in the same way 
as applied to both subjects.  For instance, it would be misleading to assert that 
“Neither Volvo nor Korean are Japanese”, where what is meant is that Volvo is not a 
Japanese automaker and ‘Korean’ and ‘Japanese’ are not identical.  In these sorts of 
statements, there ought to be the same use of ‘is’ as applied to both subjects. 
But I think Heinaman could have gone a bit further here.  For these statements 
to avoid being highly misleading, not only must the use of ‘is’ be the same, but if ‘is’ 
is being used predicatively, the predicate ‘F’ must have the same sense as applied to 
both subjects.50  For instance, it would be very misleading to claim that “Wachovia 
and La Rive Gauche are banks”, where what you mean is that Wachovia is a financial 
institution and La Rive Gauche is a slope of land beside a river.  In statements of this 
kind, not only must ‘is’ be used in the same way, but the predicate must also have the 
same sense.51  The same could be said in a case in which ‘is’ is being used consistently 
                                                
50 Perhaps Heinaman has this in mind when he claims that the predicate should be taken to ascribe “the 
same property” to the subjects (Heinaman 1989, 65). 
51 It must be admitted that in special metalinguistic contexts, a statement might involve a different sense 
of the predicate (or use of ‘is’) as applied to different subjects, without the statement being at all 
misleading.  For instance, one might nonproblematically say: “‘Bank’ is an ambiguous term having two 
senses: for instance, Wachovia and La Rive Gauche are both banks.”  However, we can reasonably 
suppose that Plato’s statements throughout Phaedo 102d-103c do not involve an intrasentential shift in 
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to express an identity.  In identities of the form “x and y are (identical to) F” or “F is 
(identical to) x and y”, the sense of ‘F’ must remain consistent in order to avoid 
confusion.  For instance, it would be very misleading to claim that “John and Steven 
are the brightest students in my class”, where what is meant is that John is the student 
with the lightest colored shirts and Steven is the most intelligent.  Similarly, it would 
be very confusing to claim that “Earth is the third planet from the Sun and dirt”, where 
what you mean is that the third planet from the sun is identical to Planet Earth and 
‘dirt’ is identical to ‘earth’.  As stated, the sentence seems to mean that our planet is 
identical to dirt, which we are supposing was not the intention.  So in order to avoid 
being unbelievably confusing, statements like these should involve the same use of ‘is’ 
to express either predications or identities (or perhaps some other use of ‘is’), and 
however ‘is’ is being used, the sense of ‘F’ should remain the same. 
 So, unless Plato is being very misleading in his language throughout this 
passage of the Phaedo from 102d-103c, we should interpret his claims such that they 
do not involve this immediate intrasentential shift in the use of ‘is’ or in the sense of 
the predicate.  Throughout this passage, Plato appears committed to the underlying 
claim that “the form of F and the-F-ness-in-x are both F”.  At least in this passage, it 
seems we should take Plato to intend either a predication or an identity (or perhaps 
some further use of ‘is’), and the same sense of ‘F’, as applied to both subjects. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
the sense of the predicate or the use of ‘is’, because there is no indication here of any such 
metalinguistic context.     
47 
IV. Applying the Requirement 
 
 With the B-requirement (and the nature of immanent characters) having been 
established and clarified, we are equipped with a useful tool for evaluating different 
interpretations of Plato’s apparent statements of the self-predication of forms.  
Commentators have suggested many different ways of understanding Plato’s 
commitment to the view that “any form of F is F”.  Since Plato seems committed to 
the B-requirement in our passage of the Phaedo, if an interpretation of the view that 
“any form of F is F” is to be consistent with this passage, it should involve a reading 
that also works in the case of immanent characters.  We are now ready to examine the 
following views: the Tautologous Identity view (derived from Allen and Cherniss), 
two different Non-Tautologous Identity views (one derived from Mills and one 
derived from Nehamas), Vlastos’ Pauline Predication view, and Peterson’s Pauline 
Predication view according to the “conservative reinterpretation”.  I will treat each in 
turn and show that we have reason to doubt that these views are correct interpretations 
of Plato’s general commitment in the Phaedo to the view that “any form of F is F”, on 
the grounds that they seem inconsistent with the evidence from the Phaedo.  In all of 
these cases, since the interpretation appears to be false when applied to immanent 
characters or form-particularizations, we have reason to hold that it is not a correct 
interpretation of what Plato intends in the Phaedo by his general claims as applied to 
all forms.  This is the case because the B-requirement necessitates that the same 
interpretation be applicable to forms and to form-particularizations. 
 The first view I will consider is what I call the Tautologous Identity view (TI), 
which is derived from a more extreme and more implausible view held by Allen and 
Cherniss.  TI is the view that Plato intends his general commitment to the view that 
“any form of F is F” to be understood as an expression of a tautologous identity.  In 
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other words, what Plato means is just that “any form of F is identical to the form of F”.  
Allen claims that “F-ness is F” states an identity where ‘F’ is used as “a synonym of 
‘the F Itself’ and ‘F-ness’” (Allen 1965, 46).  The statement “F-ness is F” really just 
means “F-ness is F-ness”.  So when Plato suggests that “the form of equality is equal” 
and “the form of largeness is large” and suggests that these claims ought to be 
generalized to all forms, all Plato means to express is that every form is self-identical, 
identical to the form that it is. 
Now the particular view of Allen and Cherniss is in fact more extreme than TI.  
They hold that not only does Plato intend his general commitment in this way, but 
Plato never intends any apparent statement of self-predication to be understood as a 
genuine predication.  According to them, Plato never claims that “the form of F is F” 
where he means that the form of F is an F thing.  For Plato, they argue, no form of F is 
an F thing.  For instance, Allen argues: 
 
[T]o say that F-ness is F is to state an identity….  In the first place, ‘F-
ness is F’ is not a predicative statement.  Second, we cannot mean by it 
what we mean when we say that a particular is F. (Allen 1965, 46, my 
emphasis) 
Cherniss similarly claims that Plato distinguishes two “meanings” of ‘is x’, that of 
predication and of identity, and Plato “assumes that whatever ‘is x’ in one sense is not 
x in the other” (Cherniss 1965, 370), and that “the idea of x, since it is identical with x, 
cannot have x as a character or property…” (Cherniss 1965, 372, my emphasis).  So 
Allen and Cherniss hold the extreme view that no form of F is an F thing, or what 
might be called universal non-SP.52 
 Now the extreme universal non-SP view of Allen and Cherniss is quite 
implausible and it is fairly easy to see that it ought not to be attributed to Plato.  And 
this is the case because Plato is clearly committed to the view that at least for some 
                                                
52 Malcolm notes that Allen and Cherniss do not allow for exceptions.  For instance, they do not allow 
that the form of beauty is itself a beautiful thing (Malcolm 1991, 195 n. 11). 
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forms, the form of F is an F thing.53  As Vlastos points out, Plato would find it 
“absolutely unacceptable” for the form of unity not to have unity (Vlastos 1981, 337).  
And likewise it would be mandatory for all of the following forms to genuinely self-
predicate: rest, being, sameness, difference, immutability, intelligibility, and 
incorporeality (Vlastos 1981, 337).  In short, there are certain “formal properties” that 
Plato tells us all forms have, and so the forms of these formal properties must 
necessarily self-predicate.  Plato is committed to the view that, in the case of any form 
of a formal property, the form of F is indeed an F thing.  For instance, since all forms 
are beings, the form of being is itself a being.  Since Plato thinks that there are 
properties common to all forms and that forms exist which corresponding to at least 
some of these properties, he must reject the universal non-SP of Allen and Cherniss. 
 But this does not show that TI is mistaken.  TI is a more plausible view in that 
it allows for there to be some exceptional cases in which the form of F is an F thing.  
What TI says is that Plato’s general commitment to the claim that “any form of F is F” 
ought to be understood as expressing tautologous identities in the case of all forms.  TI 
holds that Plato means to express that “any form of F is identical to the form of F”, 
and that Plato is not committed to a genuine self-predication assumption for all forms, 
although there may be some exceptional cases of genuine self-predication. 
How are we to assess the plausibility of the less extreme TI view?  As might be 
expected, we can do so by a consideration of the B-requirement and the nature of 
immanent characters.  According to the B-requirement, for instance, in the statements 
                                                
53 Richard Patterson makes the point that some forms “exemplify themselves simply because everything 
must exemplify them” (Patterson 1985, 74).  He adds that there are some forms such that “it only makes 
good sense, and is quite harmless, that these Forms should be self-exemplifying” (Patterson 1985, 74).  
And J. M. E. Moravcsik argues that, concerning propositions like “Existence exists” and 
“Unchangeability is unchanging”, “[u]nlike most statements involving self-predication, these make 
sense, and Plato was clearly committed to them” (Moravcsik 1963, 52). 
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“the form of largeness is large”54 and “the-largeness-in-Simmias is large”, the 
predicate ‘is large’ must apply to the subjects in precisely “the same way”.  And what 
this means is that the use of ‘is’ and the sense of ‘large’ must remain the same.  
According to TI, in the statement “the form of largeness is large”, the ‘is’ is being 
used to express an identity and ‘large’ means or is a “synonym” for largeness itself or 
the form of largeness.  According to the B-requirement, “the-largeness-in-Simmias is 
large” would have to be read as the claim that “the-largeness-in-Simmias is identical 
to the form of largeness”.55  But from our examination of immanent characters, it 
seems that for Plato the-largeness-in-Simmias is a specific form-particularization that 
cannot be identical to the form of largeness.  Immanent characters are form-
particularizations that are not identical to forms or even to form-parts.  Since it seems 
that the statements involving the form and the immanent character cannot receive “the 
same reading”, the reading cannot be correct in the case of the form without violating 
the B-requirement.  Since Plato appears committed to the B-requirement in the 
Phaedo, we have good reason not to attribute TI to him there.  It seems that Plato’s 
view that “any form of F is F” should not to be interpreted as the claim that “any form 
of F is identical to the form of F”, (although Plato obviously thinks that this claim is 
true). 
                                                
54 Here I take the statement “the form of largeness is large” as one for which Plato intends ‘is large’ to 
be read in “the same way” as he would intend ‘is F’ to be read in the generalized claim that “any form 
of F is F”.  At least at Phaedo 102b-ff, Plato does not intend largeness to be a special or exceptional 
case, and what he relies on there about largeness is generalizable. 
55 One might argue that “the form of largeness is large” and “the-largeness-in-Simmias is large” should 
both be taken to mean that the referent of the subject term is self-identical—it would then not follow 
that the form and form-particularization are identical to one another.  One way for this to be possible is 
if the predicate ‘large’ is being used here just to mean ‘self-identical’ in general, but this seems highly 
implausible.  Another possibility is that ‘large’ is being used to mean ‘the largeness that it is’, such that 
the claims say respectively that the form of largeness is identical to the largeness that it is and the-
largeness-in-Simmias is identical to the largeness that it is.  Each of the subjects would be identical to 
the largeness that it is, but they would not thereby be identical to one another.  But the predicate ‘large’ 
would then have different senses in the two statements, and the B-requirement would not be met.  If 
Plato does accept the B-requirement, then it seems he could not intend both statements as identities 
without thereby identifying the form with its form-particularization. 
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 Another view similar to TI is what I will call the Non-Tautologous Identity 
view derived from Mills (NTI-M).  Like TI, NTI-M is a more plausible view derived 
from an extreme view proposed by Mills.  NTI-M is the view that Plato intends his 
general commitment to the view that “any form of F is F” to be understood as an 
expression of a certain type of non-tautologous identity.  Specifically, NTI-M is the 
view that what Plato means by the general claim that “any form of F is F” is that “any 
form of F is the nominatum of ‘F’” or “is the thing that ‘F’ is a name of’”.  Mills 
appears to argue for a more extreme view than NTI-M, which holds that whenever 
Plato asserts that some form of F is F, he must mean to be expressing that it is the 
nominatum of ‘F’.  Mills claims that in the statement “the form of justice is just”, ‘is 
just’ is required to be “interpreted as equivalent to…‘is the nominatum of ‘just’’” 
(Mills 1957, 146).  And Mills argues that “when Plato says that the Form of Likeness 
ὅµοιόν ἐστιν, he takes this as meaning that it is actually identical with ὅµοιον (with the 
πρᾶγµα of which the term ‘ὅµοιον’ is presumed to be a name)…” (Mills 1958, 42).  
Mills holds that at least in the middle-period, Plato assumes that “the meaning of 
ὅµοιον consists entirely in its naming something”, in such a way that “ὅµοιόν ἐστι can 
only mean ‘is the thing that ὅµοιον is a name of’” (Mills 1958, 42, n. 1, my emphasis).  
And Mills adds that “the ‘is’ in this phrase is plainly synonymous with ‘is identical 
with’” (Mills 1958, 42, n. 1).  Now the view that this is what Plato must always intend 
is implausible, since as we have discussed, at least sometimes Plato clearly wants to 
assert that the form of F is an F thing.  But NTI-M is a more plausible view derived 
from this extreme view.  Unlike Mills’ own interpretation, NTI-M allows for there to 
be some exceptional cases in which Plato uses the expression “the form of F is F” to 
assert that “the form of F is an F thing”.  What NTI-M holds is that Plato’s general 
commitment is to the view that “any form of F is the nominatum of ‘F’”, and Plato is 
not committed to a genuine self-predication assumption for all forms. 
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 Again, we find reason to doubt that NTI-M is a correct interpretation of Plato’s 
view in the Phaedo, by considering the B-requirement and the nature of immanent 
characters.  According to the B-requirement, an example of the general claim that “any 
form of F is F” such as “the form of largeness is large”, ought to receive “the same 
reading” as the statement “the-largeness-in-Simmias is large”.  NTI-M holds that “the 
form of largeness is large” (as one instance of the general commitment) means that 
“the form of largeness is identical to the nominatum of ‘large’ or the thing that ‘large’ 
is a name of”.  As Mills suggests, the ‘is’ in the statement is the ‘is’ of identity, as it is 
“plainly synonymous with ‘is identical with’” (Mills 1958, 42, n. 1).  And in the 
original claim, ‘large’ means “the thing that ‘large’ is a name of”.  So by the B-
requirement, the statement “the-largeness-in-Simmias is large” must be read as the 
claim that “the-largeness-in-Simmias is identical to the thing that ‘large’ is a name 
of”.56  Once again, according to this construal, the form of largeness would be 
identical to the-largeness-in-Simmias, since they are both said to be identical to the 
thing named by ‘large’.  But since forms and form-particularizations are distinct, this 
interpretation seems incorrect as long as Plato is committed to the B-requirement.  So 
we have good reason to doubt that NTI-M—the view that “any form of F is F” should 
be read as expressing that “any form of F is the nominatum of ‘F’”—is a correct 
interpretation of Plato’s view in the Phaedo. 
 The last identity view I will consider is closely related to NTI-M.  This is the 
Non-Tautologous Identity view derived from Nehamas (NTI-N).  NTI-N is the view 
that Plato is committed to the general claim that “any form of F is F”, but he intends 
this to be understood as the claim that “any form of F is what it is to be F”.  But in 
                                                
56 Again, if we instead take ‘large’ in this statement to mean “the thing that ‘large-in-Simmias’ is a 
name of”, and so as referring to the largeness-particularization as opposed to the form of largeness, then 
the B-requirement is violated.  This is the case because ‘large’ would have different senses in the two 
statements. 
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“Self-Predication and Plato’s Theory of Forms”, Nehamas presents an extreme and 
more implausible view, that whenever Plato asserts that some form of F is F, he 
always means this to express that the form of F is what it is to be F.  And he goes even 
further: whenever Plato writes that anything “is F”, he always means by this that it “is 
what it is to be F”.  Nehamas suggests that only the form of beautiful is beautiful 
(Nehamas 1999, 176) and that Plato interprets “every sentence of the form ‘a is F’ as 
‘a is what it is to be F’” (Nehamas 1999, 179, my emphasis), and that “Plato 
understands all predication on this model” (Nehamas 1999, 179).  Again, Nehamas 
asserts that “only Justice is just” (Nehamas 1999, 180), and that instances participate 
in the form of beauty but are not beautiful (Nehamas 1999, 183), and that participation 
is “an alternative to, and not an analysis of, being F” (Nehamas 1999, 184).  On his 
view, Plato does not allow that anything other than the form of F is F.  It is not true to 
say, for instance, “Helen is beautiful”, because what this statement must mean for 
Plato is that “Helen is what it is to be beautiful”, which is clearly false. 
But concerning this more extreme view, Nehamas is certainly incorrect.  This 
is the case because Plato allows that things other than the form of F really can be F.  
At Phaedo 100c, Plato argues that if anything is beautiful besides the beautiful it is 
beautiful by participation in the form of beauty.  Nehamas is correct that this statement 
alone leaves it as an open question whether or not anything besides the form is 
beautiful (Nehamas 1999, 176).  Nehamas admits that in Plato’s view there are many 
things which participate in the form of beauty, but Nehamas holds that they are not 
thereby beautiful (Nehamas 1999, 183-4).  But what Plato suggests here in the Phaedo 
is that things other than the form of beauty are beautiful by way of participation in the 
form.  There will be many cases for Plato in which things other than the form of F are 
F via participation in the form.  But while these things are F, they are not what it is to 
be F, and so Plato at least sometimes intends another reading of “is F”.  In addition, 
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there are many cases for Plato in which the form of F is G, where F ≠ G.  For instance, 
the form of beauty will be at rest, since all forms are, but the form of beauty will not 
be what it is to be at rest.  So again, Plato does not always intend “is what it is to be F” 
when he asserts that something “is F”. 
 But even though Nehamas’ extreme view is incorrect, the more moderate NTI-
N survives these points.  This is the case because NTI-N allows for there to be 
exceptional cases—there can be cases in which the form of F or the form of G is an F 
thing, and cases in which non-forms can be F things.  What NTI-N holds is only that 
Plato’s intended general commitment is that “any form of F is what it is to be F”, and 
that Plato is not committed to a genuine self-predication assumption for all forms.  
Before this view can be assessed, we must be clear about exactly what it entails, for 
there is some disagreement about exactly what “the form of F is what it is to be F” 
means.  In my naming of the view, I have suggested that this would be a kind of non-
tautologous identity statement, but this is hardly obvious.  What Nehamas says about 
his own view is that these statements “describe the Forms, but what they describe is 
the Forms’ very nature.  They are thus not just ordinary predications, yet they are not 
pure tautologies either” (Nehamas 1999, 179).  So it seems that Nehamas does not 
understand these claims to be tautologous identities.  In “On a Proposed Redefinition 
of ‘Self-predication’ in Plato”, Vlastos argues that although Nehamas does not 
recognize it, these statements are simple disguised tautologous identities (Vlastos 
1981(b), 76, 78).  Malcolm agrees that the statements are identities, but he suggests 
they ought to be read as non-tautologous identities which say that, for instance, the 
form of beauty is the nature or essence of beauty (Malcolm 1991, 75).  In my view, 
Malcolm is right here.  The statement “the form of F is what it is to be F” is not simply 
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the claim that the form of F is self-identical.57  It is an identity, but it says more, albeit 
not much more.  What is says is that the form of F is the essence of F-ness, whatever 
that turns out to be.  So NTI-N is another version of a non-tautologous identity view. 
 But how ought we to determine whether it is plausible to attribute this view to 
Plato?  Once again, because of the B-requirement and the nature of immanent 
characters, we have good reason for thinking that this is not a correct interpretation of 
Plato in the Phaedo.  When we again consider “the form of largeness is large” as an 
instance of the general claim that “any form of F is F”, again we see that ‘is large’ in 
this statement must receive “the same reading” as it receives in the claim that “the-
largeness-in-Simmias is large”.  The ‘is’ of identity must remain the same as well as 
the meaning of ‘large’ as “what it is to be large”.  So both the form of largeness and 
the-largeness-in-Simmias are said to be identical to what it is to be large, or the 
essence of largeness.  Again, what follows is that the form of largeness would be 
identical to the-largeness-in-Simmias.  But since Plato sees forms and immanent 
characters as distinct, he could not without inconsistency intend this interpretation of 
his statements in the Phaedo.  So there is good reason for thinking that NTI-N—the 
view that “any form of F is F” should be read as the claim that “any form of F is what 
it is to be F”—is not a correct interpretation of Plato in the Phaedo. 
 The next view I will address is not another version of an identity view.  It is the 
Pauline Predication interpretation that Vlastos defends (VPP).  Peterson, whose 
distinct view I will discuss shortly, introduces the notion of Pauline predication into 
Plato scholarship.  Peterson argues that a sentence of the form “Charity is kind” is 
true, not because charity itself (whatever it is) is kind, but because instances of charity 
are kind.  What Peterson and Vlastos argue, in slightly different ways, is that Plato’s 
                                                
57 Note that if “the form of F is what it is to be F” were just a tautologous identity, then NTI-N would be 
identical to the TI view that I have already considered.  If this were the case, which I do not think it is, 
then we would have the same reason to doubt NTI-N as with TI above. 
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apparently self-predicational language ought to be interpreted, at least when 
generalized to all forms, as Pauline predications.  Vlastos’ specific view, VPP, is the 
view that Plato is not committed to a genuine self-predication assumption for all 
forms, but instead holds that “any form of F is F”, with this understood according to 
Pauline predication as follows: Any form of F is such that necessarily any instance of 
the form of F is F (Vlastos 1981, 407-9).  What follows, Vlastos points out, is that 
“any form of F is F” is analytically true (Vlastos 1981, 408).  The instances of the 
form of F are precisely those things which are F.58  Vlastos notes that according to his 
view, in a Pauline predication about a form, “the copula was evidently not meant to 
assign the predicate to the εἶδος named by the subject-term, but to unnamed instances 
of that εἶδος…” (Vlastos 1981, 407).  According to Vlastos then, “any form of F is F”, 
understood according to Pauline predication, predicates ‘F’ of the instances of the 
form of F and it does not predicate ‘F’ of the form itself.  Only the instances of the 
form of F are said to be F. 
 Again, let us apply the B-requirement to VPP.  Vlastos interprets the statement 
“the form of largeness is large” as meaning “the form of largeness is such that 
necessarily any instance of the form of largeness is large”.  By the B-requirement, the 
predicate ‘is large’ must apply in precisely “the same way” in the case of the-
largeness-in-Simmias.59  So the statement “the-largeness-in-Simmias is large” must be 
read as the claim that “the-largeness-in-Simmias is such that necessarily any instance 
                                                
58 Perhaps this could be denied by someone who held that the “instances” of the form of F, the many Fs, 
are not really F, and that only the form of F is really F.  But as I argued briefly above, Plato seems 
committed to the view that there are often many things other than the form of F that are F.  However, as 
I go on to argue in Chapter Five, there is still some reading according to which it is true to say for Plato 
that only the form of F “is perfectly F”.   
59 In the case of a Pauline predication, it is more difficult to distinguish between the use of ‘is’ and the 
sense of ‘F’ and to specify exactly what they are, at least according to Vlastos’ interpretation.  As we 
will see, Peterson’s view focuses more on unique senses of ‘F’ or ways of being F.  For Vlastos, it 
would seem, ‘F’ just remains the same as in ordinary predication, but the use of ‘is’ changes, such that 
it predicates ‘F’ of the instances of the referent of the subject term, rather than of the referent of the 
subject term.     
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of the-largeness-in-Simmias is large”.  But this claim is logically absurd for Plato, 
because the-largeness-in-Simmias is not the sort of thing which can have instances.  If 
anything, one might say that the-largeness-in-Simmias has one instance, in Simmias.  
But this seems incorrect.  The-largeness-in-Simmias does not have an instance in 
Simmias.  Instead, it is that particular thing that is in Simmias.  Remember that the-
largeness-in-Simmias is a form-particularization that has particularity and only exists, 
in this case, in Simmias.  Form-particularizations simply cannot have instances in the 
way that something like a universal has instances.  Because of how Plato understands 
immanent characters, it seems he did not intend “the-largeness-in-Simmias is large” to 
be understood according to Vlastos’ Pauline predication reading.  Therefore, because 
of his commitment to the B-requirement in the Phaedo, it seems he cannot 
consistently intend “any form of F is F” to be understood in this way either.  We then 
have good reason to doubt that VPP is a correct interpretation of Plato’s apparently 
self-predicational language in the Phaedo.60 
                                                
60 A tweaked version of VPP might avoid my criticism here.  What I have in mind here is something 
like the view that “the form of largeness is large” means “the form of largeness is such that necessarily 
anything to which the form of largeness is related in the relevant way is large”.  This interpretation as 
applied to the-largeness-in-Simmias yields that “the-largeness-in-Simmias is such that necessarily 
anything to which the largeness-in-Simmias is related in the relevant way is large”.  And this claim 
seems true, because the-largeness-in-Simmias is related to Simmias in the relevant way, by being in 
him—and he will be large when he has the-largeness-in-Simmias in him.  While this tweaked 
interpretation is not susceptible to my specific criticism of VPP, as it makes no mention of “instances”, 
it still seems to fail the B-requirement.  But it is difficult to specify exactly how it fails—see the 
previous footnote.  One way to explain how this view fails is that it seems to involve two different uses 
of ‘is’ in the two statements.  In the statement regarding the form, ‘is’ predicates ‘F’ of whatever the 
referent of the subject term is related to by way of it, the F thing, participating in the referent of the 
subject term.  But in the statement regarding the form-particularization, ‘is’ predicates ‘F’ of whatever 
the referent of the subject term is related to by way of it, the F thing, having in it the referent of the 
subject term.  The relevant relations in the two cases are different, which seems to involve different uses 
of ‘is’.  But even if this tweaked view does satisfy the B-requirement, there are other difficulties.  For 
instance, it seems that that which is related to the form of F and to F-ness particularizations in the 
relevant ways is sometimes (even necessarily) opposite-F, which appears to count against the view.  For 
example, since unequals are necessarily equals (to themselves at least), unequals that are related in the 
relevant way to the form or the form-particularization will be necessarily equal.  So “the form of 
inequality is equal” would seem to turn out true on this tweaked view (and perhaps VPP as well). 
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 The final view I will consider here is closely related to VPP, but relies on a 
slightly different interpretation of Pauline predications.  This is Peterson’s Pauline 
Predication view according to what she calls the “conservative reinterpretation” (PPP-
C).61  PPP-C is the view that Plato intends his general commitment to “any form of F 
is F” to be understood in the following way: Any form of F is F2, insofar as all of its 
instances are F1, and this is a countenanced way of being F2.  This view differs from 
VPP by not incorporating a necessity operator, and also by taking an apparent 
statement of self-predication to predicate something of the form and not merely its 
instances.  As Peterson explains, “the predicate…is true of what the subject expression 
refers to”, and that is the form (Peterson 1973, 461).  In the statement “the form of F is 
F2”, the form of F is really F2 as a result of the fact that all of its instances are F1.  And 
according to PPP-C, F1 and F2 are to be understood as two different senses of ‘F’.  
Any form of F is really F, but it is F in a different sense of ‘F’ than the many Fs which 
participate in it and are its instances.  For example, having all of its instances being 
equal makes the form of equality itself equal, but it is equal in a different sense than 
the many equals.  But like some of the other views I have considered, PPP-C allows 
for exceptions.  It holds that Plato’s general commitment to the claim that “any form 
of F is F” ought to be given this sort of Pauline predication reading, but Plato may 
allow for numerous exceptions.  Plato holds that “any form of F is F2”, and yet there 
may be numerous cases in which the form of G happens to be G1, or G in the same 
sense as the instances of the form of G. 
 We can assess this view in a way similar to VPP.  By the B-requirement, “the 
form of largeness is large”, taken as an instance of the general claim that “any form of 
                                                
61 In Chapter Four, I consider Peterson’s Pauline Predication view according to the “expansive 
reinterpretation” and the view which Fine develops from it.  I do not consider either view here because 
both are immune to my argument in this chapter based on the B-requirement and the nature of 
immanent characters.  Later, I will explain why these two views are immune and discuss my specific 
reasons for rejecting them. 
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F is F”, must receive “the same reading” as the claim that “the-largeness-in-Simmias 
is large”.  In “the form of largeness is large”, the ‘is’ is the ‘is’ of predication and the 
sense of ‘large’ is large2.  Something is large2 when all of its instances are large1.  If 
Plato is committed to the B-requirement here, we must take him to intend the same use 
of ‘is’ and sense of ‘large’ in the two statements.  But then his claim in the case of the-
largeness-in-Simmias would be that “the-largeness-in-Simmias is large2”, and this 
would mean that all of the instances of the-largeness-in-Simmias are large1.  Once 
again, it would be logically absurd to claim that the instances of the-largeness-in-
Simmias are large1, since the-largeness-in-Simmias is a form-particularization that is 
not the sort of thing which can have instances.  Since it seems that we cannot 
reasonably read the statement in the case of the form-particularization in “the same 
way” as we did with the form, we should not adopt the reading in the case of the form 
as an interpretation of Plato’s general view in the Phaedo, as he is committed to the B-
requirement there.  We have good reason then to doubt that PPP-C is a correct 
interpretation of Plato’s general commitment in the Phaedo to the claim that “any 
form of F is F”. 
 
 To sum up, because Plato seems to be committed to the B-requirement in the 
Phaedo and to specific views about the nature of immanent characters, there are 
numerous interpretations of self-predication that we should be reluctant to attribute to 
Plato there.  From my discussion of the first three views, it is clear that we have good 
reason to doubt whether any identity interpretation of “any form of F is F” can be 
correctly attributed to him in the Phaedo.  This is the case because what seems to 
follow from considerations of the B-requirement is that forms are identical to 
immanent characters, which as we saw, seems to conflict with Plato’s view.  From my 
discussion of the last two views, we see good reason not to attribute to Plato in the 
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Phaedo any interpretation that takes “any form of F is F” as referring to instances of or 
participants in the form.  And this is the case because immanent characters seem not to 
be the sort of things that can have either instances or participants.  If I am right about 
Plato’s commitment to the B-requirement and to the particularity of ontologically 
distinct immanent characters, then we have found evidence for doubting, at least as 
interpretations of the Phaedo, all five of the interpretations discussed in this section, as 
well as any other views like them in the relevant respects. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
EXPLANATORY PREDICATION 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 In the previous chapter, I presented some evidence against numerous 
interpretations of Plato’s apparently self-predicational language.  These interpretations 
of what Plato means in the middle dialogues by his generalized apparent statements of 
self-predication seem incorrect, I argued, because they appear to be inconsistent with 
evidence found in the Phaedo.  In particular, Plato seems committed there to the 
existence of form-particularizations, which are ontologically distinct from forms.  
They appear not to be identical to forms or to parts of forms.  The evidence from the 
Phaedo also suggests that Plato intends the claims “the form of largeness is large” and 
“the-largeness-in-Simmias is large” to receive “the same reading”.  What this means is 
that we should take Plato to be using the same the use of ‘is’ and the same sense of the 
predicate ‘large’ in both claims.  And in this passage of the Phaedo at 102d-103b, 
Plato does not intend to focus on something peculiar about largeness, but his claims 
can be generalized to all forms and form-particularizations.  As I explained in the 
previous chapter, this evidence can be used to tell against certain interpretations of 
Plato’s self-predicational commitments—namely, any identity interpretation and any 
interpretation that takes the apparently self-predicational statements to refer to 
instances of the subject term. 
 If my arguments in the first two chapters are successful, then we have found 
some good reason to avoid attributing NSP to Plato, or any identity or instance 
interpretation of his self-predicational commitments.  Is there any remaining hope to 
find an interpretation of Plato’s apparently self-predicational language that will avoid 
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the difficulties I have raised and that will be consistent with the text?  Perhaps there is 
simply no nonproblematic interpretation of Plato’s apparently self-predicational 
language that will be consistent with the textual evidence.  In fact, I think there is hope 
to find a successful interpretation, and the goal of this chapter will be to present and 
begin defending my own interpretation, which I call the Explanatory Predication view 
(EP).  I will first explain exactly what my view is, and I will examine some textual 
support from the Hippias Major for my sort of interpretation.  I will then present and 
rebut the main argument from a recent paper by Eck, against any sort of explanatory 
interpretation such as my own.62  Next, I will explain how my view seems immune to 
the main attack of Chapter Two.63  EP seems immune to the argument from Chapter 
Two because Plato holds that it is not only forms that are explainers—form-
particularizations are explainers as well.  I will end this chapter by resolving some 
related difficulties concerning form-particularizations, which on my view are essential 
to Plato’s account of explanation.  Commentators have disagreed about whether form-
particularizations can themselves be instances of forms, whether they can themselves 
have form-particularizations in them, and whether this would lead to regress worries.  
I end the chapter by explaining how my own account of form-particularizations deals 
with these difficulties. 
 
 
 
                                                
62 In fact, Eck directs his argument against Fine’s BSP view, although Eck seems to misinterpret her 
view.  Fine’s view (which I discuss in detail in Chapter Four) and my own view are alike in taking Plato 
to use his apparently self-predicational statements to emphasize the explanatory role of forms, although 
we differ on exactly how Plato does this.  If Eck’s argument were successful, it would undermine Fine’s 
view as well as my own, (and even, it seems, Eck’s own view).  But as I will argue in this chapter, the 
argument does not work.       
63 There are two other main types of views that also seem to be immune to the attack from Chapter 
Two.  I consider those in Chapter Four, and explain there why EP ought to be favored over them. 
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II. Explanatory Predication 
 
 What does Plato mean when he claims, for instance, that “the form of equality 
is equal”?  We have looked at many interpretations that have been defended by 
commentators, and we have seen reason for doubting whether they can be correctly 
attributed to Plato, at least in the middle period.  For example, it seems we should not 
take “the form of equality is equal” to mean: “the form of equality is an equal thing in 
the same way as sensible equals”, “the form of equality is what it is to be equal”, or 
“the form of equality is such that necessarily any instance of the form of equality is 
equal”.  In my view, when Plato suggests, for instance, that “the form of equality is 
equal” in the argument at Phaedo 74b7-c6 and essentially makes this assertion at 
74d5-6, he does not mean to say that the form of equality is itself an equal thing.  
Instead, Plato only means to convey that the form of equality is equal-explaining, or 
that it explains things’ being equal.  And this interpretation can be applied more 
generally.  Whenever Plato claims that “the form of F is F” in a context in which he 
intends this claim to be generalized to all forms, he only means to say that “the form of 
F is F-explaining”, and he does not mean that the form of F is an F thing.  Of course, a 
particular form of F might also be an F thing, but that is a further and completely 
distinct question. 
 So the Explanatory Predication view (EP) is just this, that Plato’s generalizable 
apparent statements of self-predication express only that forms are explainers and not 
that they are, to put it perhaps roughly, instances of themselves.  But there is more that 
can be said about exactly how Plato uses the statement “the form of F is F” to express 
that the form of F is F-explaining.  Plato might be taken here to be introducing a new 
use of ‘is’ or perhaps a new sense of the predicate ‘F’.  But in my view, nothing so 
peculiar is required or intended.  When Plato claims that “the form of F is F” he 
64 
intends to predicate a quality of the subject term—he wants to say of the form of F, 
that it has a certain quality, namely the quality of explaining things’ being F.  So, as 
opposed to the Frede-style view that I examine in the next chapter, Plato is not 
introducing a new kind of predication.  The ‘is’ in the generalizable apparent 
statements of self-predication is the ‘is’ of predication.  So I call my view the 
Explanatory Predication view not because I want to attribute to Plato a new kind of 
predication called “explanatory predication”.  Instead, the point is just that these 
apparent statements of self-predication are predications that emphasize the 
explanatory role of forms. 
Perhaps then, by using ‘F’ in these statements to mean “F-explaining”, Plato is 
introducing a new sense of the predicate ‘F’.  What this would mean is that for every 
seemingly unambiguous predicate for which Plato posits a form, there are in fact two 
senses of the predicate.  There are two senses of ‘equal’, one meaning “sameness of 
measure” and the other meaning “explaining things’ having sameness of measure”, 
two senses of ‘large’, one meaning “exceeding in measure” and the other meaning 
“explaining things’ exceeding in measure”, and so on for all predicates for which 
forms exist.  This view would be a tweaked version of Peterson’s Pauline Predication 
view according to the conservative reinterpretation, which was considered in the 
previous chapter.  Both views introduce a new sense of the predicate ‘F’, one which is 
intended to be applied to the form of F as opposed to the many Fs.  But this too is not 
exactly what my EP is attributing to Plato.  When Plato claims that “equality is equal”, 
he does not mean that there is some new property ‘equal’ that is being attributed to 
equality.  Instead, Plato is merely using the predicate ‘equal’, in these special contexts 
in which Plato intends his claims to be generalized, as a shorthand to refer to the 
property of being equal-explaining. 
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Let us examine an example of this sort of language, to help make the view 
clearer.  In the context of a discussion about what music to listen to before going to 
bed, John might express his opinion that “Offenbach’s Barcarolle is sleepy”.  Now one 
might disagree with John’s view of the music, but the issue at hand is not whether the 
music is itself literally sleepy or drowsy.  In fact, the music is simply not the sort of 
thing that can be a sleepy thing.  But John’s statement can still be true because what he 
means is not that the Barcarolle is a sleepy thing but rather that the Barcarolle is 
sleepy-making—it induces sleepiness in its listener.  There is not a different sense of 
‘sleepy’ which means “makes one drowsy” instead of simply “drowsy”, but rather 
John is just using the term ‘sleepy’ in this context to refer to the distinct property of 
making one sleepy.64  In this context, John could be said to be attaching the sense 
‘sleepy-making’ to the word ‘sleepy’.  In such contexts, as John uses the word 
‘sleepy’, such as when he is referring to things like music and films perhaps, the word 
(in the statement uttered by John) might be said to have the sense ‘sleepy-making’.  
But the word itself does not have this meaning—it only has this speaker-meaning as it 
is being used by a speaker in these sorts of contexts, where its meaning is clear for the 
most part.  Most listeners would understand John’s meaning, and not think that he was 
saying that the Barcarolle was itself a drowsy thing.65 
Likewise, when Plato claims that “the form of equality is equal”, he does not 
mean to say that the form of equality is really equal according to some distinct sense 
that the predicate ‘equal’ itself has.  All that he means, in this generalizable context, is 
                                                
64 It might be argued that the word ‘sleepy’ actually has this other sense according to which it means 
“sleepy-making”.  For the purposes of my example, I assume that this is not the case.  And if there is in 
fact this other sense of the word, it seems likely that it was derived from the use of ‘sleepy’ in the first 
place as shorthand to mean “sleepy-making”.   
65 Perhaps another example, although not perfectly analogous, is if John says “Sam is grammatical”, 
assuming that grammatical means something like “well-formed according to the rules of grammar” 
(such that only linguistic items and not things like Sam can literally be grammatical).  In such a context, 
on the view I am outlining here, John is merely using ‘grammatical’ in his statement to refer to the 
distinct property of something like using grammatical language. 
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that the form of equality is equal-explaining.  Plato is using the word ‘equal’ as 
shorthand to mean ‘equal-explaining’.  EP, then, does not attribute to Plato a new use 
of ‘is’ or a new sense of predicates.  EP does, however, hold that in certain contexts 
Plato uses the word ‘F’ to refer to the property, not of being F, but of being F-
explaining.  Admittedly, this seems unusual to say the least, and it would be good to 
find some textual evidence for such a use.   
 
   
III. An Explanatory Interpretation in the Hippias Major 
 
 It is certainly easy to find evidence in Plato of the claim that forms are 
explainers.  For instance, at Phaedo 100c-101c66, we are repeatedly told that sharing in 
forms is what makes things have the qualities that they have (at least in cases in which 
forms exist), and it is because of or on account of or by this sharing in forms that 
things have these qualities.  Plato clearly holds that the form of F is F-explaining or 
explains the many Fs’ being F, by way of the many Fs’ sharing in the form.  What 
“sharing in” amounts to exactly is left somewhat undetermined in the text of the 
Phaedo, but I will have more to say about it shortly. 
 However, just because Plato accepts that, for all forms, the form of F is F-
explaining, this alone in no way supports my view that Plato sometimes intends to 
assert such a claim when he says that “the form of F is F”.  Plato also accepts, for 
example, that the form of F is self-identical and that necessarily the instances of the 
form of F are F things, but I have argued that we should avoid attributing these 
interpretations of Plato’s apparently self-predicational language to him.  To support 
EP, it would help to find evidence showing that Plato uses the statement “the form of 
                                                
66 See Section V of this chapter, in which I examine these specific passages. 
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F is F” to mean “the form of F is F-explaining”, and not just that Plato is committed to 
the view that the form of F is F-explaining, which is relatively uncontroversial. 
 Unfortunately, we do not find Plato explicitly telling us that he sometimes says 
“is F” as a shorthand to mean “is F-explaining”.  And we do not find him explicitly 
saying, for instance, that when he claims that “the form of largeness is large” all he 
means is that the form of largeness explains things’ being large.  But I do think that in 
a passage from 286d-91d in the Hippias Major, which was likely written by Plato 
close to the time of the Phaedo67, there is some evidence of Plato using ‘is F’ when he 
intends to convey “is F-explaining”.  Now to be sure, we will not find Plato explicitly 
asserting here that a form is F when he clearly intends to say that the form is F-
explaining.  But if Plato sometimes uses the locution ‘is F’ to mean “is F-explaining”, 
then we have at least some textual support for thinking that this is his intention when 
he uses his puzzling apparently self-predicational language. 
 But a word of caution is in order here, about what I take this evidence from the 
Hippias Major to show.  While the textual evidence I go on to discuss in this section 
lends some support to EP, it would also equally support any other explanatory 
interpretation, such as Fine’s BSP, which also takes Plato to be using his apparently 
self-predicational language to emphasize the explanatory role of forms.  The evidence 
here will suggest that Plato uses ‘is F’ somehow to convey “is F-explaining”, but it 
leaves underspecified exactly how this happens.  For instance, Plato might simply be 
using ‘is F’ as shorthand only to mean “is F-explaining” (EP) or he might be using ‘is 
F’ to mean “really is an F thing in the broad explanatory way of being F” (BSP).  I go 
on to discuss BSP in detail and how it differs from EP in Chapter Four, and there I 
provide reasons for favoring EP over BSP.  But the textual evidence here in the 
Hippias Major lends support to either view, without itself suggesting any reason to 
                                                
67 See Teloh 1981, 4 n. 9; Woodruff 1982, 93-103; and Malcolm 1991, 21. 
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favor one view over the other.  Here we find support for an explanatory interpretation 
in general, but not necessary EP.  Once we see good reasons in the next chapter for 
rejecting BSP, the main alternative explanatory interpretation, we can more directly 
take the evidence from the Hippias Major as evidence for EP in particular. 
 
 Early in the Hippias Major, Socrates asks Hippias to teach him about the 
nature of the fine itself (HMa. 286d8-e1).  With lines reminiscent of the passage from 
Phaedo 100c-101c, Socrates gets Hippias to agree that the F or the F itself is that by 
which F things are F (HMa. 287c1-8).  In particular, all fine things are fine by the fine 
(HMa. 287c8-d1).  Socrates makes it clear that he is not looking for any old thing that 
is fine, but rather for the fine, that by which all fine things are fine (HMa. 287d4-e1).  
A bit later Socrates again stresses that what he is looking for is “the fine itself by 
which everything else is ordered and appears fine, whenever that form is added” (αὐτὸ 
τὸ καλόν, ᾧ καὶ τἆλλα πάντα κοσµεῖται καὶ καλὰ φαίνεται, ἐπειδὰν προσγένηται ἐκεῖνο τὸ 
εἶδος) (HMa. 289d2-4).  The goal at hand is to find that which makes or explains 
things’ being fine, the form of fineness. 
 At 289d6-e6, Hippias attempts to respond to Socrates’ question by proposing 
that that which makes things fine, the fine itself, is nothing other than gold.  Socrates 
restates the suggestion that gold is what makes everything fine, wherever it is added 
(χρυσὸς ἄρ’ ἐστὶν ὁ πάντα καλὰ ποιῶν, ὅπου ἂν προσγένηται) (HMa. 290b6-7).68  Socrates 
goes on to present a quick argument against this suggestion, and it is in this argument 
                                                
68 Note that forms of φαίνεσθαι are used throughout this section of the text, as in 289d2-4 above, when 
Socrates claims that they are looking for that which makes things appear fine.  But the claim is made 
that the fine will not only make things appear ordered but will actually make them ordered (κοσµεῖται).  
The point is made clearer here at 290b6-7 that whatever the fine turns out to be is not just what makes 
everything appear fine but that which actually makes things fine.  This point that they are not looking 
for that which merely makes thing appear fine is again clear at 290d5-6, when Hippias states that 
whatever is appropriate to each thing makes each thing fine.        
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that we find what looks like a use of ‘is F’ to say that something has the property of 
being F-explaining or F-making. 
 Socrates gets Hippias to agree that different materials are more appropriate in 
different applications, and that if gold ever makes things fine, it only does this when it 
is appropriate.  Hippias agrees that it is whatever is appropriate to each thing that 
makes that thing fine (HMa. 290d5-6).  Next, Socrates argues that in the case of a bean 
soup, a spoon made of figwood is actually more appropriate and makes the soup better 
(HMa. 290d7-291a2).  A gold spoon will actually make the soup worse in a number of 
ways.  Figwood is more appropriate than gold in these sorts of circumstances and so in 
cases like this, it is more fine-making.  It seems then that gold cannot be what Socrates 
is looking for, that which makes thing fine, since in cases like a bean soup it actually 
makes things foul.  And in these cases, it seems that it is figwood that would make 
things fine. 
 The instance of elenctic reasoning employed here can be written up as follows: 
 
1. The fine itself is gold. (HMa. 289e3) 
2. The fine itself is what makes everything fine wherever it is added. 
(HMa. 289d2-4) 
3. So gold is what makes everything fine wherever it is added. (HMa. 
290b6-7) [1, 2] 
4. What is appropriate to each thing makes it fine. (HMa. 290d5-6) 
5. Figwood is more appropriate than gold for bean soup. (HMa. 
290d7-291a4) 
6. Figwood more than gold makes the soup fine—in fact, gold makes 
it foul. (HMa. 290d7-291a4) [4, 5] 
7. But contradiction 3&6 – So reject 1: The fine itself is not gold. 
Socrates uses this argument to show that Hippias’ candidate, gold, cannot be the fine 
itself.  At step 6, Socrates has reached the conclusion that, in the case of the bean soup, 
figwood is more fine-making than gold.  What follows is that gold is in no way more 
fine-making than figwood in the case of the bean soup, and gold in fact ruins the soup 
in a number of ways. 
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But what is most interesting for our purposes is how Socrates sums up the 
argument by saying that what results from the claim that the fine is gold is that gold is 
in no way finer than figwood.  He explains that if he is asked what the fine itself is, i.e. 
what it is that makes things fine, and he responds that it is gold, it will be shown to 
him that gold is in no way finer than figwood (οὐδὲν ὡς ἔοικέ µοι ἀναφανήσεται κάλλιον 
ὂν χρυσὸς ἢ ξύλον σύκινον) (HMa. 291c6-8).  Socrates seems to be assuming that since 
gold is in no way more fine-making than figwood, gold is in no way finer than 
figwood.  Socrates has repeatedly stressed that he is looking for that which makes all 
things fine.  The relevant point in the argument is that gold cannot be that by which all 
things are fine, because there are many cases in which figwood rather than gold would 
seem to be that by which things are made fine.  What we would expect here is for 
Socrates to say only that, if he tries to claim that the fine itself is gold, he will be made 
to see that gold is in no way more fine-making than figwood.  But in the text we find 
this further and seemingly distinct point that gold is in no way finer. 
 Socrates seems to be relying on the general assumption that, if x is in no way 
more F-making than y, then x is in no way more F than y.  This seems related to a 
principle often attributed to Plato, mistakenly I think, called the Causal Principle.69  
The principle is as follows: 
Causal Principle (CP): If x makes things F, x is itself F. 
The idea is that something cannot possibly cause things to be F or explain things’ 
being F unless it is itself F.  And the principle seems quite implausible.  For instance, 
it is absurd to claim that something that causes other things to be dead must itself be 
dead.  Perhaps one might argue that for a restricted set of predicates or for certain 
types of causation, the principle stands a chance.  But for our purposes here, I will not 
examine in any detail whether the principle is false or whether Plato may be 
                                                
69 For instance, see Teloh 1981, 4, 42-6, 69, 156-8; and Malcolm 1991, 11-6, 21-4, 152-6, 170-5.     
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committed to it elsewhere.  Our question is whether Plato is relying on a version of CP 
in the argument we have been investigating in the Hippias Major at 286d-291d, and if 
not, what it is that he is relying on here. 
Malcolm argues that CP is repeatedly stressed throughout our passage 
(Malcolm 1991, 21).  In fact, Plato appears to be relying on a similar but distinct 
principle.  What we find here is closer to the inverse of CP with the added complexity 
of a comparative: 
 
Inverse of CP + comparative (ICP+): If x is in no way more F-making 
than y, x is in no way more F 
than y. 
What we have in the text itself is the assumption that if x is not more F-making than y, 
then x is not more F than y.  Notice that ICP+ is crucially distinct from CP.  The point 
in ICP+ is that if something is not more F-making, then it cannot possibly be more F.  
CP says that if something causes things to be F, it had better be F.  What we have here 
is roughly that if something does not cause things to be F, it had better not be F.  What 
this entails is that if something is F, it had better cause things to be F, which is 
certainly distinct from CP.  Again, CP says that causes of things’ being F must 
themselves be F.  But this principle entails roughly that things that are F must be 
causes of things’ being F. 
What follows exactly is the contrapositive of ICP+, that if something is more 
F, then it is more F-making: 
 
Contrapositive of ICP+ (CON-ICP+): If x is more F than y, x is more F-
making than y. 
Now, on the face of it, this seems like a blatantly absurd premise, and one that Plato 
clearly rejects.  Plato holds that many things can be more or less F without themselves 
being more or less F-making, or F-making at all.  There are many sensible beautifuls 
that are more or less beautiful, which are made beautiful by sharing in the form of 
beauty, but which do not themselves make things beautiful.  As Socrates has 
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repeatedly affirmed in our passage of the Hippias Major, it is the F itself by which 
things are made F, and as is clear in Phaedo 100c-101c, it is only by way of sharing in 
the F itself that things are made F.  The many Fs fall short of the form of F (at least 
partly) because of the fact that while the form of F explains things’ being F, the many 
Fs do not.  Plato is clearly committed to the view that there are many things that are 
more or less F that do not make things F—therefore, he seems to reject CON-ICP+ 
outright. 
 But then how can we explain the fact that the text we have been examining in 
the Hippias Major appears to rely on CON-ICP+.  At Hippias Major 291c7-8, 
Socrates expresses the conclusion of the argument as the claim that gold is in no way 
finer than figwood.  But what we expect Socrates to claim is only that gold is in no 
way more fine-making than figwood.  Socrates seems to be using ‘is fine’ in such a 
way that entails being fine-making.  The text appears to rely on CON-ICP+, and yet 
this principle is blatantly false for Plato if ‘is F’ means “is an F thing” or “has the 
property of being F”, unless these claims somehow receive an explanatory reading.  
What this passage suggests is that Plato has some special use of ‘is F’ according to 
which what he intends to convey is that something is F-making.70  If Plato uses ‘is 
fine’ or ‘is finer’ in the Hippias Major when he means “is fine-explaining” or “is more 
fine-explaining”, then this at least lends some plausibility to the claim that Plato 
intends this in other places as well.  So we find here some evidence to support an 
explanatory interpretation of Plato’s apparently self-predicational language, such as 
EP, which takes Plato to be asserting “the form of F is F” when he intends to 
                                                
70 Again, while the evidence here supports an explanatory interpretation, it does not clearly favor mine 
over other versions.  For instance, the evidence here is supportive of BSP as well.  CON-ICP+ turns out 
to be true if it is interpreted along the lines of BSP: if x is more F than y in the broad explanatory way, x 
is more F-making than y.  This passage in the Hippias Major only suggests that Plato uses ‘is F’ in 
some way to convey “is F-making”, but exactly how he does this is left undetermined in the text.  
Again, in the next chapter, I examine BSP in detail and present my reasons for favoring EP over it.  
73 
emphasize that the form of F is F-explaining.  Perhaps when Plato suggests that 
“equality is equal” or “largeness is large” in the Phaedo, his intention is to convey that 
equality makes things equal and largeness makes things large.  At least, it seems more 
plausible that this could be Plato’s intention, given that he uses predication to this end 
in the Hippias Major.     
 
 
IV. Against an Explanatory Interpretation 
 
In the Hippias Major, we find evidence suggesting that some explanatory 
interpretation of Plato’s apparently self-predicational language might be correct.  
However, in a recent article called “Self-predication and Being the Aitia of Things”, 
Eck argues against any explanatory or causal or “aetiological” reading of Plato’s self-
predicational commitments.  Eck presents an argument, relying on a passage at 
Phaedo 101c2-4, which he claims reduces an explanatory analysis of apparent 
statements of self-predication “to an absurdity” (Eck 2008, 115).  In fact, we will see 
that Eck’s argument is entirely unsuccessful.  We will also see that if Eck’s argument 
were satisfactory, it would not only undermine an explanatory interpretation but also, 
as Eck fails to recognize, his own preferred interpretation of Plato’s apparently self-
predicational language.  However, the argument is problematic and, in the end, is 
silent as regards self-predication. 
Eck’s main textual evidence for his argument (that we will soon examine in 
detail) comes from Phaedo 101c2-4, which is within the passage of the Phaedo in 
which Plato repeatedly stresses that participation in the form of F is that which 
explains things’ being F.  But at 101c2-4, Plato says “You’d shout loudly that you 
know of no other way in which each thing comes to be except by participating in the 
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peculiar being of each thing in which it participates” (µετασχὸν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἑκάστου 
οὗ ἂν µετάσχῃ) (Eck’s trans. adapted from Gallop 1975, Eck 2008, 110 n. 3, 112).  This 
quote makes it sound as if, most precisely, something does not participate in a form 
but rather participates in the being or οὐσία of the form.  Eck claims that Plato is 
specifying here “what it is that something participates in when it participates in some 
form F-ness”, but Eck warns that Plato is not specifying some additional thing besides 
the form itself (Eck 2008, 112).  Eck continues: Plato is here specifying that when 
something participates in a form, it participates in the specific being of the form, or the 
being that the form involves, namely being F (Eck 2008, 112).  But the specific being 
of a form, Eck claims, is identical to the form itself, which seems to follow from a 
passage at Phaedo 65d12-e1 in which forms are identified as themselves beings or 
οὐσίαι (Eck 2008, 112).                     
 Now, I think there is certainly a question as to whether Eck correctly interprets 
this textual evidence from the Phaedo.  For instance, it seems as if 101c2-4 could be 
taken simply to say that something participates in the form which is itself an οὐσία, 
rather than literally the οὐσία that the form has.  However, for our purposes here, let us 
assume that Eck is correct that Plato is specifying that when something participates in 
a form, it more precisely participates in the particular being or ἰδία οὐσία of the form.  
Even if we admit this reading of the textual evidence to Eck, his argument will be 
unsuccessful. 
Eck uses this textual evidence to argue directly against Fine’s view of Plato’s 
commitment to self-predication.  He takes Fine’s view (mistakenly I think71) to be the 
                                                
71 I examine Fine’s BSP in detail in the next chapter.  In short, Eck takes Fine’s view to be that when 
Plato says “the form of F is F” he only means that “the form of F is the ultimate explanation of things’ 
being F”.  Although Fine (rarely) says things that might be taken to suggest this view, she repeatedly 
explains that she takes Plato to be saying that the form of F is really F, but that it is F in a “broad” 
way—namely by explaining things’ being F, which Plato countenances as a way of being an F thing.  
So according to Fine’s actual view in contradistinction to Eck’s construal of it, “the form of F is F” says 
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claim that when Plato says “the form of F is F” he only means that “the form of F is 
the ultimate explanation of why anything is F”.  But the argument, if successful, 
would work against any explanatory account and not only this particular one that he 
attributes to Fine.  Eck argues as follows (Eck 2008, 115): 
 
Phaedo 101c2-4, cited above, reduces the analysis of statements of 
self-predication as in Definition 1 (F-ness is F means: F-ness is the 
ultimate explanation of why anything is F) to an absurdity.  We learn 
from the passage that participating in F-ness is participating in the 
peculiar being of F-ness (cf. µετασχὸν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἑκάστου οὗ ἂν 
µετάσχῃ, c3-4).  Now, this peculiar being of F-ness, its specific being, is 
the being F-ness involves (a being ‘according to its own nature’, in the 
words of Sophist 250c), which is being F.  So, to participate in F-ness is 
to participate in the peculiar being of F-ness, in being F.  But now, if 
this being F of F-ness means being the ultimate explanation of why 
anything is F as the above analysis would have it, then participation in 
F-ness would be participation in being the ultimate explanation of why 
anything is F, and this makes a sensible thing itself the explanation why 
anything is F! 
In short, the argument seems to be roughly that, when something participates in the 
form of F, it participates in the form’s being F.  An explanatory interpretation would 
take it that the form’s being F means the form’s explaining things’ being F, or the 
form’s being the ultimate explanation of things’ being F.  But since this is what 
participants participate in, the participants would themselves explain things’ being F 
or would themselves be the ultimate explanation of things’ being F.  This is 
impossible for Plato, so these interpretations of Plato’s apparently self-predicational 
language, of the form of F’s “being F”, cannot be correct. 
 Before we can see where Eck’s argument goes wrong, it may help to look at a 
more precise formalization of it: 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
that the form of F is an F thing, and it emphasizes that the form explains things’ being F but not 
necessarily that it is the ultimate explanation of things’ being F.    
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1. If a sensible x participates in the form of F, x participates in the 
peculiar being of the form of F. (Phaedo 101c2-4) 
2. If x participates in the peculiar being of the form of F, x participates 
in the being the form of F involves. (Eck 2008, 112, 115) 
3. If x participates in the being the form of F involves, x participates 
in being F, or the being F of the form of F. (Eck 2008, 112, 115) 
4. Now suppose this “being F” of the form of F means “being the 
ultimate explanation of why anything is F” [for reductio] 
5. Then if x participates in the form of F, x would participate in being 
the ultimate explanation of why anything is F. [1, 2, 3, 4] 
6. So if x participates in the form of F, x would be the ultimate 
explanation of why anything is F. [5] 
7. But sensible participants in the form of F cannot be the ultimate 
explanation of why anything is F. 
8. Contradiction [6, 7] – so reject 4: The “being F” of the form of F 
cannot be “being the ultimate explanation of why anything is F”.     
Notice that although this argument is specifically intended against the view that “the 
form of F is F” means “the form of F is the ultimate explanation of why anything is 
F”, if successful, it would also work against my EP view (or any other explanatory 
account).  Step 4 could be rewritten as the claim that the “being F” of the form means 
“being F-explaining” or “explaining things’ being F”.  Then what would seem to 
follow is that participants in the form of F would themselves be F-explaining or would 
themselves explain things’ being F.  And since Plato clearly rejects the claim that all 
participants in the form of F themselves explain things’ being F, then the explanatory 
interpretation of EP would have to be rejected, according to the argument. 
 So where does the argument go wrong, or does it pose a serious problem for 
EP or any other explanatory interpretation?  Before we get to this, it is interesting to 
notice, as Eck fails to, that if this argument were successful against an explanatory 
interpretation, it would also undermine Eck’s own preferred reading of Plato’s 
apparently self-predicational language.  Eck defends a Frede-style interpretation 
according to which, when Plato says that “the form of F is F” what he intends is an 
“inside predication” (and not an identity or an attribution/ascription) which asserts that 
“the form of F is F in virtue of its own nature” (Eck 2008, 111-4).  Briefly (and 
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puzzlingly), what this means is that the form of F’s being is being F or that the very 
being the form of F is is being F (Eck 2008, 114).72  It seems the view reads “the form 
of F is F” as saying roughly that “being F” is part of the definition of the form of F.  
But if Step 4 of the argument is rewritten as the assumption that the “being F” of the 
form of F means “being F in virtue of its own nature”, as Eck would have it, then it 
would follow that participants in the form of F are themselves F in virtue of their own 
nature.  Then sensible participants would themselves be being F or “being F” would be 
part of their definition.  But this is certainly not true for Plato in the case of all 
participants in the form of F.  So this would have to be rejected as an interpretation of 
Plato’s apparently self-predicational language.  Eck’s own argument, if successful, 
would reduce his own view to an “absurdity”, and not merely all aetiological accounts.               
 So how can we rescue EP and, as it turns out, Eck’s own view, from Eck’s 
argument?  It is a bit difficult to pinpoint exactly where the argument goes wrong, 
because of the fact that Eck’s use of the term ‘being F’ is somewhat mysterious.  
Depending on what Eck means by this term, the fault in the argument will be found in 
premise 3 or premise 4.  To clarify the ambiguity, let us examine an example.  How 
are we to understand what Eck would mean by “the being equal of the form of equal”?  
There are two relevant interpretations here.  On one reading, ‘being equal’ is identical 
to the form of equality—perhaps on this reading ‘being equal’ could be taken as 
shorthand for ‘the property of being equal’.  (This reading seems to be suggested on 
114, when Eck says that “the being largeness is, is being large.”)  In this sense, it 
seems relatively uncontroversial to claim that the form of equality is identical to the 
property of being equal (as long as it is admitted that forms are properties).  
Alternatively, the ‘being equal’ of the form of equality might be the form of equal’s 
                                                
72 I examine this Frede-style view (that appears not to be susceptible to my attack from Chapter Two) in 
more detail in Chapter Four. 
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“being equal”, or whatever is meant by ‘is equal’ in Plato’s claim that “the form of 
equality is equal”.  Eck may be assuming that these two readings somehow amount to 
the same thing, but he should not do this in an argument intended to show that 
explanatory interpretations of the claim that “the form of F is F” are absurd, unless he 
wants to beg the question in his argument. 
How are we to decide between these two readings of ‘being equal’, and what 
effect will this have on the argument?  Suppose first that the ‘being equal’ of the form 
of equality just means the property of being equal.  Premise 3 of the argument would 
then be nonproblematic, because it merely states that when something participates in 
the form of equality and so the οὐσία or being of the form of equality, it participates in 
the property of being equal.  In premise 4, we find the claim that the ‘being equal’ of 
the form of equality means “being the ultimate explanation of why anything is equal”.  
What this amounts to on this reading is that the property of being equal is identical to 
the property of being the ultimate explanation of why anything is equal.  It would then 
follow that if something participates in the form of equality, it participates in the 
property of being the ultimate explanation of why anything is equal, and then it would 
be the ultimate explanation.  And this is an absurd result. 
The trouble with the argument, on this reading, is that an explanatory 
interpretation of Plato’s apparently self-predicational language would never be 
committed to premise 4.  The explanatory interpretation would not be committed to 
the claim that the property of being equal is the property of being the ultimate 
explanation of why anything is equal.  The form of equality, which is identical to the 
property of being equal, is not identical to the property of being the ultimate 
explanation of why anything is equal.  An explanatory interpretation holds that Plato 
intends to emphasize the explanatory role of forms when he claims that “the form of F 
is F”.  Such an interpretation is obviously not, however, committed to the claim that 
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the form of F, or the property of being F, is identical to the property of explaining 
things’ being F.  For example, equality is the property of being equal—it is the 
property of having sameness of measure.  Now, while this property may have the 
property of explaining things’ being equal, this is not the property that it is.73  So on 
this interpretation of Eck’s use of the ‘being F’ of the form of F, the argument 
attributes and reduces to absurdity an assumption to which explanatory interpretations 
are not committed. 
 Since it seems so inappropriate to attribute premise 4 to the explanatory 
theorist on this reading, perhaps we had better understand Eck to intend the second 
possibility sketched above.  On this reading, by the “being equal” of the form of 
equality, Eck means the form’s own being equal—on whatever reading it is true of the 
form that it “is equal”.  Premise 4 now states that in such a claim as “the form of 
equality is equal”, what ‘is equal’ means is “is the ultimate explanation of why 
anything is equal”.  And this is exactly what the explanatory view Eck is arguing 
against is committed to.  But even if we take premises 1 and 2 as correct 
interpretations of the textual evidence from the Phaedo, premise 3 simply does not 
follow and would (correctly) be denied by the explanatory theorist.  Let us accept that 
when something participates in the form of equality, it participates in the οὐσία or 
being of the form (premise 1).  Premise 2 appears to be roughly a restatement of this 
first claim.  But now premise 3 says that if something participates in the οὐσία of the 
form, it participates in the “being equal” of the form, or on this interpretation, in 
“being equal” according to whatever reading of ‘is equal’ is intended in the claim that 
“the form of equality is equal”. 
                                                
73 On BSP, which I examine in the next chapter, one way of being equal is to explain things’ being 
equal.  Still, even if the form of equality is the property of being equal, it will not be simply identical to 
the property of explaining things’ being equal.  Explaining things’ being equal is only one way of being 
equal, on this view. 
80 
But it is entirely unclear why one who accepts an explanatory reading of 
Plato’s apparently self-predicational language would accept such a claim.  For, the 
question of how to interpret Plato’s apparently self-predicational language is distinct 
from the question of how to understand what the οὐσία of a form is.  The οὐσία of a 
form seems to be the sort of thing that Socrates is looking for when he asks his “what 
is F?” question—it is the essence of the form as opposed to an accidental feature of it.  
For instance, in the Euthyphro, Socrates is looking for the essence of piety 
(ἐρωτώµενος τὸ ὅσιον ὅτι ποτ’ ἐστίν, τὴν µὲν οὐσίαν µοι αὐτοῦ οὐ βούλεσθαι δηλῶσαι), as 
opposed to some accident (πάθος δέ τι) (Euthyphro 11a7-9).  And as Socrates sets out 
to find the οὐσία of piety, he already recognizes that it is that by which all pious things 
are pious (ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ᾧ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅσιά ἐστιν) (Euthyphro 6d10-1).  Now it 
seems incorrect to claim that the explanatory role of a form is an accidental feature of 
it—far from it—but at least the οὐσία of it is something distinct from this explanatory 
role, or at the very least, something more. 
In the case of the form of equality, it would seem that the οὐσία or being of the 
form would be sameness of measure (Parmenides 140b7-8).  Premises 1 and 2 in 
Eck’s argument seem to follow from the textual evidence of the Phaedo that he cites: 
if something participates in the form of equality, then it participates in the οὐσία of the 
form of equality—it participates in sameness of measure.  If something participates in 
the οὐσία of the form of equality, it will be equal and will have sameness of measure.  
But now premise 3 holds that if something participates in the οὐσία of the form of 
equality, or the οὐσία “that the form involves”, then it will participate in “being equal” 
according to the reading of ‘is equal’ on which the form of equality “is equal”.  This 
simply does not follow from the textual evidence, nor would the explanatory theorist 
have any reason to accept it.  What Plato means when he asserts that “the form of F is 
F” is simply a distinct question from what Plato thinks the οὐσία of a form is.  The 
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explanatory theorist is under no obligation to say that when x participates in the form 
of F, it will be true to say that x “is F” on whatever exact reading it is true to say that 
the form “is F”.            
 So to sum up, if in Eck’s argument we take the ‘being F’ of the form of F to be 
a way of referring to the property of being F (or perhaps the form of being F), then no 
explanatory theorist will be committed to premise 4 or one analogous to it.  If, on the 
other hand, the ‘being F’ of the form of F is a way of referring to the form’s being F or 
the ‘is F’ according to which the form of F “is F”, then no explanatory theorist will be 
committed to premise 3.  Participating in the form of F (or the οὐσία of the form of F) 
simply does not entail participating in “being F”, where this means “being F” on 
whatever exact reading it is true (in general) that the form of F “is F”.  Eck’s argument 
against an explanatory interpretation of Plato’s apparently self-predicational language 
such as EP, which he takes to be decisive, is entirely unsatisfactory.  Luckily for Eck, 
his argument also fails to undermine his own view on self-predication.  But in Chapter 
Four, we will return to the consideration of Frede-style views such as Eck’s, and we 
will see why they ought to be rejected in favor of EP.   
 
 
V. Explanatory Predication of Form-Particularizations 
 
 So far in this chapter, I have provided an account of my EP view, and I have 
presented some textual evidence to help support the view.  In the last section, I argued 
against a recent attempt to undermine explanatory accounts of Plato’s apparently self-
predicational language.  I have only suggested, and not argued for, the claim that, 
unlike the number of views considered in Chapter Two, EP is not susceptible to the 
main argument there.  In short, the main argument of that chapter was that, based on 
82 
evidence from the Phaedo, Plato is committed to the existence of form-
particularizations that are distinct from their corresponding forms.  Further, Plato 
intends the same use of ‘is’ and the sense of the predicate ‘F’ in the generalizable 
claim that “the form of F is F” and the corresponding claim concerning form-
particularizations, that “the-F-ness-in-x is F”.  For instance, the use of ‘is’ and the 
sense of the predicate ‘large’ is the same in the claims that “the form of largeness is 
large” and “the-largeness-in-Simmias is large”.  This evidence tells against numerous 
interpretations—namely, any interpretation that sees “the form of F is F” either as an 
identity statement or as referring to instances of or participants in the subject term. 
 But a difficulty seems to arise for EP itself.  According to EP, “the form of 
largeness is large” should be read as meaning only that the form of largeness is large-
explaining, or that it explains things’ being large.  But can we apply this reading to 
form-particularizations?  To do so, ‘is’ must be taken as the ‘is’ of predication and the 
predicate must also be taken to refer to the property of being large-explaining.  But 
could it possibly be true that the-largeness-in-Simmias is large-explaining?  Does the 
largeness-particularization, in addition to the form, explain things’ being large? 
 If form-particularizations are ontologically distinct from forms, as I have 
argued, then it seems as if they cannot possibly be explainers along with forms.  It 
seems as if Plato has repeatedly told us in the Phaedo that only forms can be 
explainers.  It is only the form of F that makes things F or explains things’ being F, 
isn’t it?  In fact, if we look closely at the evidence from the Phaedo, we will see that 
he is not committed to this claim exactly.  When Plato is being most precise (in 
passages that we will examine shortly), what he says is not that the form of F is the 
only explanation of things’ being F, but rather that participation or sharing in the form 
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of F is the one explanation of things’ being F.74  Now Plato does repeatedly make it 
sound as if the explanation of things’ having the properties that they have, in cases in 
which a form exists, is simply the form itself.  For instance, Plato states in two 
instances in the Phaedo that all beautiful things come to be beautiful by the beautiful 
(τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ [γίγνεται] καλά) (Phaedo 100d7-8) (τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ [γίγνεται] 
καλά) (Phaedo 100e2-3).  Right after these points, he claims that the same holds in the 
case of the forms of largeness and smallness.  He claims at 101a2-5: 
 
Everything that is larger than 
something else is larger by no other 
thing than by largeness, and it is larger 
on account of this, namely on account 
of largeness; and whatever is smaller 
is smaller by no other thing than by 
smallness, and it is smaller on account 
of this, namely on account of 
smallness. 
 τὸ µεῖζον πᾶν ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐδενὶ 
ἄλλῳ µεῖζόν ἐστιν ἢ µεγέθει, καὶ διὰ 
τοῦτο µεῖζον, διὰ τὸ µέγεθος, τὸ δὲ 
ἔλαττον οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἔλαττον ἢ 
σµικρότητι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἔλαττον, διὰ 
τὴν σµικρότητα. 
It seems that the explanation of things’ being beautiful, large (or larger), and small (or 
smaller) are simply the forms of beauty, largeness, and smallness respectively.  And 
Plato makes it clear in this passage that these claims ought to be generalized to all 
forms (Phaedo 100c4-6, 101c2-4).  Together, these claims make it seem that the form 
of F, and the form of F only, explains things’ being F.  How then can the ontologically 
distinct form-particularizations possibly explain things’ being F as well?  Are we 
forced to say that EP is susceptible to the main argument from Chapter Two along 
with the other views considered there?  For it seems that “the same reading” that EP 
affirms, for example, in the claim that “the form of largeness is large” cannot be 
applied in the claim “the-largeness-in-Simmias is large”.  While the form of largeness 
is large-explaining, it seems the-largeness-in-Simmias cannot possibly be, since that 
role seems reserved for the form alone.   
                                                
74 This is according to the safe αἰτία of the Phaedo, which in my view Plato maintains at least 
throughout this dialogue. 
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 However, both immediately before and immediately after these claims in 
which Plato suggests that the form of F is the explanation of things’ being F, he spells 
out more fully what the explanation really amounts to.  At 100c4-6, Plato states: 
 
If any other thing is beautiful except 
the beautiful itself, it is not beautiful 
on account of another single thing 
than because it shares in that 
beautiful—and indeed I speak in the 
same way concerning all things.   
 εἴ τί ἐστιν ἄλλο καλὸν πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ 
καλόν, οὐδὲ δι’ ἓν ἄλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἢ 
διότι µετέχει ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ· καὶ 
πάντα δὴ οὕτως λέγω.   
The explanation of things’ being beautiful is not simply the form of beauty but rather, 
more precisely, sharing in the form of beauty, whatever that amounts to exactly.  Right 
after this the point is reaffirmed, when Plato claims that no other thing makes anything 
whatsoever (ὁτιοῦν—100d1) beautiful than the presence of or association with that 
beautiful, or however or whatever the way of attaching is75 (οὐκ ἄλλο τι ποιεῖ αὐτὸ καλὸν 
ἢ ἡ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ εἴτε παρουσία εἴτε κοινωνία εἴτε ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενοµένη) 
(Phaedo 100d4-6).  And again at 101c2-7, Plato makes it clear that it is not simply the 
form of F that is the explanation of things’ being F, but rather the sharing or 
participation (µετάσχεσις) in the form: 
 
And you would shout loudly that you 
do not know another way in which 
each thing can come to be than by 
sharing in the particular being of each 
thing in which it shares, and in the 
case of these things, you do not have 
another explanation of becoming two 
other than the sharing in twoness, and 
it is necessary for things which are 
going to be two to share in this, and 
whatever is going to be one to share in 
oneness. 
 καὶ µέγα ἂν βοῴης ὅτι οὐκ οἶσθα ἄλλως 
πως ἕκαστον γιγνόµενον ἢ µετασχὸν 
τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἑκάστου οὗ ἂν 
µετάσχῃ, καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἔχεις 
ἄλλην τινὰ αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι 
ἀλλ’ ἢ τὴν τῆς δυάδος µετάσχεσιν, καὶ 
δεῖν τούτου ετασχεῖν τὰ µέλλοντα δύο 
ἔσεσθαι, καὶ µονάδος ὃ ἂν µέλλῃ ἓν 
ἔσεσθαι…. 
                                                
75 I use the translation here of “attaching” for προσγενοµένη, but this could be, and probably is, intended 
as metaphorical for whatever relation holds between form and participant.  There is certainly 
disagreement here about how to take ὅπῃ δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενοµένη.  See Dancy, who notes some 
unattractive textual emendations and suggests both “however and in whatever way it becomes added to 
[them]” and the vaguer “however and in whatever way it comes-to-be-related-to [them]” (Dancy 1991, 
15, 129 n. 61). 
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So although Plato sometimes speaks as if the form itself is the cause or explanation of 
something’s being the way it is, in fact his view is that (not the form itself, but) 
sharing or participation in the form is the cause or explanation.   
 But what does this participation amount to, between something which is F and 
the form of F?  Plato seems explicitly noncommittal on the exact nature of this 
relation.  In one of the passages I have just quoted from the Phaedo, Plato claims that 
what makes something beautiful is the presence of or association with the form of 
beauty, or however or whatever the way of attaching is (Phaedo 100d4-6)—by which 
he seems to mean whatever the relation turns out to be, perhaps upon further 
investigation into its nature.  Plato continues by expressing his reservations, when he 
has Socrates say that he is not confidently affirming anything further about this 
relation (οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο διισχυρίζοµαι) (Phaedo 100d6-7).  So perhaps in the Phaedo, 
Plato’s view is that the explanation of something’s being F is participation in the form 
of F, but what that participation amounts to is left entirely unspecified.           
 In fact, Plato does tell us a bit more about the nature of participation in the 
Phaedo.  Just after Plato introduces the notion of participation and claims that 
participation in forms is the explanation of things’ being the way they are (in cases in 
which forms exist), he introduces talk of form-particularizations.  And this is, I think, 
no accident.  At 102b1-2, Plato reaffirms the point about participation (although 
admittedly adding a point about naming) when he claims that “each of the forms exist 
and other things receive the name of these very things by sharing in them” (εἶναί τι 
ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τούτων τἆλλα µεταλαµβάνοντα αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ἐπωνυµίαν ἴσχειν).  
And Plato continues in the next sentence at 102b3-7 to first introduce talk of form-
particularizations: 
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And I said, if indeed you say these 
things are so, when you say that 
Simmias is larger than Socrates and 
smaller than Phaedo, do you mean 
then that there are both in Simmias, 
namely both largeness and smallness?  
I do. 
 Εἰ δή, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ταῦτα οὕτως λέγεις, ἆρ’ 
οὐχ, ὅταν Σιµµίαν Σωκράτους φῇς 
µείζω εἶναι, Φαίδωνος δὲ ἐλάττω, λέγεις 
τότ’ εἶναι ἐν τῷ Σιµµίᾳ ἀµφότερα, καὶ 
µέγεθος καὶ σµικρότητα; Ἔγωγε. 
Here Plato affirms that when Simmias is larger and smaller, there is both largeness and 
smallness in Simmias.  Very shortly after this, Plato goes on to refer more explicitly to 
form-particularizations and distinguish them from forms, when he discusses the 
largeness and smallness in us as opposed to those in nature, and then generalizes what 
he says to all opposites (Phaedo 102d5-103c1).76  So, what is true of x when it is 
large—what is the explanation of x’s being large—is participation in the form of 
largeness.  And when x is large (or larger), there is a largeness-in-x.  So when 
something is F (in a case in which a form exists), not only is it true to say that it 
participates in the form of F, but it is also true that there is an F-ness-particularization 
in it. 
But can we draw any conclusion here about the nature of participation?  I do 
not mean to suggest that the whole story of what participation in forms amounts to is 
merely the possession of form-particularizations.  However, Plato is suggesting that 
x’s having an F-ness-particularization in it is at least part of the nature of x’s 
participation in the form of F.  Something’s having a form-particularization in it is at 
least one important part of the explanation of its being the way that it is. 
Now we are in a position to see how EP can be immune to the main attack 
against interpretations of Plato’s apparently self-predicational language from Chapter 
Two.  As I have argued, the explanation of something’s being F is not simply the form 
of F—this is not the whole story.  Rather, the explanation is participation in the form 
                                                
76 See Chapter Two for an argument for the claim that form-particularizations as distinct from forms are 
being referred to in this passage. 
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of F.  And what this amounts to is at least partly the possession of an F-ness-
particularization.  While the form of F is not simply the explanation of things’ being F, 
the form of F is F-explaining because it plays a central role in that explanation.  The 
form of F explains things’ being F because it is by way of participation in the form 
that things are F.  However, the-F-ness-particularization-in-x is also F-explaining 
because it too plays a crucial role in that explanation.  What it means for something to 
participate in the form of F is at least partly for that thing to have an F-ness-
particularization in it.  So, for instance, not only the form of largeness but also the-
largeness-in-Simmias explains Simmias’ being large, because it is (partly) by way of 
having a largeness-particularization in him that Simmias is large.77  So “the form of 
largeness is large” and “the-largeness-in-Simmias is large” can receive “the same 
reading”, the one that EP proposes is Plato’s intention, because both the form and the 
form-particularization are large-explaining.  They both explain Simmias’ being large, 
because they both play important roles in the explanation of his being large.78           
                                                
77 See Devereux on the explanatory role of form-particularizations, or as he refers to them, immanent 
characters: 
 
For Plato, immanent characters have a definite explanatory role.  If the explanation of 
Socrates’ being white must include reference to something in him, and the Form 
whiteness is not in him, there must be some other entity, the immanent character of 
whiteness, to do the job. (Devereux 2000, 216) 
 
78 Note that EP satisfies the B-requirement even though the form of F and the F-ness-particularization 
are F-explaining in different ways.  As I argued in Chapter Two, Section III, the B-requirement requires 
that “the form of F is F” and “the-F-ness-in-x is F” involve the same use of ‘is’ and the same sense of 
the predicate ‘F’, but not that the predicate is true of the subjects in the same way.  As examples, I noted 
that there is nothing at all misleading with the claims: “Salmon and trout are fish” and “The Grand 
Canyon and Mozart’s Requiem are beautiful”, even though the predicates are true of the subjects in 
different ways.  Note that according to EP, the predicate ‘F’ is not (in general) literally true of the form 
of F or of the-F-ness-in-x, but the B-requirement is still satisfied because one and the same sense of the 
property that the word ‘F’ is being used to refer to is true of both subjects.  According to EP, the 
statement involving the form and the one involving the form-particularization both involve the ‘is’ of 
predication, and they say that the referent of the subject term has the property of being F-explaining.  
Now, as I have just argued in this chapter, the form and the form-particularization are F-explaining in 
different ways because they have different roles to play in the explanation of things’ being F.  But since 
the predicate ‘F’ is being used in both statements to refer to the same thing, the property of being F-
explaining, EP satisfies the B-requirement. 
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 However, one might object to my line of argument that, as I have pointed out, 
Plato seems to clue his reader in to the fact that he is unsure about the exact nature of 
the participation relation—or at least that he will not express a firm position about it 
here in the Phaedo.  At 100d, Plato is explicit that he is not confidently affirming what 
the nature of participation is, but I have been claiming that he goes on to spell out that 
participation involves the possession of form-particularizations.  As I discussed in 
Chapter Two, Dancy argues against the view that Plato posits distinct form-
particularizations.  Dancy claims further that Plato merely uses the term ‘participation’ 
as a placeholder for whatever the relation between the form of F and the many Fs turns 
out to be—Plato is explicitly silent about what the relation amounts to (Dancy 1991, 
15).  Dancy argues that because of Socrates’ “fence sitting” with regard to the nature 
of participation, we should be suspicious of a view attributing form-particularizations 
to Plato here, because: 
 
[Plato] had said that, to keep things safe, he would have nothing to say 
about how the relationship between Forms and mundane objects 
worked, but, under this interpretation, he certainly does have something 
to say, and it is far from safe. (Dancy 2004, 309) 
Dancy argues that, with regard to the nature of participation, Plato is “emphatic that he 
is committed to nothing whatever” (Dancy 1991, 15).  But in my view, Plato is 
committed in the Phaedo to the claim that participation (at least partly) involves the 
possession of form-particularizations.        
 I certainly agree with Dancy that there is evidence that Plato is reluctant in the 
Phaedo to spell out the exact nature of the participation relation.  However, my 
account of what Plato thinks participation involves in the Phaedo is consistent with his 
reluctance, because even on my account Plato has not yet fully specified the nature of 
participation.  In my view, Plato holds that the explanation of x’s being F is 
participation in the form of F, and that this participation involves x’s having a 
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corresponding form-particularization in it.  But Plato has remained silent about the 
relation between form and its corresponding form-particularization.  Plato has told us 
nothing about how exactly, for instance, the-largeness-in-Simmias is related to the 
form of largeness, beyond the fact that they are distinct and that the-largeness-in-
Simmias as opposed to the form is in Simmias.  But an F-ness-particularization is an 
F-ness-particularization rather than a G-ness-particularization because it is related in 
some special way to the form of F—and Plato has left the nature of this relation 
entirely unspecified in the Phaedo.  So Plato’s reservation concerning the exact nature 
of participation is consistent with my view that he does propose the mere involvement 
of form-particularizations.  Plato does suggest uncertainty concerning the nature of 
participation—and this uncertainty is explained by the fact that Plato has not at all 
spelled out the way in which forms are related to their corresponding form-
particularizations.79       
 
 
VI. Form-Particularizations of Form-Particularizations 
 
 Let us agree that Plato thinks in the Phaedo that the explanation of x’s being F 
is participation in the form of F, and that this participation in the form involves x’s 
having an F-ness-particularization (that is distinct from the form) in it.  A difficulty 
arises here for this interpretation.  For one wonders whether it is possible for an F-
ness-particularization to itself be an F thing and itself a participant in the form of F.  If 
so, would the F-ness-particularization be F by its having an F-ness-particularization in 
itself?  And if this further F-ness-particularization is F too, would it then have an F-
                                                
79 Plato’s preferred view of the relation between form and its corresponding form-particularizations 
seems to be one of resemblance or similarity, although this is not made clear in the Phaedo.  I return to 
a discussion of the exact nature of this relation in Chapter Five. 
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ness-particularization in it, and so on ad infinitum?  Would this interpretation then 
commit us to there being at least some instances of form-particularizations with 
infinite numbers of form-particularizations in them?  Isn’t this a devastating result?  
Both Mohan Matthen and McPherran, who attribute to Plato form-particularizations 
and a role for them in participation, respond to this puzzle differently.  I will examine 
both of their responses to these questions, which I argue are extreme and 
unsatisfactory.  Then I will argue for my own account according to which Plato 
accepts that there can be form-particularizations of form-particularizations.  Although 
this view may commit Plato to some infinite regresses of form-particularizations, the 
regresses, I will argue, are not vicious. 
 In two papers, “Plato’s Treatment of Relational Statements in the Phaedo” and 
“Forms and Participants in Plato’s Phaedo”, Matthen argues for the view that all form-
particularizations are participants in their corresponding forms.  Matthen puzzles over 
the question of whether form-particularizations, which he takes Plato to posit as a third 
sort of thing along with forms and particulars (Matthen 1982, 90, 96; Matthen 1984, 
281), “in addition to the bearers of properties, are participants in the forms” (Matthen 
1984, 281).  He claims that it follows from Plato’s ontology that “Simmias participates 
in tallness” implies that “Some characteristic present in Simmias participates in 
tallness” (Matthen 1982, 94, 96).  Matthen’s view is that the characteristic present in 
Simmias when he participates in tallness, the form-particularization or immanent 
character in Simmias, will itself be a participant in tallness along with Simmias.  And 
he thinks that this generalizes to all form-particularizations.     
 But why should we think that all form-particularizations are participants in 
their corresponding forms?  Matthen seems to hold this view on the basis of some 
confusion about the distinction between ‘being an F thing’ and ‘being an F-ness’.  
Matthen suggests that it is the central claim of Plato’s theory of forms that “bearers 
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have their properties because they participate in a form—for example, that 
[Praxiteles’] Aphrodite is beautiful because it participates in beauty” (Matthen 1984, 
281).  But Matthen continues: “An analogous claim would be that the relevant 
character in the Aphrodite (that is, the beauty in the Aphrodite) is a beauty because it 
participates in beauty” (Matthen 1984, 281).  What it means to say that the-beauty-in-
the-Aphrodite is “a beauty” is that it is a property-instance of the form of beauty—it is 
a beauty-particularization.  But contrary to what Matthen suggests, the claim that the-
beauty-in-the-Aphrodite is a beauty, is not a claim analogous to the first, now in the 
case of a form-particularization.  The relevant analogous claim would be that the-
beauty-in-the-Aphrodite is beautiful because it participates in beauty.  On Plato’s 
view, it is not being an F-ness which is explained by participation in the form of F, but 
rather being F or being an F thing.  But Matthen seems to miss the important 
distinction here between ‘being F’ and ‘being an F-ness’.  Again, Matthen reveals his 
confusion when he claims that “equality is an equal, that is, it is an equality” (Matthen 
1984, 294).  What it would seem to mean for equality to be “an equal” would be for it 
to be an equal thing, and this is certainly distinct from the claim that it is an equality. 
 So Matthen is correct in his claim that all F-ness-particularizations “are F-
nesses” in the sense that they are each the-F-ness-in-something.  But Matthen seems 
wrong to think, if he does, that all F-ness-particularizations are F things.  And they 
would all be participants in the form of F only if they were all F things.  Being an F-
ness alone does not entail participating in the form of F.80  Matthen is certainly wrong 
in thinking that all F-ness-particularizations must be participants in the form of F on 
the grounds that they are all F-nesses. 
                                                
80 I do think, however, that being an F-ness-particularization does have something to do with being 
related to the form of F in some special way, just not by participation.  Again, I return to a discussion of 
this relation in Chapter Five. 
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 But while Matthen may suggest that all form-particularizations are participants 
in their corresponding forms on the basis of some confusion, the question still remains 
whether form-particularizations can be participants in (their corresponding or other) 
forms.  McPherran accepts Matthen’s general account of Plato’s ontology and theory 
of forms, but offers a “small correction” (McPherran 1984, 30).  McPherran argues 
that on the correct interpretation of participation and the role of form-particularizations 
or immanent characters, similar to the one I have argued for in Section V of this 
chapter, “only particulars—and not immanent characters—need to be said to 
participate in forms…” (McPherran 1984, 32).  Although form-particularizations do 
not need to be said to participate in forms, this seems to leave open the possibility that 
some of them, in fact, do.  But in other places, McPherran clearly stresses that he 
thinks it is impossible for form-particularizations to participate in forms.  He claims 
that form-particularizations are “nonparticipating” (McPherran 1984, 31) and that “no 
one, including Matthen, ought to think that Plato’s immanent characters participate in 
forms…” (McPherran 1984, 33).  Again, he asserts bluntly that “immanent characters 
do not participate in forms” (McPherran 1984, 36).  So while Matthen mistakenly 
holds that all form-particularizations are participants in their corresponding forms 
(merely because they are F-nesses), McPherran seems to hold an opposing extreme 
view—no form-particularizations are participants in their corresponding forms (or 
perhaps any forms at all). 
 McPherran provides two main reasons for attributing such a view to Plato, one 
textual and the other philosophical.  First, he claims that “there is no textual demand” 
for attributing to Plato the view that form-particularizations are participants in forms 
(McPherran 1984, 36).  Now McPherran is correct that Plato never explicitly states 
that form-particularizations participate in forms—he does not say, for instance, that 
the-largeness-in-Simmias participates in the form of largeness, or any such analogous 
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claim.  But there does seem to be some textual evidence for claiming that (at least 
some) form-particularizations are participants.  Plato is emphatic in the Phaedo in 
suggesting that if anything whatsoever81 is F (perhaps with the only exception being 
the form of F), it is F because it participates in the form of F.  So if it is true to say that 
there are cases in which form-particularizations are F, in cases in which a form of F 
exists, then it seems Plato’s view is that they will be F as well by participation in the 
form of F.82  Shortly, I will return to the point that there are obviously numerous cases 
of ‘F’ in which it will be true to say that form-particularizations are F.  Also, even if 
McPherran is right that there is no explicit textual demand for claiming that some 
form-particularizations are participants, the textual silence would certainly leave this 
as a live possibility. 
But McPherran thinks we should attribute to Plato the view that it is 
impossible for form-particularizations to be participants, mainly because he thinks that 
disastrous philosophical consequences would follow if they were participants.  In 
“Plato’s Particulars”, McPherran hesitantly suggests what would follow if form-
particularizations or immanent characters were participants in forms and thereby had 
form-particularizations in themselves: “[I]mmanent characters do not possess other 
immanent characters (and should not, it would seem, on pain of a possible infinite 
regress of possessors of possessors)” (McPherran 1988, 545).  In an earlier paper, 
“Participants and Particularizations in the Phaedo”, McPherran puts the point more 
fully and confidently: 
 
 
                                                
81 For instance, see the τί at 100c4, the ὁτιοῦν at 100d1, the πᾶν at 101a2, and the ἕκαστον at 101c3.  
82 Of course, it could be argued that Plato intends to restrict the claims he makes throughout this 
passage to all particulars, and does not intend for these claims to apply in addition to form-
particularizations.  I only want to stress that Plato is emphatic in suggesting that these claims apply to 
all Fs, and if I and McPherran are correct that Plato already has form-particularizations in mind here as 
he introduces participation, it seems likely that what he says here is meant to apply to form-
particularizations as well as particulars.  
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[I]f immanent characters participate in forms, then immanent characters 
possess immanent characters, which in turn would themselves be 
participants in forms.  The result is then an infinite regress of the 
possession of immanent characters by immanent characters possessing 
immanent characters ad infinitum.  Plato, however, would seem to have 
been a good enough philosopher to have been able to spot this obvious 
a ‘third man’.  If so, then participation within the context of a tripartite 
ontology should be understood to be limited to particular subjects (the 
possessors of immanent characters), and forbidden to immanent 
characters. (McPherran 1984, 38) 
So McPherran argues that the-F-ness-in-x cannot participate in the form of F, nor can 
the-F-ness-in-x be F.  (For if the-F-ness-in-x were F, it would be F by way of 
participation in the form of F).  He makes his commitment to this further point, that 
the the-F-ness-in-x cannot be F, clear when he asserts that “immanent characters do 
not have their characteristics predicated of them; rather, their characteristics are what 
they are (identical to)” (McPherran 1984, 38-9).  In the particular case of Praxiteles’ 
Aphrodite, the argument would go as follows:  Suppose that the-beauty-in-the-
Aphrodite were itself a beautiful thing, and so, in addition to the Aphrodite, also 
participated in the form of beauty.  What this would mean is that there would be, in 
the-beauty-in-the-Aphrodite, another beauty-particularization—there would be the-
beauty-in-the-beauty-in-the-Aphrodite.  But this beauty-particularization of the first 
beauty-particularization would itself be a beautiful thing.83  And so there would be a 
further beauty-particularization in it, and so on, ad infinitum.  To avoid this obvious 
“third man” regress, McPherran argues, we should attribute to Plato the view that F-
ness-particularizations simply cannot be F nor can they participate in the form of F. 
 While I think that McPherran is correct in criticizing Matthen’s view that all 
form-particularizations must participate in their corresponding forms, McPherran is 
wrong to go for the opposite extreme view that no form-particularizations can 
                                                
83 This does not necessarily follow—perhaps the-beauty-in-the-Aphrodite is beautiful but the-beauty-in-
the-beauty-in-the-Aphrodite is not beautiful.  However, this seems highly unlikely and ad hoc.  If the 
first beauty-particularization counts as a beautiful thing, why wouldn’t the second?  
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participate, and that this leads to a disastrous third man-type regress.  Consider again 
what McPherran claims when he says that “immanent characters do not have their 
characteristics predicated of them; rather, their characteristics are what they are 
(identical to)” (McPherran 1984, 38-9).  McPherran’s claim here is not correct in all 
cases.  Form-particularizations are “characteristics”, and so there is some sense in 
which it is true to claim that they “are identical to their characteristics”, but they also 
have some characteristics, and sometimes they have “their own characteristics”.  
McPherran might be right to claim that the-largeness-in-Simmias is identical to a 
largeness (i.e., a largeness-particularization), but the-largeness-in-Simmias is not itself 
large and so does not participate in the form of largeness.  But there are other cases in 
which it seems that Plato is committed to the view that F-ness-particularizations are F, 
and so in these cases, contrary to what McPherran suggests, immanent characters do 
have their characteristics predicated of them.  Beauty is perhaps such a case.  Plato 
might think that beauty-particularizations are in fact beautiful things, participate in the 
form of beauty, and thereby have beauty-particularizations within themselves.  And 
consider what might be a less controversial example, sameness or self-identity.  
Socrates is the same as himself (i.e., is self-identical) because he participates in 
sameness.  What follows is that there is a sameness-particularization in Socrates.  But 
it certainly seems correct to claim that the-sameness-in-Socrates, that particular 
sameness-particularization, is itself the same as itself.  If so, then the-sameness-in-
Socrates participates in the form of sameness and has a sameness-particularization in 
itself.  It seems unavoidable that at least in some cases, form-particularizations will 
participate in forms and have form-particularizations in themselves. 
 But while McPherran is wrong to claim that form-particularizations cannot 
participate and cannot possess form-particularizations, he does seem right to suggest 
that an infinite regress follows from such a view.  For clearly, the-sameness-in-the-
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sameness-in-Socrates will itself be self-identical, and this will require a further 
sameness-particularization, and so on ad infinitum.  This is undeniable.  However, I 
want to suggest that, contrary to what McPherran asserts, this is not a vicious regress 
or a “third man”.  The (first) Third Man Argument (TMA) of the Parmenides is 
vicious (in part) because it is explanatory.84  According to the regress of the TMA, the 
question of what explains something’s being F is never fully answered.  Something is 
F because it participates in a never-ending sequence of ontologically distinct forms of 
F.  If something is F, it is F by way of participating in the form of F at level 1, the 
form of F at level 2, the form of F at level 3, and so on ad infinitum.85  A complete 
account of what makes something F would have to mention an infinite number of 
things.  So at least one reason why the regress of the TMA is so disastrous for the 
theory of forms is that a complete explanation of things’ being the way they are 
requires reference to an infinite string of forms, as opposed to a unique form in each 
case. 
 On the other hand, the regress of form-particularizations of form-
particularizations is different.  The question of what makes x F has a complete answer 
involving a finite number of entities86: x is F because x participates in the form of F, 
which involves x’s having in it an F-ness-particularization (which is related in a 
special way to the form of F).  That is the end of the story.  Whether the F-ness-
particularization is itself F is a further and entirely unrelated question.  The F-ness-in-
x’s being F has nothing to do with x’s being F.  For instance, Socrates is the same as 
himself because he participates in the form of sameness and so has a sameness-
particularization in him.  That is the complete account of what explains Socrates’ 
                                                
84 I examine this argument in detail in Chapter Seven. 
85 Again, see Chapter Seven for a defense of this claim. 
86 That is, assuming that the theory of forms of the middle dialogues is not otherwise susceptible to the 
regresses of the TMA, which is a position I argue for in Chapter Seven. 
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being self-identical.87  Now the question of whether the-sameness-in-Socrates is 
identical to itself, is entirely irrelevant to the question of what makes Socrates self-
identical.  It turns out of course that the-sameness-in-Socrates is self-identical, but that 
is a further unrelated point that has its own complete explanation.88 
 But let us not be too hasty here.  We should not ignore what might be thought 
to be an undesirable result of this interpretation of Plato’s ontology and his 
understanding of participation.  One might think that this interpretation attributes to 
Plato an inelegant and messy ontology.  It certainly does not seem like much of a 
desert landscape.  Not only do numerous intelligible forms exist in addition to 
particulars, but there will also be infinite strings of form-particularizations within 
form-particularizations all over the place.  But we should not forget what sort of things 
form-particularizations are supposed to be—even if they can have form-
particularizations in them, they are not particulars like Socrates or Praxiteles’ 
Aphrodite.  So it may not be a disastrous feature of the view that it posits lots and lots 
of form-particularizations.  It does in fact seem true to claim that Socrates’ self-
identity is self-identical, and so on and so forth, and it seems other theories may find it 
difficult to explain this fact.  Whether or not the view I am attributing to Plato is a true 
account of reality, in my view, at least it should not be quickly cast aside.  The 
explanatory elegance of the view far outweighs any inelegance it might have on the 
basis of its lack of parsimony—at least, it offers a fairly straightforward account of 
what it means for anything to have and gain and lose properties. 
                                                
87 Admittedly, it is relevant to know what makes the-sameness-in-Socrates a sameness-particularization.  
This will have to do with there being a special relation between the-sameness-in-Socrates and the form 
of sameness.  Again, I argue in Chapter Five that there is evidence in Plato to suggest that his preferred 
view is that the relation is a resemblance relation.  I also spell out there what exactly this resemblance 
between form and form-particularization amounts to. 
88 Also note that the TMA is problematic for Plato because, if there are infinitely many forms of F, his 
uniqueness assumption is violated.  (See Chapter Seven for more on this point.)  But there being 
infinitely many form-particularizations within form-particularizations does not present any analogous 
difficulty for Plato—he does not seem to be committed to any relevant uniqueness assumption in the 
case of form-particularizations. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
OTHER REMAINING VIEWS 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 We have been looking for an interpretation of Plato’s puzzling apparently self-
predicational language that will be consistent with the textual evidence and, to borrow 
a phrase from Penner, will be one that Plato “could have had in mind”.  So far, we 
have seen textual and philosophical reasons to avoid attributing NSP to Plato.  We also 
saw evidence from the Phaedo concerning form-particularizations that was especially 
helpful to our project:  Plato seems committed to the view that, for instance, “the form 
of largeness is large” and “the-largeness-in-Simmias is large”, with these claims 
receiving “the same reading”.  What this means is, at least, that the use of ‘is’ and the 
sense of the predicate ‘large’ should be understood to be the same in the two claims.  
This argument led us to doubt numerous influential interpretations of Plato’s 
apparently self-predicational language.  In particular, we saw that the following views 
seemed susceptible to our argument: the Tautologous Identity view (derived from 
Allen and Cherniss), two different Non-Tautologous Identity views (one derived from 
Mills and one derived from Nehamas), Vlastos’ Pauline Predication view, and 
Peterson’s Pauline Predication view according to the “conservative reinterpretation”.  
All of these views seemed not to satisfy the B-requirement because, according to 
them, “the form of largeness is large” and “the-largeness-in-Simmias is large” could 
not receive “the same reading”. 
 In the last chapter, I introduced the Explanatory Predication (EP) view, 
presented textual evidence from the Hippias Major for any explanatory view such as 
this one, and explained how EP seems immune to the argument based on the Phaedo 
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evidence concerning form-particularizations.  According to EP, the use of ‘is’ and the 
sense of the predicate ‘F’ (or perhaps more precisely, the sense of the property that the 
predicate ‘F’ is being used to refer to) can successfully be kept the same in the 
statements “the form of F is F” and “the-F-ness-in-x is F”—both statements say that 
the referent of the subject term has the property of being F-explaining.  This is a happy 
result for Plato, I argued, because both forms and form-particularizations have 
important explanatory roles to play in what makes something the way it is (in cases in 
which forms exist).  It looks as if we may have found a successful interpretation of 
Plato’s apparently self-predicational language, at least in so far as it does not commit 
Plato to anything grossly implausible, and it seems consistent with the textual 
evidence (that we have looked at so far).89 
 But we cannot be too hasty here.  EP seems immune to the main argument 
from Chapter Two concerning the form-particularization evidence from the Phaedo, 
while numerous influential views do not seem to fare as well.  However, there are 
some other influential views that appear unsusceptible to this main argument and 
consistent with the textual evidence from the Phaedo relied on in this argument.  
These views fall into two main groups, the first attributing a genuine self-predication 
assumption to Plato and the second not.  Views in the first group hold that Plato 
expands the extension of predicates (at least in cases in which forms exist) in such a 
way that, although the form of F and sensible Fs are F in the same sense of ‘F’, the 
form of F is F in a different way.  Both Peterson’s Pauline Predication view according 
to the “expansive reinterpretation” and Fine’s Broad Self-Predication view (developed 
from Peterson) fall into this group.  Views in the second group hold that Plato uses a 
                                                
89 In Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, I examine further textual evidence from the Republic, Phaedrus, 
Timaeus, Phaedo, and Parmenides, thought by many commentators to commit Plato to a genuine self-
predication assumption (SP)—and so not EP—in the middle dialogues.  I argue that these passages can 
and should be read consistently with EP and do not provide adequate evidence for SP.  
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new kind of predication when he uses apparently self-predicational language in 
contexts in which he intends to generalize his claims.  Frede and Meinwald are the 
main proponents of this sort of interpretation.90  They claim that Plato distinguishes a 
different kind of predication called kath’ hauto, pros heauto, or tree predication, and 
according to this special kind of predication, it will be true in all cases to say that “the 
form of F is F”. 
 In this chapter, I will examine the views falling into these two groups, views 
which at least seem immune to the argument from Chapter Two.  I will argue that 
although the Peterson/Fine views succeed when faced with the main argument from 
Chapter Two, they ought not to be attributed to Plato, because there is evidence to 
suggest that Plato did not expand the extension of predicates as these views require.  
Concerning the Frede/Meinwald view91, I will first argue that it does seem not to be 
immune to the main argument from Chapter Two.  Further, I will show that even if we 
take this view to be immune to that argument, there is good reason not to attribute it to 
Plato—this view is inconsistent with Plato’s generalized claim that “the form of F is 
not opposite-F”. 
By the end of this chapter, we will have shown that there is good reason to 
doubt all of the main interpretations of Plato’s apparently self-predicational language 
that have been offered by commentators.92  On the other hand, there is some textual 
                                                
90 Silverman and Eck are other proponents of views of this sort, but I focus on Frede and Meinwald 
here, and Frede’s later presentation of his view.  For his earlier thoughts, see Frede 1967, 12-36. 
91 I discuss the different presentations of the views of Frede and Meinwald, but treat their views as one 
and the same for our purposes.  There are some subtle distinctions however.  For instance, Frede takes it 
that participation only explains something’s “being F” according to the “ordinary” use of ‘is’, while 
Meinwald thinks that participation explains something’s “being F” according to both the “ordinary” and 
“special” uses of ‘is’ (Meinwald 1992, 381).  In this regard, I think Frede’s interpretation is more 
plausible—participation is meant to explain the display of features. 
92 In this chapter, I do not discuss in detail Penner’s own interpretation of Plato’s apparently self-
predicational language, in large part because it seems unclear and underdeveloped.  For instance, Fine 
notes that he does not provide an adequate explanation of his position nor does he sufficiently 
distinguish it from other views (Fine 1991, 131 n. 7).  It is difficult to understand and evaluate Penner’s 
position in the absence of an elaboration of his view.  It does seem as if his view might be another 
interpretation that would be immune to the main argument from Chapter Two.  Penner suggests that, 
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evidence to support EP and EP does not seem susceptible to the objections faced by 
the others.  Unless EP is shown to face its own serious difficulties or is inconsistent 
with the textual evidence, we have good reason to accept it as a correct account of 
what Plato’s intention is when he suggests that for all forms, “the form of F is F”.     
 
 
II. The Expansive Interpretations – Peterson and Fine 
 
 In Chapter Two, I presented Peterson’s Pauline Predication view according to 
the “conservative reinterpretation”, or PPP-C, and I explained how this view seems 
inconsistent with evidence drawn from the Phaedo concerning form-particularizations.  
Once again, PPP-C is the view that Plato intends his general commitment to “any form 
of F is F” to be understood in the following way: Any form of F is F2, insofar as all of 
its instances are F1, and this is a countenanced way of being F2.  According to PPP-C, 
F1 and F2 are to be understood as two different senses of ‘F’.  Any form of F is really 
F, but it is F in a different sense of ‘F’ than the many Fs which participate in it and are 
its instances.  For example, having all of its instances being equal makes the form of 
equality itself equal, but it is equal in a different sense than the many equals.  The 
many equals are equal1 by having sameness of measure because of their participation 
in the form of equality, while the form of equality is equal2 by having its participants 
                                                                                                                                       
although in general the form of F is not literally an F thing, it is still true to say that for all forms, “the 
form of F is F”, because there is “something the same seen or otherwise apprehended in both [the form 
of F and F particulars]” (Penner 1987, 298).  Penner’s view seems to be that there is “something” 
present in the form of F that is sufficient to make particulars literally F when it is present in them, but 
does not make the form literally F.  Perhaps this view would be immune to the argument from Chapter 
Two, because an F-ness-particularization might also “be F” (with or without being literally F), by 
having this same “something” present in it.  But what sort of thing is this “something” supposed to be 
exactly?  And why would this “something” make large things large but not the form of largeness?  On 
my view, large things are large not because they possess something that is also possessed by the form of 
largeness, but rather because they possess something that is a resembler of the form, namely a form-
particularization (see Chapter Three, Sections V-VI, and Chapter Five). 
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being equal1.  The key point here is that according to PPP-C, equal1 and equal2 are two 
different senses of ‘equal’. 
 This view seemed susceptible to the argument from Chapter Two, because, for 
instance, Plato could not consistently intend the same sense of ‘large’ in the statements 
“the form of largeness is large” and “the-largeness-in-Simmias is large”.  According to 
PPP-C, ‘large’ in “the form of largeness is large” is large2, the sense of ‘large’ 
according to which it means “having one’s instances being large1” or perhaps “having 
one’s instances exceeding in measure”.  As we saw, the-largeness-in-Simmias is not 
the sort of thing that could be large in the same sense of ‘large’, namely large2, 
because it is not the sort of thing that can have participants or instances.  But the 
textual evidence from the Phaedo suggests that in both of these statements, the sense 
of the predicate should be the same. 
 In contrast to PPP-C, Peterson also presents a Pauline Predication view 
according to what she calls the “expansive reinterpretation” (PPP-E).  On this view, as 
on PPP-C, any form of F is F2, insofar as all of its instances are F1.  But now F1 and F2 
are not taken to be different senses of ‘F’.  Instead, these are different ways of being F 
according to the same sense of ‘F’.  Peterson explains that on this view “‘just’ is more 
widely applicable than one might have thought before reflection on ‘Justice is just’: 
that is, it is held that ‘just’ has the same extension as ‘just1 or just2’…” (Peterson 1973, 
462).  So on PPP-E, Plato is taken to have expanded the extension of predicates in 
such a way that having one’s instances being F is countenanced as another way of 
being F, according to the same sense of ‘F’.  For instance, the form of largeness is 
itself really a large thing, in the same sense of ‘large’ as the many sensible larges.  But 
while the sensible larges are large by way of exceeding in measure, the form of 
largeness is large in a different way, namely by having its instances exceeding in 
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measure.  And having one’s instances exceeding in measure is understood as another 
way of being large, in the same sense of the predicate ‘large’. 
 Now it may seem that, like PPP-C, PPP-E also succumbs to the main argument 
from Chapter Two.  On PPP-E, “the form of largeness is large” is true because, one 
way of being large is having one’s instances exceeding in measure, and this is true of 
the form.  But how is it supposed to be true to say that “the-largeness-in-Simmias is 
large”?  The-largeness-in-Simmias does not seem to exceed in measure, nor does it 
have its instances exceeding in measure, since it is not the sort of thing that has 
instances to begin with.  As Peterson might put it, the-largeness-in-Simmias does not 
seem to be large1 or large2.  It does not seem to be large according to the two 
countenanced ways of being large.93  It would seem to follow that on PPP-E the form-
particularization is not large in the same sense as the form, and so it seems we ought to 
be as skeptical of PPP-E as we were of PPP-C. 
 But this is perhaps too hasty.  The spirit of PPP-E is that Plato expanded the 
extension of predicates to include other ways of being (or ways of having predicates) 
than we might have at first recognized.  So, one might develop the view a bit further to 
say that, while the-largeness-in-Simmias is not large1 or large2, perhaps it is large3—
perhaps Plato also countenanced some further way of being large according to which it 
will be true to say that the form-particularization is large.  For example, perhaps Plato 
countenanced ‘being a form-particularization the possession of which makes a thing 
large’ as a third way of being large according to the same sense of ‘large’.  If so, then 
it would be true to say that the-largeness-in-Simmias is large, and it would be large in 
                                                
93 In fact, it seems strange to claim that there are only these two countenanced ways of being large, 
because there are seemingly infinitely many ways of exceeding in measure.  For instance, something 
can exceed in measure by exceeding in length or even by exceeding in length by two inches, etc.  But 
all of these different ways of exceeding in measure can be captured under the more abstract description 
of ‘exceeding in measure’.  All of these infinite ways of exceeding in measure fall under the more 
abstractly specified way of being large by ‘exceeding in measure’.  For more on this, see Chapter One, 
Section II.   
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the same sense of ‘large’ as the form of largeness, although in a different way.  Still, 
such a view would be immune to the argument from Chapter Two, because the use of 
‘is’ and the sense of the predicate ‘large’ can be the same in the statements “the form 
of largeness is large” and “the-largeness-in-Simmias is large”. 
 
 Before setting out why I think we ought not to attribute PPP-E to Plato, I will 
first present Fine’s expansive interpretation, as my response can be used against both 
views together.  Fine defends a view developed from Peterson’s called the Broad Self-
Predication view (BSP).  Fine explains the view as follows: 
 
On BSP, as on NSP, the Form of F is predicatively F; the Form of F is 
a member of the class of F things.  However, BSP countenances more 
ways of being F, more criteria for being included in the class of F 
things, than NSP does.  In particular, on BSP the Form of F is F in 
quite a different way from the way in which (most) sensible F 
particulars are F.  It is F because, being the property of F, it explains 
the F-ness of things….  For Plato, if something explains the F-ness of F 
things, it is itself predicatively F, of belonging to the class of F things. 
(Fine 1992, 26) 
As on PPP-E, BSP holds that Plato expands the extension of predicates, (at least those 
for which forms exist).  The form of F is really an F thing in the same sense of ‘F’ as 
the many sensible Fs94, but it is F in a different way.  The form of F is F by explaining 
things’ being F, which is countenanced as another way of being F.  For instance, the 
form of largeness is itself large and is a member of the class of large things, not 
                                                
94 At one point, Fine claims the following, which makes it seem that “the form of F is F” is not 
supposed to say that the form of F is really an F thing:  “To say that the Form of F is F is only to say 
that it is the ultimate source or explanation of why anything is F, and that reference to it never as such 
explains why anything is not F” (Fine 1992, 26, my emphasis).  This makes it seem that “the form of F 
is F” is reducible to the claim that the form of F explains things’ being F, and does not say that the form 
of F is really an F thing (by way of explaining things’ being F).  But Fine is clear that “the form of F is 
F” does not merely say that the form explains things’ being F, but it says that the form is an F thing (in 
the same sense of ‘F’ as sensible Fs) because of this explanatory role.  Fine also points out in a note that 
her account differs from Vlastos’ Pauline Predication view because her view is not reductive (Fine 
1992, 26 n. 27).  Vlastos takes “the form of F is F” to just make a claim about the instances of the form, 
whereas BSP takes that statement to be about the form and to say that the form of F is really F, because 
of its explanatory role.     
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because it exceeds in measure, but because it explains things’ being large.  And while 
explaining things’ being large seems like a drastically different way of being large, it 
is counted as itself a way of being large along with the more mundane way of 
exceeding in measure.  According to BSP, both explaining things’ being large and 
exceeding in measure are ways of being large according to the same sense of ‘large’. 
 It is clearer in the case of BSP, as opposed to PPP-E, to see how the view is 
immune to the argument from Chapter Two.  This is so because the form of largeness 
and the-largeness-in-Simmias can both be large in the same broad way that BSP 
attributes to the form.  According to BSP, “the form of largeness is large” says the 
form of largeness is really a large thing, because it explains things’ being large.  
Explaining things’ being large is counted as what might be called a broad way of 
being large, as opposed to the narrow way of being large in which the many sensible 
larges are large, by exceeding in measure.  Likewise, “the-largeness-in-Simmias is 
large” can also be taken to say that the referent of the subject term is really a large 
thing, not only in the same sense of the term ‘large’ (which is all that the Chapter Two 
argument requires), but also in the same (broad) way as the form.  As I argued in 
Chapter Three when discussing EP, form-particularizations are explainers in addition 
to forms.  The-largeness-in-Simmias is therefore a large thing by being large in the 
same broad way that the form is, by explaining things’ being large, or in this case, by 
explaining Simmias’ being large.  According to BSP, “the form of largeness is large” 
and “the-largeness-in-Simmias is large” can receive “the same reading”.  Note too that 
even if it was thought (contrary to what I have argued) that the-largeness-in-Simmias 
does not explain Simmias’ being large and so is not large in the same way as the form, 
the form-particularization could still be large in the same sense as the form, by being 
large in some further broad way (as I argued when discussing PPP-E above).  And this 
is all that is required for BSP to be immune to the argument from Chapter Two. 
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 So if PPP-E and BSP are both consistent with the textual evidence concerning 
form-particularizations from the Phaedo, do we have any reason to favor EP over 
these views?  Both of these views hold that Plato expands the extension of predicates 
(for which forms exist) in such a way that having one’s instances being F (PPP-E) or 
explaining things’ being F (BSP) is countenanced as just another way of being F along 
with the more usual ways in which sensible Fs are F.  Any view that does this, I will 
argue, not only attributes to Plato a view that, as Fine admits, at first sounds 
counterintuitive (Fine 1992, 26), but a view that seems quite implausible.  And there is 
textual evidence to suggest that Plato did not expand the extension of predicates in the 
sort of way suggested by PPP-E or BSP. 
As we will see, Plato seems committed to the view that (unambiguous) 
predicates (for which forms exist) must have single non-disjunctive definitions.95  If 
these broad ways of being F were really countenanced by Plato as ways of being F 
according to the same sense of ‘F’ in which sensible Fs are F, then (as I go on to 
discuss) it seems very difficult to imagine what definitions of predicates would look 
like.  We will also look to actual definitions that Plato presents in numerous dialogues, 
definitions which it seems he is at least fairly satisfied with—these definitions would 
all be entirely unsatisfactory if Plato truly expanded the extension of predicates as 
PPP-E and BSP propose.  But Plato seems to accept the definitions or at least accepts 
that they are very close to being correct.  Based on the fact that Plato seems committed 
to the view that definitions (in cases in which forms exist) are non-disjunctive, and 
                                                
95 This view is closely related to the Unity Assumption that I discussed in Chapter One, Section II.  The 
Unity Assumption says that in cases in which forms exist, there is one single form through which all Fs 
are F.  This is similar to Dominic Scott’s “unitarian assumption”, although Scott’s assumption seems 
unrestricted—it seems to apply to all cases in which the same term applies to many different things 
(Scott 2006, 25-30).  As I argued in Chapter One, Plato is committed to the Unity Assumption.  Further, 
it seems that, for Plato, the definition of an unambiguous predicate in the case in which a form exists 
will specify (the essence of) a form.  Plato seems committed to the view that definitions (in cases in 
which forms exists) are non-disjunctive because of his commitment to the Unity Assumption—since 
there is one single form in these cases, there will also be one single non-disjunctive definition of these 
predicates. 
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adopts the sort of definitions that he does, it seems an expansive interpretation such as 
PPP-E and BSP ought not to be attributed to Plato. 
 As I have suggested, Plato seems committed to the view that (concerning an 
unambiguous predicate ‘F’ for which a form exists) while things may be F in many 
different ways, there is some single non-disjunctive account according to which they 
are all F.  All things that are F in the same sense of ‘F’ (at least in a case in which a 
form exists) will be F according to a single non-disjunctive account.  For example, in 
the Euthyphro, Plato claims that “the pious is the same in every action” (ταὐτόν ἐστιν 
ἐν πάσῃ πράξει τὸ ὅσιον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ) (Euthyphro 5d1-2) and all piouses are pious (and 
impiouses impious) through one form (µιᾷ ἰδέᾳ τά τε ἀνόσια ἀνόσια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὅσια ὅσια) 
(Euthyphro 6d11-e1).  What follows is that, although there may be many different 
ways in which things are pious, there is a single non-disjunctive account that will 
cover all (and only) cases of piety.  Likewise, in the Meno, Plato argues that “even if 
virtues are many and various, they all have some one and the same form on account of 
which they are virtues” (Οὕτω δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· κἂν εἰ πολλαὶ καὶ παντοδαπαί εἰσιν, 
ἕν γέ τι εἶδος ταὐτὸν ἅπασαι ἔχουσιν δι’ ὃ εἰσὶν ἀρεταί) (Meno 72c6-8).  Plato also uses the 
example of bees to illustrate his view.  There may be many different ways of being a 
bee or kinds of bees—one could be a bee by being a bumblebee or by being a 
honeybee for example.  But all of the thousands of different kinds of bees do not differ 
from one another in any way insofar as they are bees (οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν, ᾗ µέλιτται 
εἰσίν, ἡ ἑτέρα τῆς ἑτέρας) (Meno 72b8-9).  There will be a single non-disjunctive 
account of ‘bee’ that will cover all cases of the many different kinds of bees. 
 As Plato points out first in the Euthyphro when discussing what is required for 
an acceptable definition, the definition of ‘F’ must cover all cases of Fs.  Socrates asks 
Euthyphro to provide him with an account of the pious, and Euthyphro first answers 
by claiming that “the pious is to do what I am doing now, to prosecute the wrongdoer” 
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(Euthyphro 5d8-10).96  Socrates responds to this attempted definition by saying to 
Euthyphro: “You did not teach me adequately (ἱκανῶς) when I asked what the pious 
was…” (Euthyphro 6d1-2).  And Socrates goes on to spell out why this account is 
inadequate.  First, he has Euthyphro recognize that there are many other pious actions 
that have nothing to do with prosecuting the wrongdoer (Euthyphro 6d6-8).  Then 
Socrates stresses that he was not asking Euthyphro to tell him some one or two 
examples of the many pious things, but wanted to be instructed as to the one form 
itself by which all pious things are pious (Euthyphro 6d9-e1).  What Socrates wants is 
the single form that he can look to and use as a model (παραδείγµατι) to tell whether 
something is pious (Euthyphro 6e3-6).  Since there is one single form of piety 
covering all cases of pious things, the definition of piety must likewise be single and 
non-disjunctive, and must be comprehensive and not too narrow, in the sense that it 
must cover all cases of pious things.97  If one comes across a pious thing, one should 
be able to use the form as a model, and one should be able to see whether that thing 
satisfies the definition of piety—so again, all instances of pious things must be 
captured by the definition. 
 Now, according to PPP-E and BSP, Plato expands the extension of predicates 
to include expanded or broad ways.  One way of being F (in the same sense of ‘F’ as 
the many sensible Fs)—one way of being included in the class of F things—is to have 
one’s instances being F (PPP-E) or to explain things’ being F (BSP).  What follows is 
that, for Plato, the definition of ‘F’ would have to cover the cases of F things that are 
                                                
96 Euthyphro’s attempted definition here is ambiguous.  Euthyphro may be claiming that piety ought to 
be defined as the action-type of prosecuting the wrongdoer, or he may be claiming (perhaps oddly) that 
piety ought to be defined as the specific action-token of prosecuting his father that Euthyphro is 
currently undertaking.  In what follows, I assume that Euthyphro means the former, but this distinction 
is not relevant for my present purposes.  Even if Euthyphro is taken to define piety as his action-token, 
Socrates’ point still stands that this definition is too narrow because it fails to cover all cases of piety.     
97 On the point that, in the Socratic dialogues, the objects of definitions are forms and that definitions 
are thereby non-disjunctive, see Fine 1993, 46-8. 
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only F in these broad ways.  If the definition does not cover all cases of Fs and all 
countenanced ways of being F, then the definition will be inadequate because it is too 
narrow.  So for instance, an acceptable definition of ‘largeness’ cannot possibly be 
something like ‘exceeding in measure’.  Such a definition is inadequate because it 
does not cover all ways of being large countenanced by PPP-E or BSP.  For instance, 
for BSP, one way of being large is simply to explain things’ being large.  But 
explaining things’ being large is not another way of exceeding in measure—this is 
admitted by BSP, because explaining things’ being large is supposed to be 
distinguished as a broad and non-narrow way of being large.98  So explaining things’ 
being large is not captured by the proposed definition of largeness, namely exceeding 
in measure.  An acceptable definition of largeness would have to cover the narrow and 
non-narrow ways of being large.  But what would such a definition look like?  
Remember that Plato holds that a definition must be one and non-disjunctive.  So the 
definition of largeness cannot be “exceeding in measure or explaining things’ 
                                                
98 Here I am assuming that explaining things’ being large, or explaining things’ exceeding in measure, 
is not being counted as a way of exceeding in measure, which is considered as the narrow way of being 
large.  For instance, Fine argues: 
 
[O]n BSP the form of F is F in quite a different way from the way in which sensible 
particulars are F.  For example, any particular sensible object that is equal is equal in 
virtue of having the same measures as something.  But when Plato suggests that the 
form of equal is equal, he does not mean that it has the same measures as something.  
He means that it is equal because it explains why particular sensible things are equal 
to one another…. (Fine 1993, 62) 
 
When Plato claims that equality is equal, he does not mean that it is equal by having sameness of 
measure, but rather by explaining things’ being equal.  Likewise, largeness is large not because it 
exceeds in measure, but rather because it explains things’ exceeding in measure.  Explaining things’ 
being large or explaining things’ exceeding in measure is supposed to be a distinct way of being large 
than the narrow way of ‘exceeding in measure’.  Now one could alternatively argue that ‘exceeding in 
measure’ works as a comprehensive definition of ‘largeness’ as long as explaining things’ being large 
or explaining things’ exceeding in measure is considered as a way of exceeding in measure.  One might 
then say that largeness is large by exceeding in measure, and it exceeds in measure by explaining 
things’ exceeding in measure.  But it seems we have just postponed the problem.  Now, largeness seems 
to have a single non-disjunctive definition, ‘exceeding in measure’, and this definition covers all cases.  
But if we look at what ‘exceeding in measure’ means, we can no longer specify a single account that is 
not overly abstract and counterintuitive.  ‘Exceeding in measure’ does not really have to do with having 
a measure that exceeds, because the form of largeness “exceeds in measure” merely by explaining 
things’ exceeding in measure. 
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exceeding in measure”.  There would have to be some more abstract specification of 
largeness that covers both of these ways of being large, if these ways of being large 
are really accepted as ways of being large according to the same sense of ‘large’, as 
BSP proposes.  I must admit that it is very unclear to me what such a definition would 
look like, and the defenders of PPP-E and BSP have not offered us any such account.  
Largeness really does seem to have something to do with exceeding in measure, but it 
is unclear how an adequate definition of largeness, which respected the expansive 
views of Peterson and Fine, would still have to do with exceeding in measure.  
Likewise, one would expect a definition of hotness roughly to have something to do 
with having a high degree of heat or warmth, but the definition of hotness would have 
to cover all cases of hot things and be usable to tell whether anything is hot.  On PPP-
E or BSP, one instance of a hot thing is the form of hotness itself, which is itself a hot 
thing either by having its instances being hot (in the narrow way) or by explaining 
things’ being hot (in the narrow way).  But having one’s instances being hot or 
explaining things’ being hot does not seem to have anything to do with exuding heat.  
Again, it is very unclear what exactly the single definition of hotness would look like, 
and it seems as if it would not really be about what we think of as hotness anymore. 
 Not only would definitions of predicates (in cases in which forms exist) seem 
overly abstract and counterintuitive according to PPP-E or BSP, but there are textual 
reasons for thinking that Plato was not committed to such definitions.  Plato seems to 
present numerous definitions that he either takes as correct or at least as very close to 
correct.  For example, in the Laches, Socrates asks Laches to provide him with a 
definition of courage, a single definition that will cover all cases of courageous things 
(Laches 190d-191e).  At first, Laches fails to provide Socrates with an adequate 
response, because his attempted definition is too narrow.  So, to illustrate to Laches 
what he is looking for, Socrates offers a definition of speed: Socrates says that “speed 
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is the power to accomplish many things in little time, both concerning speech and 
running and all the other things” (τὴν ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ πολλὰ διαπραττοµένην δύναµιν 
ταχυτῆτα ἔγωγε καλῶ καὶ περὶ φωνὴν καὶ περὶ δρόµον καὶ περὶ τἆλλα πάντα) (Laches 192b1-
3).  In looking for a definition of courage, Socrates wants Laches to speak in the same 
way about courage as he did about speed (Laches 192b5-6).99 
According to this definition of speed, all things having speed will have speed 
by having the power to accomplish many things in little time—the definition picks out 
what makes all things having speed have speed, and what does this is having the 
relevant power.  But, suppose that Plato accepted BSP for instance.  It would follow 
that the form of speed itself has speed in the broad explanatory way, by explaining 
things’ having speed.  But explaining things’ having speed is certainly different from 
having the power to accomplish many things in little time.  So the form of speed 
would have speed in a non-narrow way that is not covered by the proposed definition.  
Therefore, the definition of speed that Plato seemingly accepts, would be too narrow if 
Plato accepted BSP.100  The definition of speed would be too narrow because it would 
not cover all ways of having speed that BSP (or PPP-E) says Plato accepted.  It seems 
                                                
99 One might object here that it is unclear whether Plato posited a form of speed, and so one cannot use 
the definition of speed as evidence for what Plato accepts as an acceptable definition in the case in 
which a form does exist.  But there are numerous reasonable responses to this move: First, even if Plato 
was committed in the middle dialogues to a restricted set of forms containing opposites and numbers, it 
is likely that he was committed to the form of speed.  Second, I will go on to discuss other examples of 
definitions that we find in Plato in cases in which he explicitly posits the existence of a form, and these 
definitions also seem inconsistent with PPP-E and BSP.  Third, even if Plato did not posit a form of 
speed, this example is still intended to be illustrative of the sort of definition that Plato is looking for in 
the case in which forms do exist.  It is reasonable then, even if there is no form of speed for Plato, to 
think that the definition in the case in which a form does exist would be analogous.  (Note that if he had 
wanted to, Plato could have presented a definition of speed that also covered non-narrow ways of being 
speedy, as an illustrative example, even if he did not posit a form of speed.) 
100 One might argue that the form of speed could be said to have speed by way of itself having the 
power to accomplish many things in little time, (since in no time at all it explains many things’ having 
speed).  Even if this is admitted, it will not help here.  What would follow is that, in addition to having 
speed in the broad explanatory way, the form of speed would also have speed in the narrow way in 
which the many sensibles have speed.  It would still be the case according to BSP, however, that the 
form of speed also has speed in the broad explanatory way, and this is supposed to be another distinct 
way of having speed.  The definition of speed is still too narrow because it does not cover all 
countenanced ways of having speed.   
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unreasonable, however, to think that Plato presented a definition of speed that he 
seems to accept, which was itself too narrow, immediately after pointing out that 
Laches’ definition failed because of its narrowness.  Plato seems to think that an 
acceptable definition of speed need only cover all narrow ways of having speed.  
Since Plato also thinks that an adequate definition of ‘F’ must cover all countenanced 
ways of being F, he seems not to have countenanced non-narrow ways of being F as 
ways of being F according to the same sense of ‘F’.  Since PPP-E and BSP both take 
Plato to admit non-narrow ways of being F, it seems we should not attribute either of 
these views to Plato.   
Analogous arguments could also be made in the case of other definitions that 
Plato seems to accept.  For instance, in the Euthyphro, when again illustrating what 
sort of definition he is looking for, Plato seems to provide a definition of evenness:  
He writes that the even is the part of number that is divisible into two equal parts 
(Euthyphro 12d7-10).  So, a group of four sticks is even in number because it is 
divisible into two equal parts, two groups of two.  According to PPP-E or BSP, the 
form of evenness is also even in the same sense of ‘even’, but it is even in a different 
way, by having its instances being even or by explaining things’ being even.  But these 
are distinct ways of being even that have nothing to do with the form itself being 
divisible into two equal parts.  Again, these non-narrow ways of being even would not 
be covered under the proposed definition, and so this definition would be too narrow if 
Plato did really accept these expansive ways of being even.101 
                                                
101 Note that EP is not susceptible to these objections.  EP is not committed to the claim that the form of 
evenness is even in the same sense of ‘even’ as the many evens, or even in any sense for that matter.  
Instead, in the generalized claim applied in this case, that “the form of evenness is even”, Plato just 
would be using the predicate ‘even’ as shorthand to refer to the property of being even-explaining.  But 
the predicate ‘even’ does not itself have the sense of ‘being even-explaining’ (even though the word in 
Plato’s statement might be said to have this speaker-meaning attached to it) nor is ‘being even-
explaining’ considered as a way of being even.  The definition of even as the part of number that is 
divisible into two equal parts, can be exhaustive and can cover all cases of even things.  The form of 
evenness is not a case of an even thing, even though it is true for Plato to say, in generalizable contexts, 
that “the form of evenness is even”.  This statement is true not because the form of evenness is literally 
113 
 There are numerous other examples of definitions that Plato seems to accept, 
but which would be wholly inadequate and too narrow if Plato did countenance these 
expansive ways of having predicates.102  Based on Plato’s acceptance of definitions 
that only cover narrow ways and his commitment to the non-disjunctiveness of 
definitions, it seems views such as PPP-E and BSP should be rejected as 
interpretations of Plato because they attribute to him ways of having predicates that he 
simply seems not to have countenanced.103       
                                                                                                                                       
even, but because the form of evenness is literally even-explaining, which is the property that the 
predicate ‘even’ is being used to refer to in these contexts. 
102 Another example of a definition that Plato seems to accept: In the Meno, again when illustrating 
what sort of definition he is looking for, Plato proposes two definitions of shape.  First, shape is defined 
as that which alone of things always traces color (Meno 75b8-c1), but the further attempt that shape is 
that which limits a solid (Meno 76a4-7) is preferred because it is in terms that are understood.  And this 
account is said to hold true of every shape (Meno 76a5).  But according to PPP-E or BSP, the form of 
shape would be a shape by having its instances being limits of a solid or by explaining things’ being 
limits of a solid, and these are countenanced as ways of being a shape.  Then it would follow that the 
form of shape is a shape (in same sense of ‘shape’) in a way that is not covered by the proposed 
definition.  Plato seems at least fairly pleased with the proposed definition of shape (Meno 75b11-c1), 
but this sort of definition would not even be close to adequate if these broad ways were countenanced as 
ways of being F according to the same sense of ‘F’.  The true definition of shape would have to be 
broader to cover the case of the form, but it is unclear what the nature of such a non-disjunctive 
definition would be, and Plato does not feel the need for one.  Other examples: In the Republic, Plato 
seems to define justice as an inner harmony consisting of parts doing their proper work (Republic 442d-
444b).  And Plato suggests that this account covers not only the just man and the just city in particular, 
but justice itself more generally (Republic 444a4-5).  In the Parmenides, Plato appears to define 
equality as sameness of measure (Parmenides 140b7-8).  In these cases, Plato presents (perhaps 
plausible) definitions that he seems to accept.  But again, these definitions would be too narrow if Plato 
were to countenance non-narrow ways of having predicates such as are proposed by PPP-E and BSP.  
For instance, on these views, the form of equality is supposed to be equal in some other way than by 
having sameness of measure.  But then the definition of equality cannot be sameness of measure, 
because the definition would fail to cover all instances of equality and all ways of being equal.  Since 
Plato seems to accept this (plausible) definition of equality, it seems he did not countenance non-narrow 
ways of being equal.    
103 A proponent of PPP-E or BSP might respond to my general strategy here by claiming that these 
purported “definitions” in the text are not really intended by Plato to be true definitions of predicates.  
Rather, they are merely non-disjunctive accounts meant only to cover narrow ways of being F.  Perhaps 
Plato is not trying to provide definitions, but is only giving a single account of the way all everyday Fs 
are F—this would explain why these attempted “definitions” do not cover non-narrow ways of being F.  
This would perhaps involve rethinking what the purpose is of the Socratic “What is ‘F’” question.  For, 
Fine is clear in taking the Socratic “What is ‘F’” question to be asking for definitions, and real rather 
than nominal ones (Fine 1993, 46-9).  But with this being granted, the question would remain as to 
whether Plato is committed to non-disjunctiveness with respect to actual definitions.  If yes, then the 
objection remains that real definitions (covering both narrow and non-narrow ways) would turn out to 
be strange indeed.  If no, then again definitions turn out to be fairly strange.  For every predicate ‘F’ for 
which a form exists, there is one single sense of ‘F’ but the definition of ‘F’ is always disjunctive. 
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III. Interpretations Distinguishing Kinds of Predication – Frede and Meinwald 
 
 The final remaining interpretation of Plato’s apparently self-predicational 
language is one developed by Frede and Meinwald, which takes “any form of F is F” 
to involve a special kind of predication.  In “Plato’s Sophist on false statements”, 
Frede argues that in the Sophist, Plato “distinguishes two uses of ‘…is…’” (Frede 
1992, 401).  He introduces the distinction between the two uses of ‘is’ as follows: 
 
Some of the things we say something is, it is by itself; other things we 
say something is, it just is with reference to something else, it is by 
standing in the appropriate relation to something else. (Frede 1992, 
400) 
So, for example, “Socrates is white” is an instance of the second (normal) use of ‘is’.  
Socrates is white by having a certain feature, by way of being related to the form of 
white (if there is one) in the appropriate way—by way of participation in the form 
(Frede 1992, 400-1).  However, “White is a color” is an instance of the first (special) 
use of ‘is’, because it “lies in the very nature” of white to be a color, and it is not by 
being related to some other thing that white is a color (Frede 1992, 410).  Frede does 
clarify that “The same is the same (with itself)” is still an instance of the second 
(normal) use of ‘is’, even though it is not correct here to say that the same is the same 
by standing in the appropriate relation to something else.  The same is being related in 
an appropriate way to itself, but it is still an instance of the second use of ‘is’ rather 
than the first because of the involvement of this (participation) relation.  The same is 
not the same as itself because of its very nature, but because it happens to have the 
feature of being the same (as itself), because it participates in itself. 
Frede does not merely claim that this distinction between uses of ‘is’ is 
relevant for understanding the Sophist, but he argues that it ought to be applied more 
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widely to interpreting Plato.  He suggests one way in which we should apply this 
distinction of the two uses of ‘is’: 
 
This [distinction] allows us to distinguish different kinds of self-
predication and to claim that the kind of self-predication Plato had been 
interested in all along, and continues to hold on to, is the one that 
innocuously involves the first use of “…is…”. (Frede 1992, 402, my 
emphasis) 
So, Frede’s view is that Plato is committed all along to the claim that for all forms, 
“the form of F is F”, but that this claim ought to be understood as involving the first 
use of ‘is’.  He says this would be a commitment to “self-predication”, but as we have 
been using the term, that is not the case.  For us, Plato is only committed to Self-
Predication (SP) if he holds that for all forms, the form of F is an F thing (in the same 
sense of ‘F’ as the many sensible Fs).  And Frede does not want to say that this is 
Plato’s view.  Instead, Frede thinks that Plato is not committed to the view that every 
form of F has the feature of being F (by way of participating in itself or otherwise).  
His view is just that for all forms, being F lies in the very nature of the form of F. 
 Now, this view is still admittedly somewhat unclear.  What does the claim “the 
form of F is F” mean exactly when interpreted as involving the first (special) use of 
‘is’?  Meinwald follows Frede and further explains the distinction between these two 
uses of ‘is’.  In “Good-bye to the Third Man”, Meinwald, too, suggests that Plato 
distinguishes between two “kinds” of predication (Meinwald 1992, 367, 378).  
Meinwald calls the second kind of predication pros ta alla (Parmenides), pros allo 
(Sophist), or “common”, “garden”, “ordinary”, or “everyday” predication.  If “x is F” 
involves this second kind of predication, it is “a predication in relation to the others” 
and it “concerns the display of features by an individual” (Meinwald 1992, 380-1, 5). 
On the other hand, the first (special) kind of predication is called pros heauto 
(Parmenides), kath’ hauto (Sophist), or “tree” predication.  If “x is F” involves this 
first kind of predication, it involves the “predication of a subject in relation to itself” 
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(Meinwald 1992, 379).  Meinwald explains this kind of predication in more detail: “A 
predication of a subject in relation to itself holds in virtue of a relation internal to the 
subject’s own nature, and can so be employed to reveal the structure of that nature” 
(Meinwald 1992, 378).  A pros heauto predication “offers an analysis of the nature in 
question” (Meinwald 1991, 71)—it is “grounded in the structure of the nature in 
question” (Meinwald 1992, 379).  Meinwald calls these “tree” predications, because 
she explains that a predication of this kind will be true if it reflects the actual structure 
of something like a Linnaean genus-species tree.  For example, Persian Cat appears in 
a genus-species tree far below the kind Animal (Meinwald 1992, 378-9).  Because of 
this, it will be true to say “Persian Cat is an animal” if this sentence is interpreted as 
involving this first kind of predication.  What the sentence says if so interpreted, is that 
being an animal is part of what it is to be a Persian Cat.  Another example that 
Meinwald discusses is the sentence “Dancing moves”.  This is a true tree predication 
because moving is part of what it is to dance, or as Meinwald puts it, “Motion figures 
in the account of what Dancing is” (Meinwald 1992, 380).  “Justice is virtuous” is also 
a true tree predication, because being virtuous is part of what it is to be just. 
Now we can understand how one would interpret a statement such as “the form 
of largeness is large” as a pros heauto predication.  What such a statement would 
mean is that being large is part of what it is to be large, or that being large figures into 
the account of what it is to be large.  As Meinwald explains, such a statement is true 
but uninformative (Meinwald 1992, 380).  So all statements concerning forms which 
appear to be self-predicational, would be true but uninformative if understood as pros 
heauto predications.  Pros heauto “self-predication” is trivially true of all forms.  But 
as we have seen with some examples, not all true pros heauto predications have this 
form and are uninformative.  For instance, “the form of largeness has a measure” 
would be a true pros heauto predication, because having a measure figures into the 
117 
account of what it is to be large—since to be large is to exceed in measure, and so 
crucially to have a measure.  As Meinwald would agree however (Meinwald 1992, 
384-6), “the form of largeness is large” and “the form of largeness has a measure” 
would be false pros ta alla predications, because the form of largeness does not itself 
display the feature of being large or of having a measure.104   
 
 The question remains: is the Frede/Meinwald view immune to the main 
argument from Chapter Two, and if so, why ought we to reject this interpretation in 
favor of EP?  One can see how the Frede/Meinwald view seems immune to our 
argument.  According to Frede/Meinwald, the statement “the form of largeness is 
large” should be taken as a true pros heauto predication which trivially says that being 
large is part (or in this case is all) of the nature of being large.  Remember that our 
argument requires that “the-largeness-in-Simmias is large” receives “the same 
reading”—so at the very least, the use of ‘is’ and the sense of the predicate ‘large’ 
must be the same in both statements.  According to the Frede/Meinwald construal 
then, “the-largeness-in-Simmias is large” would have to be a true pros heauto 
predication.  But is it true to say that being large is part of what it is to be the-
largeness-in-Simmias?  Is being large part of the internal nature of this form-
particularization?  At least at first, it seems that being large is part of the nature of the-
largeness-in-Simmias, since this form-particularization is a largeness-particularization.  
If one were to give an account of what the-largeness-in-Simmias is, being large would 
                                                
104 Meinwald thinks that drawing this distinction between the two kinds of predication will allow Plato 
to “say good-bye” to the Third Man (Meinwald 1992, 387).  However, as I point out in Chapter Seven 
on the Third Man Argument (TMA), this move will not suffice as an adequate response to the TMA.  If 
Plato holds that for all forms, “the form of F is F”, but only with these taken as pros heauto 
predications, he will avoid the result that there are infinite regresses of forms in all cases.  However, 
Plato certainly will still admit that there are some remaining forms for which pros heauto and pros ta 
alla “self-predications” are true, and for these, vicious regresses will remain unless Plato rejects some 
other premise(s) of the TMA.  Contrary to Meinwald, this distinction of kinds of predication will not 
allow Plato to adequately say good-bye to the TMA.  
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seem to figure in that account.  Therefore, the Frede/Meinwald view seems immune to 
the main argument from Chapter Two, as it seems that the statement involving the 
form and the one involving the form-particularization can both be taken as true pros 
heauto predications. 
 However, on further reflection, it seems that the statement involving the form-
particularization ought not to be taken as a true pros heauto predication according to 
the Frede/Meinwald view.  Recall that a pros heauto or tree predication will be true if 
it conveys part of the real structure of the world, by accurately representing genus-
species structures (Meinwald 1992, 387).  The structures or trees are made up of kinds 
(Meinwald 1992, 379), and these kinds are no different from forms (Meinwald 1992, 
395 n. 27).  Meinwald argues that we cannot be subjects of true tree predications 
because we “are not the kind of things that figure in the structures represented by tree 
predications” (Meinwald 1992, 388).  So as Meinwald notes, for example, “nothing 
can be correctly predicated pros heauto of Callias” (Meinwald 1991, 178 n. 17).  
When Meinwald claims that a pros heauto predication “offers an analysis of the nature 
in question”, she does not mean that this kind of predication analyzes the nature of 
whatever happens to be the referent of the subject term.  Instead, a pros heauto 
predication is only used to analyze a “real nature”—these predications present “the 
internal structures of the real natures” (Meinwald 1991, 71, my emphasis).  And these 
predications “hold in virtue of reflecting genus-species structures (which they do by 
showing the internal structures of properties)” (Meinwald 1991, 71).  So it seems that 
only properties, kinds, or forms can be subjects of true pros heauto predications, since 
it is only these that figure in the tree structures.  The-largeness-in-Simmias is simply 
not the sort of thing that figures in any of these trees reflecting the real structure of 
properties in the world.  Since “the-largeness-in-Simmias is large” cannot be a true 
pros heauto predication, it cannot consistently be taken to involve the same use of ‘is’ 
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that the Frede/Meinwald view claims is involved in the statement “the form of 
largeness is large”.  So it would seem that the main argument from Chapter Two does 
provide us with reason to doubt the Frede/Meinwald view. 
 However, one might respond that although the key role of pros heauto 
predications is to reveal the internal structure of forms, these predications might also 
be used to reveal the internal nature of form-particularizations.  Even if what 
Meinwald says suggests that this is impossible, perhaps this was not her intention or 
perhaps she could slightly tweak her view to allow for true pros heauto predications 
involving form-particularizations as the referents of the subject terms.  However, a 
main and undeniable feature of the distinction between pros heauto and pros ta alla 
predication, to which both Frede and Meinwald are explicitly committed, is that pros 
heauto predication holds of something “in relation to itself” and pros ta alla 
predication holds of a thing “in relation to something else”.  And pros ta alla 
predication holds of something because it has or displays a feature, by way of being 
related to something (by participation).  On the other hand, pros heauto predication 
holds of something in relation to itself, in the sense that it does not hold true by way of 
an external relation (such as participation).  What is crucial to note is that a statement 
like “the-largeness-in-Simmias is large” appears to fail to fit neatly into either kind of 
predication.  “The-largeness-in-Simmias is large” is not supposed to be a pros ta alla 
predication—the-largeness-in-Simmias is not supposed to be large because it displays 
the feature of being large by way of participation in the form of largeness.  (It is 
Simmias who is large by way of participation in the form of largeness and by way of 
possession of the form-particularization.)  Even if the-largeness-in-Simmias could be 
said to display the feature of being large, which I think ought to be avoided, that 
would not suffice to allow the Frede/Meinwald view to be immune to the argument 
from Chapter Two.  To be immune to that argument, “the-largeness-in-Simmias is 
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large” must be able to be read as involving the same use of ‘is’ and so the same kind 
of predication as “the form of largeness is large”.  So the question is, again, whether 
“the-largeness-in-Simmias is large” can be a true pros heauto predication.  And the 
answer seems to be that it cannot, and not again for the reason that the subjects of true 
pros heauto predications can only be forms.  The further point here is that being large 
does not seem to be part of the nature of the-largeness-in-Simmias in relation to the 
form-particularization itself.  In other words, the-largeness-in-Simmias is a largeness-
particularization because of an external relation it has to something other than itself, 
namely the form of largeness.  Now in this case, the relevant external relation is not 
participation.  Still, the-largeness-in-Simmias is a largeness-particularization rather 
than an equality-particularization because it is related in a special way to the form of 
largeness.105  As I have already suggested, the preferred understanding of the relation 
between the form-particularization and its corresponding form seems to be one of 
resemblance or similarity, and this is an external relation.106  So we seem to have 
another reason to hold that “the-largeness-in-Simmias is large” cannot be taken as a 
true pros heauto predication.  Being large is only part of what it is to be the-largeness-
in-Simmias, if it is at all, because of the relation that this form-particularization has to 
the form of largeness—and so it is not large in relation to itself.  It seems then that the 
Frede/Meinwald view is susceptible to our main argument from Chapter Two.             
 
However, even if we ignore all of this and claim that the statement “the-
largeness-in-Simmias is large” could be a true pros heauto predication, there is still 
good reason not to attribute the Frede/Meinwald view to Plato.  As I pointed out in 
                                                
105 As Silverman argues: “The form-copy…seems to have a relational aspect to it.  Not so the Form.  
The Form is what it is in its own right.” (Silverman 2002, 99)  The form-copy is not what it is in its own 
right, because it is the form-copy that it is because of its (copying) relation to the form.   
106 I discuss the nature of this relation between form and form-particularization in more detail in 
Chapter Five. 
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Chapter One when arguing against NSP, Plato expresses in the Phaedo a commitment 
to the view that for all forms, “the form of F is not opposite-F” (Chapter One, Section 
III).  This generalized assumption could not be intended as involving the kind of 
predication that the Frede/Meinwald view classifies as pros ta alla predication, 
because there will be numerous cases of forms that display the feature of their 
opposites, (for instance, the forms of sameness, difference, evenness, plurality, etc.).  
Also, it is clear that Plato intends the generalized claim “the form of F is not opposite-
F” to receive “the same reading” as the generalized claim “the form of F is F”.107  The 
Frede/Meinwald view holds that Plato intends the statement “the form of F is F”, 
when generalized to all forms, to be understood as involving pros heauto predication, 
and so this view would be forced to say that the same kind of predication is involved 
in the claim that for all forms, “the form of F is not opposite-F”. 
What would the statement “the form of F is not opposite-F” mean when 
understood as a pros heauto predication?  What it means is that being opposite-F is not 
part of what it is to be F.  Consider Meinwald’s example of what the following true 
pros heauto predication means: “Justice is not curved”.  Meinwald explains that “As a 
tree predication the sentence holds in virtue of the fact that being curved is not part of 
what it is to be just” (Meinwald 1992, 383).  Our generalized assumption will then 
turn out true in the case of the form of justice.  “The form of justice is not unjust” is a 
true pros heauto predication, because being unjust is obviously not part of what it is to 
be just.  However, this generalized assumption will not turn out true for Plato in the 
case of all forms.  For instance, consider the case of the form of change.  “The form of 
change is not at rest” appears to be false as an instance of a pros ta alla predication, 
because the form of change, like all forms, seems to display the feature of being at 
rest.  But more relevant for our purposes here, this statement also seems false for Plato 
                                                
107 On this point see Chapter Two, Section III. 
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as a pros heauto predication.  That is the case because, for Plato, being at rest does 
seem to be part of what it is to change.  In other words, Plato seems committed to the 
view that change is impossible without some aspect of rest, but more than that, that 
part of what it means for something to change is for some aspect of it to be at rest 
throughout the change. 
 When Plato provides his preferred positive account of change in the Phaedo, 
he seems to hold that rest is going to play an important role in the analysis of change.  
As discussed in Chapter Three, Plato argues that what explains something’s coming to 
be a certain way (in a case in which a form exists) is participation in the relevant form.  
Plato writes that there is “no other way in which each thing can come to be than by 
sharing in the particular being of each thing in which it shares” (Phaedo 101c2-4).  
What follows from this account is that when x becomes F or changes into being F, it 
comes to share in the form of F, (which as I argued involves its taking on an F-ness-
particularization in it).  But what is crucial to this account of change here is that there 
will always be some x that underlies the change, some x that comes to participate in 
the form and comes to possess a form-particularization.  For something to change, it 
must persist through the change when it comes to participate in a form.  Plato 
emphasizes the persistence of the changing thing when he points out that when 
Socrates becomes small, he endures and remains the same through this change.  
Socrates says: “I, receiving and enduring smallness, also still am who I am, namely, I 
am this small man.” (ἐγὼ δεξάµενος καὶ ὑποµείνας τὴν σµικρότητα, καὶ ἔτι ὢν ὅσπερ εἰµί, 
οὗτος ὁ αὐτὸς σµικρός εἰµι) (Phaedo 102e3-5).  Plato seems to think that part of what it 
is for something to change is for that thing to remain and endure through the change.  
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Therefore, Plato appears committed to the view that being at rest figures in the account 
of what it is to change.108 
 Because of this, Plato will hold that “The form of change is not at rest” is a 
false pros heauto predication.  If Plato did intend the generalized statement “the form 
of F is F” to be understood along the lines of the Frede/Meinwald view, then it seems 
he would also have intended “the form of F is not opposite-F” to be taken along these 
lines as well.  But the form of change would be a counterexample to this generalized 
assumption, since Plato thinks that being at rest is part of what it is to change.  
Therefore, we have good reason not to attribute the Frede/Meinwald view to Plato, 
even if such a view is immune to our main argument from Chapter Two, which as we 
saw already, is highly doubtful. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
108 There do seem to be a number of difficulties here.  For instance, even if alteration is understood in 
terms of an underlying and persisting subject coming to participate in a form, what about generation and 
destruction?  For example, it seems that form-particularizations undergo generation and destruction 
rather than alteration, a point I discuss in more detail in Chapter Five.  When unfortunate-looking Jim 
undergoes a makeover and becomes beautiful, it seems that the-ugliness-in-Jim is destroyed and 
replaced by the-beauty-in-Jim.  But then the-ugliness-in-Jim seems to go through a change (i.e., its 
destruction), and yet there does not appear to be something persisting through this change.  Is it then 
right to claim that all change essentially involves rest as part of its nature?  Another potential difficulty 
is what the account of change will be in a case in which Plato does not posit the existence of a form.  
What happens when something comes to be G in a case in which there is no form of G?  Perhaps unlike 
the first difficulty, this one is easier to resolve.  Although it seems the account of change here will not 
involve something underlying that comes to participate in the form of G, there will still be something 
underlying this change.  While it is unclear as to exactly how Plato would describe such a change, for 
our purposes, it is sufficient to recognize that such changes would involve the persistence of an 
underlying subject.  Being at rest would still be part of what it is for things to change in this way.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESEMBLANCE WITHOUT SELF-PREDICATION 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 We have seen that there is good reason to doubt all of the most influential 
interpretations of Plato’s apparently self-predicational language.  We have also been 
introduced to a new interpretation called the Explanatory Predication view (EP).  
According to EP, Plato uses his apparently self-predicational language to express 
claims to which he is clearly committed.  EP also attributes to Plato a view that he 
“could have had in mind”, since it does not involve any blatantly implausible 
underlying assumptions or consequences.  EP is also consistent with the textual 
evidence that we have examined, and if we have truly found an acceptable 
interpretation of Plato’s apparently self-predicational language, one would hope it is 
consistent will all of Plato or at least with all of middle Plato.109 
Once again, EP holds that in contexts in which Plato intends his apparently 
self-predicational language to be generalizable to all forms, the statement “the form of 
F is F” only says that the form of F is F-explaining.  In such statements, the predicate 
‘F’ is just being used as shorthand to refer to the property of being F-explaining.  One 
crucial thing to note here is that an important aspect of EP is that it avoids attributing a 
genuine Self-Predication Assumption (SP) to Plato—part of EP is the rejection of SP.  
EP holds that it is not true for Plato that for all forms, the form of F is itself an F thing.  
                                                
109 Of course, it is possible that Plato changes his views from some dialogues to others.  So it may be 
that EP correctly identifies Plato’s intentions in some dialogues but not others.  In fact, however, I think 
a case could be made that Plato’s intention when using generalizable apparently self-predicational 
language is consistent throughout his dialogues.  But throughout this work, I focus on evidence 
regarding Plato’s view in the middle dialogues, and I argue that he intends EP at least throughout this 
period. 
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(Although EP does allow that there may be exceptional cases in which a certain form 
of F is an F thing.)  So EP, like many other views that we have considered and brought 
into doubt, is a non-SP view. 
It is important to recognize that EP is a non-SP view, because a number of 
commentators have argued that there is definitive textual evidence suggesting that 
Plato must be committed to some version of SP.  If they are right, then EP cannot be 
correct, since it involves a denial of SP.  So what is this textual evidence that has been 
used to show that Plato is committed to SP, and so not EP?  The commentators have 
focused on a number of passages which, they argue, show that Plato thinks 
participants in forms are copies, images, or likenesses of the forms in which they 
participate.  They argue that since Plato sees sensible Fs as copies, images, or 
likenesses of the form of F, and it is precisely in being F that there is a resemblance 
between sensible and form, then the form of F must itself be an F thing.  If this is 
right, then it would seem that Plato is committed to some version of SP.  Since Plato 
thinks, according to the argument, that for all forms, the form of F is an F thing, we 
ought to simply read Plato’s apparently self-predicational language as making such 
claims.  When Plato says that “the form of F is F” in a context in which he intends to 
generalize the claim, he simply wants to say that the form of F is an F thing.  
According to these commentators, Plato is committed to the view that the form of F is 
an F thing because of his commitment to the resemblance between the form and 
sensible Fs. 
In this chapter, I will begin by examining this sort of argument as it has been 
presented by Norman Gulley, Bostock, and Malcolm.  I will then discuss the textual 
evidence that has been thought to commit Plato to the view that participants are 
copies, images, or likenesses of forms.  I will argue that even if it is correct to attribute 
to Plato the view that participants are resemblers of forms, they will be resemblers by 
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having form-particularizations which are more directly copies of forms.  The complex 
resemblance relation between form and participant is grounded in the relation between 
form and the form-particularization in the participant.  Because of this, I will argue 
that there is no good reason to think that resemblance entails SP.  Finally, I will 
provide an account of the relation between form-particularizations and their 
corresponding forms of which they are resemblers.  Once we spell out the exact 
relation, we will see that there are certain crucial ways in which the resemblers can 
approach forms, but only in a deficient way.  My account of the relation between 
forms and their corresponding resemblers involves a clear specification of how 
resemblers strive, but are unable, to be fully like the paradigmatic forms. 
 
 
II. The Resemblance Argument – Resemblance Entails Self-Predication 
 
 Gulley, Bostock, and Malcolm all argue that Plato is committed to there being 
a resemblance relation between forms and their participants, and that this resemblance 
relation entails that all forms genuinely self-predicate, or that, for all forms, the form 
of F is itself an F thing.  Gulley argues that in the theory of forms as presented in the 
Phaedo and other middle dialogues, Plato conceives of forms as “ideal standards” or 
“archetypes” (32).  Gulley outlines what he takes to be part of this theory of forms: 
 
[S]ensible characteristics are explained in terms of ‘participation’ of 
sensible objects in Forms, and…this ‘participation’ establishes a 
relation of resemblance between sensible objects, in respect of their 
characteristics, and Forms. (Gulley 1962, 32-3) 
Gulley adds that “to conceive the Form as an archetype which its sensible instances 
resemble is to conceive it as a perfect particular object possessing the same 
characteristic as its sensible instances” (Gulley 1962, 33, my emphasis).  So Gulley 
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here not only thinks that the form of F is conceived of as an F thing, but further that it 
is conceived of as a perfectly F thing.  He attributes to Plato not merely SP but what 
might be called paradigmatic-SP.  For our purposes, it is important to recognize that 
Gulley thinks participation is explained in terms of a relation of resemblance between 
participants and forms.  And further, this relation of resemblance is precisely “in 
respect of their characteristics”—it is precisely in being F that the many Fs resemble 
the form of F.  What follows from this, at least, is that the form of F is an F thing.  
And perhaps, as Gulley suggests, the form will not only be an F thing but will be a 
perfectly F thing. 
 In “Plato and Nominalism”, Bostock suggests that the most serious objection 
to any non-SP view is that it is inconsistent with Plato’s “frequent claim that sensible 
particulars resemble the Forms they are called after, and that they are copies, images, 
or imitations of these forms” (Bostock 1990, 262).110  Bostock admits that Plato does 
not explicitly claim that the respect in which the many Fs resemble the form of F is in 
their being F, but Bostock asks rhetorically: “But if this is not the respect of 
resemblance between Forms and particulars, then what is?” (Bostock 1990, 262-3).  
Further, Bostock suggests that without a commitment to SP, “all this talk of 
resembling and copying is totally misleading” (Bostock 1990, 263).  What the non-SP 
theorist “owes us [is] an account of why Plato himself should nevertheless find it an 
appropriate terminology” (Bostock 1990, 263).  And Bostock seems to be hinting that 
no such account is possible.  Plato’s talk of participants as being resemblers or copies 
of forms would simply be entirely misleading and inappropriate, if Plato had not held 
that participants resemble the form of F in being F, and so Plato thinks that the form is 
itself really F.  Because Plato frequently claims that the many Fs resemble the form of 
F, and this resemblance must be resemblance with respect to being F, the form of F 
                                                
110 Also see Bostock 1986, 90-4, where Bostock argues that resemblance entails SP. 
128 
must be F.  So, the argument goes, Plato’s use of resemblance talk entails his 
commitment to SP. 
 In Plato on the Self-Predication of Forms, Malcolm argues against any non-SP 
theorist in a chapter called “The Rejection of the Doctrine that the Form is not an F 
Thing”.  Against the non-SP theorist, he argues that Plato thinks that for all forms, the 
form of F is an F thing, or that Plato is committed to SP.  In fact, Malcolm goes 
further, like Gulley, to attribute paradigmatic-SP to Plato.  Not only is the form of F 
itself an F thing, but it is a perfectly F thing.111  Malcolm argues that the strongest 
evidence for attributing SP (and paradigmatic-SP) to Plato is the metaphysical theme 
of what he calls “Model/Copy”.  He sketches the argument as follows: 
 
The argument from Model/Copy maintains that, since the copies, the 
many Fs, must resemble the model, the model must resemble the 
copies.  The respect in which this mutual resemblance must take place 
is in being F, and this makes the Form a (paradigmatically) F thing. 
(Malcolm 1991, 68) 
Malcolm makes use of Plato’s purported commitment to the claim that participants are 
copies of forms, copies which resemble forms as their models.  Concerning 
Model/Copy, Malcolm argues: “On the most natural reading of this central part of 
Plato’s ontology the Forms are F things which the copies resemble” (Malcolm 1991, 
90).  This resemblance consists precisely in both the copies’ and the model’s being F 
things.  Obviously, then, the model, the form of F, is itself an F thing. 
                                                
111 In fact, Malcolm often seems to fail to draw the distinction between SP and paradigmatic-SP, but 
these are crucially different.  Paradigmatic-SP entails SP, but not the other way around.  Malcolm 
suggests that he will establish the view that the form is a paradigm case by showing that the form of F 
must be an F thing (Malcolm 1991, 64)—and by ‘paradigm case’, Malcolm means being a perfectly F 
thing (Malcolm 1991, 68).  But showing that the form of F is an F thing does not, on its own, show that 
it is a perfectly F thing.  However, Malcolm claims that the form of F’s being a paradigm case and so its 
being perfectly F is a necessary condition for “self-exemplification” (Malcolm 1991, 213, n. 23), which 
in his terminology means the form’s being an F thing (Malcolm 1991, 1).  But this seems wrong, as it at 
least seems possible for the form to be an F thing without being a perfectly F thing.  Again, Malcolm 
claims that once we arrive at the conclusion that “F-ness is an F thing, …we get the entity which is the 
general property also being a paradigm instance thereof” (Malcolm 1991, 126).  But a further argument 
would be required to move from SP to paradigmatic-SP.  For similar apparent confusion concerning the 
distinction between SP and paradigmatic-SP, see Malcolm 1991, 63, 128, 134.     
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 Malcolm suggests that any non-SP view (or any view that adopts what 
Malcolm calls “Thesis A”)—any view which takes Plato not to be committed to the 
view that for all forms, the form of F is an F thing—does not take Model/Copy very 
seriously (Malcolm 1991, 92).  More definitively, Malcolm argues that any non-SP 
view “cannot deal adequately with Model/Copy” (Malcolm 1991, 124).  Model/Copy, 
Malcolm claims, is the “best evidence” for the claim that Plato saw forms as paradigm 
cases and so as genuinely self-predicating (Malcolm 1991, 99). 
 
 The bare essentials of the main argument from these three commentators112 
against non-SP and so for SP, which I will call the Resemblance Argument (RA), 
seems to be as follows: 
 
1. The participants in the form of F are images-imitations-likenesses 
of the form. 
2. Images-imitations-likenesses resemble that of which they are the 
image-imitation-likeness. 
3. So, the participants in the form of F resemble the form of F (insofar 
as they are participants113). [1, 2] 
4. If participants in the form of F resemble the form of F (insofar as 
they are participants), then the resemblance between the 
participants and the form of F consists in their both being F things. 
5. So, the resemblance between the participants and the form of F 
consists in their both being F things. [3, 4] 
6. So, the form of F is itself an F thing. [5]          
                                                
112 Vlastos also argues that Plato’s “Copy-Theory of the relation of things to Forms” implies SP, for “if 
the F particular is a copy of F-ness and resembles F-ness in respect of being F, then…F-ness is F” 
(Vlastos 1965, 248).  In a note, Eck also sums up the argument that resemblance entails SP, and even 
paradigmatic-SP: 
 
In some passages of the dialogues it is said that sensible things resemble the forms 
they participate in.  F things are resemblances, imitations or images of the F-ness; the 
form is a model the sensible things are copies of.  Now it has been argued that a form 
F-ness can only function as a model if it is itself a standard, an exemplary specimen, 
exhibiting the property of being F perfectly, while the sensible F things have the 
property only in a deficient way. (Eck 2008, 114, n. 8) 
 
113 The point here is not simply that the participants happen to resemble the form in some way or 
another, but that their participating consists in their standing in a certain resemblance relation to the 
form. 
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What follows from the resemblance relation between forms and participants is that 
forms genuinely self-predicate.  If this is right, then a view such as EP cannot be 
correct because it attributes to Plato the denial of SP.  But is this Resemblance 
Argument (RA) successful?  Have we found a devastating objection to EP?   
 
 
III. The Text 
 
Before presenting my response to RA, let us examine the textual evidence that 
purports to commit Plato to the view that participants are copies or in some way 
resemblers of forms.114  We will refer back to this textual evidence below, when we 
discuss how to respond to the argument of Gulley, Bostock, and Malcolm. 
Some of this evidence comes from the central books of the Republic.  Toward 
the end of Book V, Plato contrasts the lover of sights and sounds with the philosopher.  
The lover of sights and sounds is someone who believes in beautiful things but not in 
the beautiful itself (Republic 476c2-3).  Such a person, Plato suggests, is living in a 
dream rather than a waking state (Republic 476c4)—and he is dreaming insofar as he 
“believes that a likeness to something is not a likeness but rather is the thing itself 
                                                
114 In this section, I examine evidence from the Republic, Phaedrus, Timaeus, and Parmenides.  
Noticeably absent here is a discussion of the text from the Phaedo 74-76, which is often thought to be 
relevant to the point that sensibles are resemblers of forms.  I leave this out because I discuss that 
evidence in detail in Chapter Six.  As I argue there, in this passage, Plato has a specific way in mind in 
which sensibles strive unsuccessfully to be such as forms—sensible properties and particulars fail to be 
like the forms in being explainers.  Another noticeable omission is a discussion of the ascent up the 
rising stairs to the form of beauty, in the Symposium 210a-212a.  One reason for its absence here is that 
we do not find there explicit use of the image-imitation-likeness terms, which we do find in the other 
passages.  Perhaps more importantly, it is not clear that Plato intends the claims made there to be 
generalizable to all forms, whereas this is fairly certain in the other passages.  As Vlastos argues, in the 
Symposium, Plato is emphasizing the connection between love and that which is beautiful—there are 
good contextual reasons for thinking that Plato is claiming that the form of beauty in particular is really 
a beautiful thing (Vlastos 1981, 262-3).  So the form of beauty may really be a wonderfully beautiful 
thing, and perhaps the many beautifuls are resemblers of the form of beauty in this (additional) respect, 
but it is not clear that Plato intends this resemblance to be generalizable to all forms and their 
corresponding particulars. 
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which it is like” (τὸ ὀνειρώττειν ἆρα οὐ τόδε ἐστίν, ἐάντε ἐν ὕπνῳ τις ἐάντ’ ἐγρηγορὼς τὸ 
ὅµοιόν τῳ µὴ ὅµοιον ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ ἡγῆται εἶναι ᾧ ἔοικεν) (Republic 476c5-7).  Plato suggests 
here that the lover of sights and sounds somehow mistakes the beautiful things (καλὰ 
πράγµατα) for the form of beauty, or at the very least, the lover of sights and sounds 
fails to recognize that the beautiful things are merely likenesses of something else, the 
form of beauty.  Unlike the lover of sights and sounds, the philosopher is awake and 
does not confuse the likenesses with the thing that they are likenesses of.  The 
philosopher is able to distinguish between the things sharing in the form of beauty and 
the form of beauty itself (οὔτε τὰ µετέχοντα αὐτὸ οὔτε αὐτὸ τὰ µετέχοντα ἡγούµενος) 
(Republic 476d2-3).  Plato seems to make clear here the view that the things sharing 
(τὰ µετέχοντα) in the form of beauty, the beautiful things (καλὰ πράγµατα), are 
likenesses of the form of beauty.        
 Toward the end of Book VI of the Republic, when Plato introduces the Divided 
Line, he again seems to suggest that sensibles are somehow resemblers of forms.  The 
first distinction drawn in the Line is between the visible and the intelligible.  The 
visible portion of the Line is further divided into images (εἰκόνες—509e1) and that 
which the images resemble (ᾧ τοῦτο ἔοικεν) (Republic 510a5).  Plato clarifies that by 
images, he has in mind things like shadows, reflections, and other things like that 
(Republic 509e1-510a3).  And the things that these images resemble, the originals of 
these images, are animals, plants, and artifacts (Republic 510a5-6).  These sensible 
objects are the originals that cast the shadows, reflections, and so on. 
 Plato then goes on to divide the intelligible portion of the Line into two parts.  
In the first part of the intelligible portion, “the soul uses as images the things that were 
being imitated before” (τοῖς τότε µιµηθεῖσιν ὡς εἰκόσιν χρωµένη ψυχὴ) (Republic 510b4-
5).  In the second part of the intelligible portion, the soul proceeds without making use 
of the images that were used in the first part (ἄνευ τῶν περὶ ἐκεῖνο εἰκόνων) (Republic 
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510b7-8).  Plato suggests here that the things that were being imitated before in the 
visible portion, sensible objects like animals and plants, are now used by the soul as 
images of the intelligibles in the first part of the intelligible portion of the Line.  But 
Plato does not merely suggest that these sensible objects are used as images, but he 
refers to them directly as images at 510b7-8.  Plato provides an example to help 
illustrate the point.  Geometers, for example, use visible figures but do not direct their 
thought to the visible figures but rather to the things that the visible figures are like 
(τοῖς ὁρωµένοις εἴδεσι προσχρῶνται καὶ τοὺς λόγους περὶ αὐτῶν ποιοῦνται, οὐ περὶ τούτων 
διανοούµενοι, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνων πέρι οἷς ταῦτα ἔοικε) (Republic 510d5-7).  And the things that 
the visible figures resemble are things like the square itself and the diagonal itself 
(Republic 510d7-8).  The geometers use their drawn visible figures, of which shadows 
and reflections are images, in turn as images of those things themselves which are only 
graspable in thought (αὐτὰ µὲν ταῦτα ἃ πλάττουσίν τε καὶ γράφουσιν, ὧν καὶ σκιαὶ καὶ ἐν 
ὕδασιν εἰκόνες εἰσίν, τούτοις µὲν ὡς εἰκόσιν αὖ χρώµενοι, ζητοῦντες δὲ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα ἰδεῖν ἃ 
οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἴδοι τις ἢ τῇ διανοίᾳ) (Republic 510e1-511a1).  Again, Plato generalizes the 
point: In the first section of the intelligible portion, the soul “uses the very images 
which had their own images in the section below” (εἰκόσι δὲ χρωµένην αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ 
τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθεῖσιν) (Republic 511a-6).  Through all of this, Plato suggests that 
while sensible objects such as animals, plants, and artifacts have their own images in 
the sensible realm, these sensible objects are also images of forms existing in the 
intelligible realm.  And just as the drawings of geometers resemble their 
corresponding objects of thought, sensible objects in general resemble their 
corresponding intelligible forms. 
 In Book VII of the Republic, Plato again suggests that sensibles are images of 
forms.  After introducing the Allegory of the Cave, Plato argues that the philosophers 
who have acquired knowledge of the good and other forms, while outside of the cave, 
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ought to return to the cave in order to guard and care for others.  The philosophers 
must go down to the common dwelling place in the cave and must grow accustomed to 
seeing in the dark (Republic 520c1-3).  Plato adds that once the philosophers become 
accustomed to seeing in the dark, they will see much better than the people there and 
they will “know what each image is and also of what it is the image, on account of 
having seen the truth concerning beautifuls and justs and goods” (συνεθιζόµενοι γὰρ 
µυρίῳ βέλτιον ὄψεσθε τῶν ἐκεῖ καὶ γνώσεσθε ἕκαστα τὰ εἴδωλα ἅττα ἐστὶ καὶ ὧν, διὰ τὸ 
τἀληθῆ ἑωρακέναι καλῶν τε καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν πέρι) (Republic 520c3-6).  Plato 
suggests here that the sensibles encountered in the cave are images (εἴδωλα), and 
presumably they are images of those things that the philosopher has grasped outside of 
the cave, the forms.         
 We find more evidence for the view that there is a resemblance between 
sensibles and forms in the Phaedrus.  Plato describes “when someone sees the beauty 
here and is reminded of true beauty” (Phaedrus 249d5-6).  Those who have sufficient 
memory are startled “when they see some likeness of the things there” (ὅταν τι τῶν ἐκεῖ 
ὁµοίωµα ἴδωσιν) (Phaedrus 250a5-6).  Plato adds at 250b1-5: 
 
Justice and temperance and as many 
other things as are held in honor in 
souls, are in no way lit up in their 
likenesses here.  But only a few 
people, through obscure organs, 
scarcely behold the kind of thing 
having images, when they encounter 
the images.   
 δικαιοσύνης µὲν οὖν καὶ σωφροσύνης 
καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τίµια ψυχαῖς οὐκ ἔνεστι 
φέγγος οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς τῇδε 
ὁµοιώµασιν, ἀλλὰ δι’ ἀµυδρῶν 
ὀργάνων µόγις αὐτῶν καὶ ὀλίγοι ἐπὶ 
τὰς εἰκόνας ἰόντες θεῶνται τὸ τοῦ 
εἰκασθέντος γένος 
Here, Plato seems to suggest that in our experience with sensibles we encounter 
likenesses and images of forms.  We grasp beauty using our sight down here, 
presumably by seeing images of beauty in the sensible world (Phaedrus 250c8-d3).  
Plato claims that we do not see images of wisdom through our vision, but we would be 
in the grips of a terribly powerful love, if some clear image of wisdom itself came into 
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our sight (δεινοὺς γὰρ ἂν παρεῖχεν ἔρωτας, εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἑαυτῆς ἐναργὲς εἴδωλον παρείχετο 
εἰς ὄψιν ἰόν) (Phaedrus 250d4-6).  Plato suggests that in the case of beauty, we do 
happen to encounter clear images of the form in the sensible world, through the use of 
our vision.  Throughout this section, Plato seems committed to the view that we 
encounter an array of likenesses or images of forms in the sensible world.  These 
likenesses or images may vary in clarity and may be present only to some one or other 
of our senses.  But the key point is that there seem to be sensibles that resemble the 
forms and so are able to remind us of the forms that they resemble. 
 There are also numerous passages in the Timaeus115 where Plato seems to 
suggest that sensibles are images, imitations, or likenesses, which resemble forms.  
After introducing the thing which receives all bodies, the receptacle, Plato makes the 
following claim about it at 50c4-d2: 
                  
The things going into and out of it are 
imitations of the things which always 
are, imprinted from them in an 
amazing way that is hard to describe, 
which we will pursue at another time.  
But at the present time, it is necessary 
to have in mind three kinds: that 
which comes to be, that in which it 
comes to be, and that from which that 
which comes to be is likened and is 
produced. 
 τὰ δὲ εἰσιόντα καὶ ἐξιόντα τῶν ὄντων 
ἀεὶ µιµήµατα, τυπωθέντα ἀπ’ αὐτῶν 
τρόπον τινὰ δύσφραστον καὶ 
θαυµαστόν, ὃν εἰς αὖθις µέτιµεν. ἐν δ’ 
οὖν τῷ παρόντι χρὴ γένη διανοηθῆναι 
τριττά, τὸ µὲν γιγνόµενον, τὸ δ’ ἐν ᾧ 
γίγνεται, τὸ δ’ ὅθεν ἀφοµοιούµενον 
φύεται τὸ γιγνόµενον. 
In this passage, Plato seems to claim that the things which come to be in the sensible 
world are imitations of the forms and come to be so as to be like the forms.  Soon after 
                                                
115 It has been argued that the Timaeus is a late dialogue, in part because it involves the seemingly new 
roles of the receptacle and demiurge and a seemingly clear commitment to the existence of forms for 
predicates such as ‘man’ and ‘fire’ (for instance, see Cherniss 1957 and Sarah Waterlow 1982).  One 
must be careful, then, to use it as evidence of Plato’s views in the middle period.  While I think the 
Timaeus may be a later dialogue and may involve numerous developments in Plato’s views, I include a 
discussion of some key passages in which Plato uses explicit resemblance terms.  Plato does still seem 
explicitly committed to there being a resemblance relation between forms and sensibles, although the 
account of exactly how that relation comes about may have changed.  Also, as I go on to discuss, 
Plato’s language in Timaeus 52b-c is especially reminiscent of his discussion of likenesses in Republic 
V. 
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this, Plato points out that the receptacle must be formless (ἄµορφον), at least with 
respect to what it is going to receive (Timaeus 50d7-e1).  If it were not formless, it 
would only be able to poorly copy (κακῶς ἂν ἀφοµοιοῖ) what it receives (Timaeus 50e1-
3).  The suggestion again is that it is the job of the receptacle to be that in which the 
forms are copied well.  Again, Plato reaffirms the point that the receptacle is that 
which receives the copies (ἀφοµοιώµατα) of all the things which always are (Timaeus 
51a1-3).  For example, parts of the receptacle will appear as fire, water, earth, or air, 
“to the extent that it receives the imitations of these” (καθ’ ὅσον ἂν µιµήµατα τούτων 
δέχηται) (Timaeus 51b4-6).  There are certainly difficult issues of interpretation 
throughout this section, but for our purposes up to this point, it is sufficient to 
recognize that Plato seems committed to the view that there will be resemblers of 
forms existing in the sensible world.  I will return later to an ambiguity concerning 
exactly what things are supposed to be the likenesses or imitations of forms that enter 
the receptacle. 
 Plato continues in the Timaeus to distinguish the three kinds of things: the 
forms, that which comes to be, and the receptacle.  After describing the forms, he 
moves on to characterize that which is “perceivable, begotten, and always being borne 
along, coming to be in some place and in turn being destroyed from there” (αἰσθητόν, 
γεννητόν, πεφορηµένον ἀεί, γιγνόµενόν τε ἔν τινι τόπῳ καὶ πάλιν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπολλύµενον) 
(Timaeus 52a5-7).  This second sort of thing, Plato claims, has the same name as the 
forms and is similar to them (τὸ δὲ ὁµώνυµον ὅµοιόν τε ἐκείνῳ δεύτερον) (Timaeus 52a4-
5).  Once again, Plato seems clearly committed to the view that things which come to 
be and are perceivable are resemblers of forms.           
 Using language reminiscent of the passage we discussed from Book V of the 
Republic 476c-d, Plato claims that people are usually unable to draw these distinctions 
between the three different kinds of things, because of their dreaming state (ὑπὸ ταύτης 
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τῆς ὀνειρώξεως) (Timaeus 52b6-c2).  Our dreaming state makes us unaware of the 
following fact (Timaeus 52c2-5): 
 
Since the very thing in relation to 
which an image has come to be <as an 
image> is not <part> of the image 
itself, but the image is always borne 
along as an appearance of something 
else, on account of this it is fitting for 
an image to come to be in something 
else, somehow clinging to being or 
being nothing at all. 
 εἰκόνι µέν, ἐπείπερ οὐδ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐφ’ 
ᾧ γέγονεν ἑαυτῆς ἐστιν, ἑτέρου δέ 
τινος ἀεὶ φέρεται φάντασµα, διὰ ταῦτα 
ἐν ἑτέρῳ προσήκει τινὶ γίγνεσθαι, 
οὐσίας ἁµωσγέπως ἀντεχοµένην, ἢ 
µηδὲν τὸ παράπαν αὐτὴν εἶναι 
Because of our dreaming state, we fail to recognize that, since what comes to be are 
images of forms, they come to be in something else, namely the receptacle.  Again, 
Plato seems to suggest that sensibles are images and appearances of forms, and so 
resemble them. 
 Finally, in the Parmenides, we find evidence of the view that sensibles are 
resemblers of forms.  It is true, however, that we should be cautious when attempting 
to attribute a certain view to middle or late Plato based on textual evidence found in 
the first part of the Parmenides.  As I explain in Chapter Seven on the Third Man 
Argument, Plato may be discussing views in this part of the dialogue that he thinks 
have often been mistakenly attributed to him based on his middle dialogues.  However, 
we have seen a great deal of evidence from the middle dialogues suggesting that 
sensibles are in some way resemblers of forms, and Plato does present the view in the 
Parmenides favorably as what appears most right to Socrates (µάλιστα ἔµοιγε 
καταφαίνεται) (Parmenides 132d1).  The view that appears most right is as follows 
(Parmenides 132d1-4): 
 
These forms are just like models set in 
nature, and other things resemble 
these and are likenesses, and 
participation in forms for the other 
things is not any other thing than 
being made like them.  
 τὰ µὲν εἴδη ταῦτα ὥσπερ παραδείγµατα 
ἑστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα 
τούτοις ἐοικέναι καὶ εἶναι ὁµοιώµατα, 
καὶ ἡ µέθεξις αὕτη τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι 
τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ εἰκασθῆναι 
αὐτοῖς. 
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Here, Plato suggests that what it is for something to participate in a form is for that 
thing to resemble and become a likeness of that form.  Participants, then, would 
clearly be resemblers of forms.  Now perhaps we should be reluctant to take this 
evidence to suggest that the Plato of the middle dialogues thought that participation 
was just for things to come to be like forms.  However, given the amount of textual 
evidence, it seems safe to conclude that whatever view Plato has of exactly what the 
nature of participation is in the middle dialogues, it will turn out to at least involve 
participants’ resembling forms.  For Plato of the middle dialogues, if something 
participates in the form of F, then at the very least we can say that Plato thinks it will 
resemble the form.  How exactly participants resemble forms is something we will 
return to shortly. 
 
 
IV. The Response – Resemblance without Self-Predication 
 
 Based on the textual evidence that we have examined, we seem to have 
established Plato’s commitment to the first three premises of the Resemblance 
Argument (RA) for SP relied on by Gulley, Bostock, and Malcolm.  Once again, that 
argument is as follows: 
 
1. The participants in the form of F are images-imitations-likenesses 
of the form. 
2. Images-imitations-likenesses resemble that of which they are the 
image-imitation-likeness. 
3. So, the participants in the form of F resemble the form of F (insofar 
as they are participants). [1, 2] 
4. If participants in the form of F resemble the form of F (insofar as 
they are participants), then the resemblance between the 
participants and the form of F consists in their both being F things. 
5. So, the resemblance between the participants and the form of F 
consists in their both being F things. [3, 4] 
6. So, the form of F is itself an F thing. [5]          
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Many commentators agree with Gulley, Bostock, and Malcolm, that participants in the 
form of F, sensible (and perhaps non-sensible) Fs, are resemblers of the form.116  And 
we have seen considerable textual evidence that seems to establish this point.  
However, a number of commentators have suggested that this traditional interpretation 
is incorrect.  They contend that Plato does not think of sensible objects as resemblers 
of forms, but rather he attributes this role to form-particularizations alone.  If these 
commentators are correct, this would constitute an adequate response to the main 
argument of Gulley, Bostock, and Malcolm.  If the many Fs, the participants in the 
form of F, are not resemblers of the form of F, then we can reject RA right at the 
outset, since premise 1 would be false for Plato. 
 Some commentators have defended the view that form-particularizations are 
resemblers of forms.  For instance, Silverman claims that form-particularizations are 
copies of forms and refers to them as “form-copies” (Silverman 2002, 18).  John 
Brentlinger attributes to Plato the following view: 
 
[A] particular which is round…possesses, as a part, something which, 
not being roundness, represents or imitates it—stands to it as an image 
in water stands to the reality which is imaged. (Brentlinger 1972, 68 n. 
9) 
It is the form-particularizations or what Brentlinger calls the immanent properties that 
are representations, imitations, or images of forms.  Ross claims that a form-
particularization is “an imperfect copy of the Idea” and that it “imitates” the Idea 
                                                
116 For instance, Ross claims that “the relation of sensible things to Ideas is thought of as imitation” 
(Ross 1951, 24).  Taylor also defends the view that sensibles are resemblers of forms: 
 
[S]ensible things are being treated as “imitations” (µιµήµατα) of the “form”….  It is 
quite untrue to say that the “imitation” formula only appears in Plato’s latest 
dialogues as an improvement on his earlier formula of “participation”.  In the Phaedo 
itself Socrates starts with the conception of things as ‘imitating’ forms…. (Taylor 
1936, 188) 
 
N. White also holds that “…Plato arrives at his well-known doctrine that sensible objects are in some 
sense copies, or poor imitations or replicas, of Forms” (N. White 1976, 68).  Allen attributes the view to 
Plato that “the objects of opinion are the likenesses of Forms in the sensible world” (Allen 1961, 330).  
Burnet also expresses the view that the “objects of sense” are only “images” of forms (Burnet 1914, 
317-8). 
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(Ross 1951, 30).  Now, it must be admitted that what these commentators suggest is 
consistent with the view that the many Fs, the participants in the form of F, are also 
resemblers of the form.  Perhaps these commentators want to attribute to Plato the 
view that form-particularizations and participants are resemblers.  But seeing form-
particularizations as resemblers in addition to participants does not seem to help us 
with RA. 
 However, some commentators go further to clearly argue that it is form-
particularizations and not participants that are resemblers of forms.  Raphael Demos 
argues that form-particularizations or what he calls “empirical” or “actual” forms 
“imperfectly imitate” “ideal” forms (Demos 1948, 457).  Further, he claims that the 
terms of the imitation relation “are not: actual thing and ideal form, but: actual form 
and ideal form” (Demos 1948, 457-8).  Particulars are not imitations of forms, but 
form-particularizations existing in the particulars are.  Matthen argues likewise that 
form-particularizations are copies of forms, and claims that “Equality itself, for 
example, turns out to be a paradigm not of the bearers of equality, but of the equality 
relations immanent in sensible things” (Matthen 1984, 294).  The suggestion here is 
that form-particularizations are copies of forms as their models, and particulars are 
not.  McPherran claims that form-particularizations are images and likenesses of forms 
(McPherran 1988, 534), and adds that “it is not particulars but only immanent 
characters that are in fact images of Forms…” (McPherran 1988, 535, my 
emphasis).117  He is clear in attributing to Plato the view that “it’s not literally 
particulars which are likenesses of forms, but only immanent characters” (McPherran 
1984, 31).  Now, if these commentators are correct in attributing to Plato the view that 
                                                
117 McPherran expresses the same view in numerous places: “[I]t is immanent characters and not 
particulars that are images of Forms…” (McPherran 1988, 533).  Again, the “F-in-x (and…not the 
particular x) is an image of the Form the F-itself, of which it is a manifestation/particularization” 
(McPherran 1988, 536).  For the same point repeated in another paper with slightly different wording, 
see McPherran 1984, 32. 
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form-particularizations and not participants are resemblers of forms, then we can 
reject premise 1 of RA.              
 I think these commentators may be right to suggest that sometimes, when Plato 
refers to resemblers of forms, he has form-particularizations in mind—for instance, 
perhaps a case could be made that this is what Plato intends in the textual evidence 
from the Phaedrus and Timaeus.  However, for our purposes, it is sufficient to 
recognize that we have seen clear cut evidence of Plato’s referring to particulars 
rather than form-particularizations as resemblers.  As we saw from Book V of the 
Republic at 476c-d, Plato is clear in saying that the lover of sights and sounds fails to 
recognize beautiful things (καλὰ πράγµατα) as likenesses of the form of beauty.  There 
is no indication that form-particularizations are to be included as relevant “things” in 
this passage, and Plato has just referred to beautiful things such as “sounds, colors, 
shapes, and all the things fashioned out of things of this sort” (τάς τε καλὰς φωνὰς 
ἀσπάζονται καὶ χρόας καὶ σχήµατα καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων δηµιουργούµενα) (Republic 
476b4-6).  Further, Plato makes clear that it is the things sharing (τὰ µετέχοντα) in the 
form of beauty that are likenesses of the form.  And crucially, F-ness-
particularizations (in general) are not the things sharing in the form of F.  It is the 
particular Fs, the things which have the F-ness-particularizations in them, that share or 
participate in the form of F.  So Plato is clear here in referring to the many Fs that 
participate in the form of F as likenesses of the form. 
 We also saw a clear reference to particulars as opposed to form-
particularizations as resemblers of forms in the Divided Line of Book VI of the 
Republic at 509e-511a.  There, Plato suggests that sensible particulars such as animals, 
plants, and artifacts have their own images in the sensible world.  But Plato continues 
to suggest that these sensible particulars will be used as, and are, images of forms in 
the intelligible world.  Plato is clear in claiming that things like animals, plants, and 
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artifacts, and not merely the form-particularizations in these sensible particulars, are 
images of forms. 
 In the Parmenides at 132d, we saw the presentation of the view that 
participation in forms is merely being made like them, and that participants are 
likenesses of forms and resemble them.  Again, it is not form-particularizations (in 
general) that participate in the forms of which they are particularizations.  Instead, 
particulars participate in forms and thereby have the relevant form-particularizations 
in them.  So the suggestion here in the Parmenides is that it is the many Fs, the 
participants in the form of F, that are likenesses and resemblers of the form of F. 
 Given this textual evidence, Demos, Matthen, and McPherran appear to be 
incorrect to claim that participants are simply not resemblers of forms.  They may be 
right to claim that form-particularizations are also form-resemblers (and even that 
Plato is sometimes referring to form-particularizations in passages involving 
resemblance talk), but they must admit that Plato thinks participants are somehow 
resemblers as well.  Therefore, there does not seem to be much hope in responding to 
RA by rejecting premise 1. 
 How, then, ought we respond to RA, or must we admit that it is definitive in 
establishing SP?  Where RA goes wrong, I think, is in premise 4.  Even if it is allowed 
that participants in the form of F somehow resemble forms insofar as they are its 
participants, it does not follow that this resemblance consists in both the form’s and 
the participants’ being F.  How is it that participants are supposed to resemble the 
forms that they participate in?  The first point to recognize about this resemblance is 
that it is not the participant as a whole that resembles the form of F—the participant 
resembles the form of F insofar as the participant is F.  For instance, if the oak tree in 
my yard is large, the fact that it is large, Plato thinks, is explained by its participation 
in the form of largeness.  What this will involve for Plato, I argued, is the oak tree 
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having a largeness-particularization in it.  I have suggested that there is textual 
evidence showing that Plato considers the oak tree, and not merely the largeness-
particularization in the oak tree, to be a resembler of the form of largeness.  However, 
it is not the oak tree as a whole that makes it a resembler of the form.  It is precisely 
the largeness of the oak tree that makes the oak tree a resembler of the form of 
largeness.  What should be recognized here is that the resemblance between oak tree 
and the form of largeness is a complex and somewhat indirect relation—it is the oak 
tree’s largeness that is more simply and directly a resembler of the form of largeness.  
And the oak tree’s largeness is a direct resembler of the form of largeness itself, and 
not a direct resembler of the form of largeness’ largeness.  The direct resemblance 
relation is between the largeness-particularization in the oak tree and the form of 
largeness, and not between the largeness-particularization in the oak tree and what 
might be considered another largeness-particularization in the form of largeness itself.   
So, the oak tree, the participant in the form of largeness, is a resembler of the 
form of largeness because of its particular largeness, which stands in a more direct 
resemblance relation to the form of largeness.  In other words, the oak tree’s being a 
resembler of the form consists in the oak tree’s having within it the-largeness-in-the-
oak-tree, which is a more direct resembler of the form.  I do not want to suggest here 
that participants are not resemblers of forms—however, participants are resemblers 
precisely because they have form-particularizations in them that are direct form-
resemblers.  Participants, then, can really be thought of as resemblers of forms, but 
they are perhaps resemblers derivatively, because of the form-particularizations that 
they have within them.118 
                                                
118 Although McPherran is often explicit about his view that participants are not resemblers of forms 
(McPherran 1984, 31, 32, and McPherran 1988, 533, 535, 536), at one point he does suggest the view 
that participants are resemblers derivatively.  He writes that particulars “are only derivatively described 
as resembling forms” (McPherran 1984, 36).  This suggests the view that participants might rightly be 
described as resembling forms, albeit derivatively, because of the form-particularizations that they have.   
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 If it is because of the participant’s F-ness that it is a resembler of the form, then 
why doesn’t it follow that this resemblance involves the form of F’s F-ness as well?  
In other words, why doesn’t it follow that the resemblance between participant and 
form consists in their both being F (since the participant’s being F is obviously the 
relevant feature of the participant)?  As I have just argued, the resemblance relation 
between participant and form is a complex one that involves the simpler and more 
direct resemblance relation between the form-particularization in the participant and 
the form of F.  It is the form-particularization that is more directly a resembler of the 
form.  But it is crucial to note that (in general) the F-ness-particularization does not 
seem to be an F thing.  It is the F-ness-particularization which, being in the participant, 
is a key part of what makes the participant an F thing.  For instance, it seems the-
largeness-in-the-oak-tree is not itself a large thing—it is the possession of the-
largeness-in-the-oak-tree that makes the oak tree a large thing.  Since F-ness-
particularizations (in general) are not instances of their corresponding forms, are not 
included in the class of F things, the motivation is lost for thinking that the form must 
itself be an F thing.  The participant that resembles the form of F is an F thing, but it is 
a resembler because of the F-ness-particularization that it has in it.  And the F-ness-
particularization, which is the direct resembler of the form and is the reason why the 
participant is a resembler in the first place, is (in general) not itself an F thing.  So 
there is no inclination to say that, because participants are resemblers of forms, the 
forms must genuinely self-predicate.  Once we understand what the resemblance 
between participant and form of F consists in, we see that their resemblance does not 
entail that they are both F things.  At the very least, this analysis of the resemblance 
between form and participant allows us to reject premise 4 of RA.  Even if 
participation is or involves a resemblance relation between form and participant, this 
alone does not entail that the resemblance consists in their both being F. 
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 But, as one might anticipate Bostock asking: on the view we have outlined, if 
the respect of resemblance between the form of F and an F-ness-particularization is 
not in their both being F, then what is the respect of resemblance between them?  
What is it that makes the-largeness-in-the-oak-tree a direct resembler of the form of 
largeness, since we have suggested that their resemblance does not consist in their 
both being large things?  It must be admitted that, as Plato does not say very much 
about the nature of form-particularizations, he says even less about how exactly form-
particularizations are related to their corresponding forms.  If we cannot find Plato 
explicitly saying what this relation consists in, can we at least anticipate what Plato is 
likely to have said about it? 
McPherran is a strong proponent of the view that Plato posits form-
particularizations that are resemblers of forms.  But in his paper in which he discusses 
form-particularizations in the most detail, he claims: “It goes beyond the practical 
scope of this paper to offer a fully articulated account of the sense in which immanent 
characters are images of Forms” (McPherran 1988, 536).  He goes on to explain the 
relation in the following sketchy way: “Let me simply characterize this relationship as 
a matter of immanent character Fs embodying many, but not all, of the properties of 
their Form the F-itself…” (McPherran 1988, 536).119  Now this is certainly an 
unsatisfying account of the nature of the resemblance between form-particularization 
and form—what we would like is some account of how exactly, when x participates in 
the form of F, the-F-ness-in-x is a resembler of the form. 
 Here, I would like to suggest an account of the main ways in which it seems 
likely that Plato thinks, or ought to think, of form-particularizations as resemblers of 
forms.  Form-particularizations seem to resemble their corresponding forms in the 
                                                
119 He does go on to point to some features shared between forms and their corresponding form-
particularizations, and also some features distinguishing them.  I discuss these below. 
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following four respects: (a) essence, (b) logical relations, (c) immutability, and (d) 
explanatory role.  The first resemblance of essence is fairly straightforward.  As I have 
argued, an F-ness-particularization and the form of F are not (in general) both F 
things, but there is a sense in which they are both “F-nesses”.  The-largeness-in-
Simmias and the form of largeness are both largenesses, in the sense that they have 
analogous essences.  For instance, if largeness is exceeding in measure, then the-
largeness-in-Simmias is Simmias’ exceeding in measure.  The-largeness-in-Simmias 
will be a resembler of the form of largeness (i.e., the form of which it is a 
particularization120) and not a resembler of the form of equality, since the essence of 
the form-particularization mirrors the essence of the form of largeness and not that of 
the form of equality—the-largeness-in-Simmias is Simmias’ exceeding in measure and 
not Simmias’ sameness of measure.  Obviously, the-largeness-in-Simmias is a 
largeness-particularization because it is an exceeding in measure.  Since the essence of 
the form is exceeding in measure, the essence of the form-particularization will 
resemble that of the form.121  
                                                
120 When I say that the-largeness-in-Simmias is a particularization of the form of largeness, I just mean 
that it is one of the many largeness-particularizations that are in each of the many larges.  Although the-
largeness-in-Simmias is a particularization of the form of largeness, it is not a particularization in the 
form of largeness—this largeness-particularization is in Simmias, and not in the form.  I do, however, 
leave open the possibility that forms (as well as form-particularizations) can have form-
particularizations in them.  In fact, on my interpretation of Plato, since forms and form-
particularizations themselves display some features (for which forms exist), they will thereby have 
form-particularizations in them.  In a note in Chapter Two, Section II, I suggest that form-
particularizations in forms are examples of form-particularizations that will not be perishable.  I discuss 
form-particularizations that escape generation and destruction shortly. 
121 This resemblance of essence seems to be what some commentators have in mind when they refer to 
“definition” as one respect of resemblance between form and form-particularization.  For instance, 
Silverman claims that “…Forms are not definitionally separate from their form-copies” (Silverman 
2002, 19).  And McPherran appears to make a similar point about F-ness-particularizations and the form 
of F “satisfying” the same “definition” (McPherran 1988, 536).  I prefer to refer to this similarity as a 
similarity of essence rather than definition.  And Silverman does refer to it this way in another place 
when he says: “A Form and its form-copies are alike…in that their essence is the same” (Silverman 
2002, 99).  This appears to be more appropriate than saying that they have the same definition.  For, it 
seems strange to claim that a form-particularization is even the sort of thing that can have a definition.  
Can something like Simmias have a definition?  Form-particularizations are not exactly like things like 
Simmias—they are not particulars—but because of their particularity, it seems wrong to claim that they 
have definitions. 
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 Closely tied to the resemblance of essence is the resemblance of logical 
relations.  What I have in mind here is that F-ness-particularizations have opposites 
and entailments that correspond to those of the form of F.  Plato suggests the point 
about opposites at Phaedo 102d-103b.  The opposites in nature correspond to the 
opposites in us.  Simmias is the sort of thing that can have within him, at the same 
time, opposite form-particularizations, because they are had in relation to different 
things.  Just as the form of largeness is opposite to the form of smallness, the-
largeness-in-Simmias is opposite to the-smallness-in-Simmias.  Simmias is able to 
suffer the compresence of opposites, participate in opposite forms, and have the 
corresponding opposite form-particularizations in him.  The key point for our purposes 
here is that, if the form of F is opposite to the form of G, then an F-ness-
particularization will also be opposite to a G-ness-particularization.122 
 And forms and their form-particularizations also have corresponding 
entailments.  For instance, if something participates in the form of largeness, it 
exceeds in measure, and so it follows that it must have a measure.  Likewise, if 
something has a largeness-particularization in it, it also must have a measure.  Let us 
suppose at least for the sake of our explanation that there is a form of humanity and a 
form of rationality.  It follows that if something participates in the form of humanity, it 
will also participate in the form of rationality.  Likewise, if something has a humanity-
particularization, it will also have a rationality-particularization.  As Plato points out in 
the Phaedo at 104d, if something is three in number it will also be odd.  This fact is 
again mirrored for forms and form-particularizations (David Keyt 1963, 168).  A 
participant in the form of threeness will also be a participant in the form of oddness, 
                                                
122 McPherran briefly makes this point when he says “both the tallness-in-Simmias and Tallness-itself 
have ‘opposites’ (shortness-in-something and Shortness-itself)” (McPherran 1988, 536).  And Keyt also 
proposes that “if two transcendent forms are opposites, the corresponding immanent forms are 
opposites” (Keyt 1963, 168). 
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and that which has a threeness-particularization in it will also have an oddness-
particularization in it.  So, the logical relations among form-particularizations 
resemble those among their corresponding form. 
 Above, I suggested that a third sort of resemblance between form-
particularization and form is in their immutability.  That is perhaps surprising, as the 
perishability of form-particularizations was one of the features that was used to 
distinguish them from forms in Chapter Two.  But what I have in mind here is not that 
form-particularizations are, like forms, completely unchanging.  Rather, form-
particularizations seem to be unchanging like forms in one respect: they do not 
undergo alteration (Demos 1948, 458).  Plato seems committed to the view that 
sensible particulars undergo both alteration and generation/destruction.  These 
particulars alter when they come to participate or cease to participate in a form, and 
when they gain or lose form-particularizations.  But form-particularizations seem to 
resemble forms at least insofar as they escape alteration.  As Demos explains: 
 
Properly speaking, alteration is ascribed to the concrete thing only, in 
so far as it assumes different opposites.  So long as empirical forms 
exist, they remain exactly what they are, without changing. (Demos 
1948, 458) 
For example, when a metal rod is heated sufficiently, it comes to participate in the 
form of hotness and to have a hotness-particularization in it.  When the rod cools, the 
rod undergoes alteration, but the hotness-particularization does not.  When the rod is 
no longer hot, the hotness-particularization is destroyed.  So while form-
particularizations are not entirely immutable like forms, they do seem to resemble 
forms (as opposed to sensible particulars) at least in being unalterable.     
 Notice that this third respect of resemblance is crucially distinguishable from 
the first two.  First, this is a way in which form-particularizations in general seem to 
be resemblers of forms in general.  While the first two respects of resemblance dealt 
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with how the specific F-ness-particularization is a resembler of the specific form of F, 
the feature of resistance to change is more general.  Form-particularizations are like 
forms in general in escaping alteration.  But notice also that, perhaps as opposed to the 
first two features, this is a respect of resemblance in which the form-particularization 
seems necessarily deficient.  Perhaps a form-particularization and its corresponding 
form can non-deficiently mirror one another with respect to their essence and logical 
relations, but not so with respect to their immutability.  While form-particularizations 
escape alteration like forms, they are not completely unchanging like forms because 
they undergo generation and destruction.  In a sense, form-particularizations are more 
unchanging than sensibles, but always less unchanging than forms. 
 However, this is a bit too hasty.  It seems there will be some cases of form-
particularizations that are not deficient in their resemblance to forms in respect of 
immutability.  For example, it seems that forms can themselves have form-
particularizations in them, and these form-particularizations will be entirely 
unchanging, like the forms they are in.  The form of beauty itself is unchanging and so 
participates in the form of rest.  It would seem then that there is a rest-particularization 
in the form of beauty.  But not only does this rest-particularization escape alteration, it 
also escapes generation and destruction.  The rest-particularization-in-the-form-of-
beauty does not seem at all deficient in its resemblance to the form of rest, with 
respect to immutability.123  And as I suggested, it also seems non-deficient in its 
resemblance of essence and logical relations.  But is there any way in which all rest-
particularizations fall short in their resemblance to the form of rest? 
                                                
123 Another example of a form-particularization that is perhaps not deficient in its resemblance to its 
corresponding form, with respect to immutability, is the-life-in-Socrates’-soul.  Since Plato seems to 
think that the soul is immortal, it seems a case could be made that the-life-in-Socrates’-soul will never 
undergo alteration or generation and destruction.  Perhaps one would have to assume here that the 
Timaeus story is not meant literally, otherwise souls (and their form-particularizations) would seem to 
undergo generation.   
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 Now, there will certainly always be ways that form-particularizations are 
distinguished from their corresponding forms.  One obvious way is that form-
particularizations are particularizations and forms clearly are not.  As Silverman 
notes, “…Forms and their form-copies are not identical; for no property is identical 
with an instance” (Silverman 2002, 19).  And in another place he explains that the 
particularity of form-particularizations distinguishes them from forms: “Forms differ 
from form-copies because Forms are general or predicable of many, whereas the form-
copy is singular and instantiable at only one place at one time…” (Silverman 2002, 
99).  There is no worry that some form-particularization, like the rest-particularization-
in-the-form-of-beauty, will be completely indistinguishable from its corresponding 
form, the form of rest. 
 But even though the particularity of form-particularizations distinguishes them 
from forms, this distinguishing feature does not have to do with a respect of 
resemblance between them.  What we would like to know is if there is any respect of 
resemblance between a specific form-particularization and its specific corresponding 
form, that will always be deficient in some way.  Even if all form-particularizations 
were to undergo generation and destruction, this would not constitute a way in which 
an F-ness-particularization deficiently resembles the form of F in particular.  Is there 
any way in which, in respect of resembling the specific form that it resembles, a form-
particularization must fall short? 
In fact, I think there is such a way, and it involves a respect of resemblance 
that we have seen is very important to Plato.  A key feature of forms is their 
explanatory role.  Plato accepts as his safe answer that what explains something’s 
being a certain way is participation in the relevant form, and this participation will 
involve the possession of a corresponding form-particularization.  Both the form and 
the form-particularization have a key role in the explanation of something’s being the 
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way that it is.  So while the form of F and the-F-ness-in-x will not both be F (in 
general), they will both always be F-explaining.  The resemblance between the form of 
F and the-F-ness-in-x will then not consist in their both being F things, but in part in 
their both being F-explaining things.  But here is a clear way in which the form-
particularization will always be deficient in its resemblance to its corresponding form.  
In a sense, the form of F could be said to be perfectly F-explaining, in the sense that it 
plays a key role in the explanation of all F things’ being F.  However, while the-F-
ness-in-x is F-explaining, it is not perfectly F-explaining in this sense, since it only 
plays a key role in the explanation of x’s being F.  The explanation of all large things’ 
being large will involve the form of largeness, but the-largeness-in-Simmias is only 
relevant in the explanation of Simmias’ being large.  So form-particularizations will 
always be deficient in their resemblance to their corresponding forms in respect of 
their explanatory role, because of the explanatory breadth of forms, and the 
explanatory narrowness of form-particularizations.  
As I have argued, Plato does use resemblance talk suggesting that participants 
in forms are resemblers of forms.  But what Plato means to convey is that participants 
in forms are resemblers precisely because they have direct resemblers of forms within 
them, namely form-particularizations.  And these form-particularizations are like the 
forms of which they are particularizations with regard to essence, logical relations, 
immutability, and explanatory role.  As I noted above, Bostock claims that a non-SP 
theorist owes an account of why Plato finds resemblance talk to be appropriate 
terminology, and an account of what in the world the resemblance between the form of 
F and its participants could consist in if not in their both being F.  In this chapter, I 
hope to have provided a sufficient and correct response to Bostock. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
PLATO’S ARGUMENT FOR FORMS IN THE PHAEDO 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 In the last chapter, we looked at Plato’s commitment to there being a 
resemblance relation between forms and their participants, which commentators have 
taken as the strongest evidence of a commitment to SP.  I argued there that this 
resemblance relation does not provide any such definitive evidence for attributing SP 
to Plato.  EP then, which involves the denial of SP, is consistent with Plato’s view in 
the middle dialogues that participants are resemblers of forms. 
But in addition to relying on the resemblance between forms and participants, 
SP-theorists have often seen the passage of the Recollection Argument in the Phaedo 
from 72e-77a as containing clear evidence of Plato’s commitment to SP.124  In this 
passage, which I discussed briefly in Chapter One, Section III, Plato seems to claim 
that sensible Fs strive to be like the form of F but “fall short” and are “inferior”.  And 
in a key argument at Phaedo 74b7-c6, Plato seems to suggest that, unlike sensible Fs, 
the form of F “is F” and “is not opposite-F”.  Commentators argue that these claims 
show that in the Phaedo, Plato thinks that for all forms, the form of F is an F thing. 
Much of this chapter will focus on the question of how we ought to interpret 
this key argument at 74b7-c6, and whether on a correct interpretation of it, it can 
rightly be used as evidence for SP and so against EP.  This argument at 74b7-c6 is one 
of the few places in all of Plato’s works where we find him presenting what appears to 
                                                
124 For instance, see Taylor 1936, 187; Ross 1951, 23-4; Gulley 1962, 28-40; Owen 1965, 295, 310; 
Vlastos 1965, 248; Bostock 1986, 90-4; N. White 1987, 67-8; Malcolm 1991, 47, 106, 111-20, 144-5; 
Fine 1993, 167-8, 332 n. 28.  And see Penner 1987, 99, where he discusses the “two locutions” within 
this passage of the Phaedo that “tempt interpreters” to attribute SP to Plato. 
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be an argument for the existence of forms, or at least an argument for the nonidentity 
of forms and sensibles.  As Gallop stresses in his Notes on the Phaedo, “[t]his passage 
is of the utmost importance for understanding the Theory of Forms…” (Gallop 1975, 
121).  It is so important because, as Gallop suggests, it should shed light on Plato’s 
underlying motives for positing the existence of nonsensible forms (Gallop 1975, 
121).  The trouble is that the text here is notoriously difficult to interpret, and 
commentators have suggested many different nuanced ways of understanding it.  
However, as far as I can tell, a satisfactory interpretation of the argument has not been 
provided. 
Now to be sure, the argument for forms that Plato intends here might not have 
been a good one, and so it seems wrong to rule out an interpretation on the basis of the 
fact that it makes the argument a poor one.125  But according to a satisfactory 
interpretation of the argument, at the very least, the argument should involve premises 
to which Plato is committed in the Phaedo (and perhaps other middle dialogues), or at 
least it should not involve premises that he clearly rejects there.  Further, in the spirit 
of charity, if we are considering two or more possible construals of the argument, we 
ought not to attribute a worse argument to Plato without any reason for doing so.  So 
for instance, if the text can consistently be read in such a way that the argument is 
valid or such that it is invalid, we ought to favor the valid interpretation, if there is no 
evidence pushing us in the other direction.  Ideally, what we are looking for is an 
interpretation of the argument that is consistent with the Greek text, according to 
which all of the premises are ones that Plato would accept, and, at the very least, 
                                                
125 In fact, I think that the argument will not be very successful against the nominalist according to any 
interpretation of it, because it will simply beg the question.  The argument involves premises that a 
nominalist would never accept.  Rather than an argument intended to convince nonbelievers that forms 
do exist, I think Plato uses this argument to set out one of his main reasons for positing forms.  Then 
later on in the Phaedo, he goes on to defend the controversial premises which are simply assumed in the 
argument. 
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according to which it is a valid argument.  And as far as I can tell, no such 
interpretation has been offered.  I will attempt to offer such an interpretation in this 
chapter. 
 Now, as Gallop puts it, this passage “has become a notorious philosophical 
crux” (Gallop 1975, 121).  Many different interpretations of this argument have been 
offered by commentators, and it would be tedious and unfruitful to examine all of 
them here.  What we will examine are especially good examples of the two most 
popular lines of interpretation.  The many different interpretations of the argument are 
divided on whether they see Plato as arguing for forms on the basis of an 
epistemological or an ontological contrast between forms and sensibles.  The 
epistemological interpretations take the argument to focus on a contrast between how 
forms and sensibles appear, while the ontological interpretations take the argument to 
focus on a contrast between how forms and sensibles are. 
First, I will discuss the epistemological reading defended most recently by 
David Sedley in 2007 in a paper called “Equal Sticks and Stones” and by Svavar 
Svavarsson in 2009 in a paper called “Plato on Forms and Conflicting Appearances”.  
Second, I will examine the ontological reading defended by Terence Irwin in 2000 in a 
paper called “The Theory of Forms” (Irwin 2000, esp. 154-163).  I will argue that both 
the Sedley/Svavarsson and the Irwin interpretations are unsatisfactory because, at least 
in part, they involve premises that Plato clearly rejects in the Phaedo and other middle 
dialogues.  I will go on to present my own interpretation of the argument.  I will 
outline the benefits of my interpretation and discuss the possible costs, which, as I see 
it, are relatively minor.  My hope is that we will finally have a satisfactory 
interpretation of this stubborn argument—and on the interpretation of the argument 
that I will defend, the text can be seen to provide no evidence for SP, and so no 
evidence against EP.  Finally, I will end the chapter by arguing that we ought to 
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interpret Plato’s claims at 74d4-75b9, that sensibles “fall short” of forms and are 
“inferior” to them, in light of our interpretation of the preceding argument at 74b7-c6.  
By doing so, we will see that these claims also fail to provide evidence for a 
commitment to SP, and so are consistent with EP.  
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II. Interpreting the Text 
 
Let us look at the text in question including the main argument and the 
discussion that leads up to it, at Phaedo 74a9-c6: 
 
Consider then, he said, whether this 
is the case.  We say, I suppose, that 
there is some equal.  I do not mean a 
stick to a stick nor a stone to a stone 
nor any other thing of the things of this 
sort, but there is something different 
beyond all these things, namely the 
equal itself: are we to say that it is 
something or nothing? 
Indeed by Zeus, let us certainly say 
it is something, Simmias said. 
Yes and do we know what it itself 
is? 
Indeed, he said. 
From where did we acquire the 
knowledge of it?  Isn’t it from the 
things we were saying just now, from 
seeing either sticks or stones or some 
other equal things, from these we have 
thought of that thing which is different 
from these?  Or does it not appear 
different to you?  But consider also in 
this way: don’t equal stones and sticks 
sometimes, although being the same, 
appear equal to one, but not equal to 
another? 
Certainly. 
What then?  Is there a time when 
the equals themselves ever appeared 
unequal to you, or equality inequality? 
Never, Socrates. 
Then these equals and the equal 
itself are not the same, he said. 
They do not at all appear the same 
to me, Socrates. 
 Σκόπει δή, ἦ δ’ ὅς, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως 
ἔχει. φαµέν πού τι εἶναι ἴσον, οὐ ξύλον 
λέγω ξύλῳ οὐδὲ λίθον λίθῳ οὐδ’ ἄλλο 
τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ ταῦτα 
πάντα ἕτερόν τι, αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον· φῶµέν 
τι εἶναι ἢ µηδέν; 
Φῶµεν µέντοι νὴ Δί’, ἔφη ὁ Σιµµίας, 
θαυµαστῶς γε. 
Ἦ καὶ ἐπιστάµεθα αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν; 
Πάνυ γε, ἦ δ’ ὅς. 
Πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν 
ἐπιστήµην; ἆρ’ οὐκ ἐξ ὧν νυνδὴ 
ἐλέγοµεν, ἢ ξύλα ἢ λίθους ἢ ἄλλα ἄττα 
ἰδόντες ἴσα, ἐκ τούτων ἐκεῖνο 
ἐνενοήσαµεν, ἕτερον ὂν τούτων; ἢ 
οὐχ ἕτερόν σοι φαίνεται; σκόπει δὲ καὶ 
τῇδε. ἆρ’ οὐ λίθοι µὲν ἴσοι καὶ ξύλα 
ἐνίοτε ταὐτὰ ὄντα τῷ µὲν ἴσα φαίνεται, 
τῷ δ’ οὔ; 
Πάνυ µὲν οὖν. 
Τί δέ; αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἄνισά 
σοι ἐφάνη, ἢ ἡ ἰσότης ἀνισότης;  
Οὐδεπώποτέ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.  
Οὐ ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐστίν, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ταῦτά 
τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον. 
Οὐδαµῶς µοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες. 
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 There are numerous difficult issues of interpretation in this argument, but here 
I will focus on the one issue that has consistently determined whether commentators 
see the argument as drawing an epistemological or an ontological contrast between 
forms and sensibles.  The issue I have in mind here is how we should understand 
Plato’s use of the verb φαίνεσθαι or “appear” within the argument.126  The trouble is 
that there are two widely attested uses of this verb in the Greek, a nonveridical use and 
a veridical use.127  According to the nonveridical use of φαίνεσθαι, the verb is usually 
accompanied by an infinitive, and it means that something appears or seems to be F, 
but may or may not actually be F.  Perhaps two pieces of chalk appear to be equal in 
length, but they may or may not in fact be equal in length.  According to the veridical 
use of φαίνεσθαι, on the other hand, the verb is usually accompanied by a participle, 
and it means that something is manifestly or evidently F, in a way that entails that it is 
F.  If those two pieces of chalk are manifest as being equal in length or are manifestly 
equal in length, then it follows that they really are equal in length. 
The difficulty is that in the passage at hand in the Phaedo, no infinitive or 
participle is supplied and so from the perspective of grammar, we do not have any sign 
of whether the veridical or nonveridical reading is intended.  So how are we to decide 
between the two uses, and what affect will this have on the interpretation of the 
argument as a whole? 
 I will return below to the question of why we ought to favor, in my view, the 
nonveridical reading of φαίνεσθαι in the argument.  As I suggested already, the issue of 
                                                
126 Some other important questions of interpretation are whether the τῷ/τῷ are masculine or neuter or 
why Plato uses the expression αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα to refer to what it seems must be the form of equality.  
Briefly, I think there is good reason to read the τῷ/τῷ as masculine given that we find σοι with a form of 
φαίνεσθαι in the next step of the argument, and because a form of φαίνεσθαι is accompanied by ἡµῖν in 
the “resumption” of the argument at 74d5-7.  And I think Plato uses αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα to refer to the form of 
equality just because of the fact that plurality is part of the essence of equality.  Equal is a two-place 
predicate which (usually) relates two or more things.  He also uses analogous plural expressions when 
referring to the form of similarity (Parmenides 129b), two, three and four (Phaedo 104a-c), ten 
(Cratylus 432a9-10), and five (Theaetetus 196a2), all forms that have plurality as part of their essence. 
127 See Irwin 1977, 318-9 n. 29; Bostock 1986, 73; and Sedley 2007, 80. 
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how we should take φαίνεσθαι has consistently determined whether commentators read 
the argument as drawing an epistemological or ontological contrast between forms and 
sensibles.  Commentators who see φαίνεσθαι in its nonveridical use have favored the 
epistemological reading of the argument, while those who see φαίνεσθαι in its veridical 
use have favored the ontological reading.  However, on the interpretation of the 
argument that I will argue for below, φαίνεσθαι is being used nonveridically and yet the 
argument is still drawing an ontological contrast between forms and sensibles.  We 
will soon see how exactly that works in the argument. 
 
 
III. The Epistemological Interpretation with Nonveridical φαίνεσθαι 
 
For now, let us look at the epistemological interpretation of the argument 
favored by Sedley and Svavarsson, who do take Plato to use φαίνεσθαι nonveridically 
in the argument.  (As we will see, I think they have good reason to take φαίνεσθαι this 
way, but they are wrong in thereby taking an epistemological reading of the 
argument.)  According to them, what Plato is arguing is that forms and sensibles must 
be distinct because, while sensibles appear a certain way to observers, forms do not.  
In particular, sensible equals appear unequal to observers, while the form of equality 
never appears unequal to anyone.  Loosely speaking, the form never appears to anyone 
to have the property that is opposite to itself.  So for instance, the form of beauty never 
appears to anyone to be ugly.  But sensible beautifuls, while appearing beautiful, also 
appear ugly.  Because of this disparity in appearances, the form of equality and 
sensible equals must be distinct.  Shortly after this argument, at Phaedo 75c10-d4, 
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Plato makes it clear that his argument here is no more about equality than it is about 
any of the forms128, and so the argument can be formalized more generally as follows: 
 
Sedley/Svavarsson – Argument from Conflicting Appearances  
(S1) Sensible Fs appear F to one person and opposite-F to another 
person. 
(S2) The form of F never appears opposite-F to anyone. 
(S3) Therefore, the form of F and sensible Fs are not the same. 
So what is wrong with this particular epistemological interpretation of the 
argument?  One problem that commentators have noticed is that the argument seems 
to be fallacious on this sort of reading.129  Even Sedley, who argues that this is the 
correct interpretation of Plato’s argument, claims that the argument is fallacious 
because it “would turn on the different phenomenologies of sensible and intelligible 
equality” (Sedley 2007, 78).  The verb ‘appear’ in its nonveridical use introduces an 
intentional context according to which x and y may be identical even though 
something is true of x and not of y (Sedley 2007, 78).  An example might help make 
this point clearer.  Consider the following argument: 
 
(A) Clark Kent appears to be Superman to (a few) people and not to 
be Superman to (most) people. 
(B) Superman never appears not to be Superman to anyone. 
(C) Therefore, Superman and Clark Kent are not the same. 
This argument is invalid because Superman and Clark Kent can be identical even 
though it appears to some people that Clark Kent is not Superman.  These are just the 
people who are unaware of the fact that Clark Kent and Superman are identical.130  
                                                
128 The argument should apply at least to all those forms for which there is an opposite.  The main point 
of the argument as I understand it, however, that forms and sensibles are distinct because forms are 
explainers and sensibles are not, applies in the case of all forms. 
129 See Irwin 1977, 319 n. 29. 
130 Here is another helpful example: 
  
(1) The highest mountain on Earth has appeared to some to be on the Nepal-Tibet 
border and has appeared to others to be in Alaska (to those who mistakenly 
take Mount McKinley to be the highest mountain on Earth). 
(2) Mount Everest has never appeared to anyone to be in Alaska. 
(3) Therefore, Mount Everest is not the highest mountain on Earth. 
 
(Continued on next page…) 
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Likewise, according to Plato’s argument as Sedley and Svavarsson understand it, the 
form of equality and sensible equals might be identical even though it appears to 
people that sensible equals are unequal and it never appears to anyone that the form of 
equality is unequal.  Perhaps the fact that it never appears to anyone that the form of 
equality is unequal stems in some way from the fact that they are all unaware that the 
form is just identical to sensible equals (in some way).  If they knew about this 
identity, then the form of equality would appear unequal to them. 
So the point is that the argument is invalid according to the Sedley/Svavarsson 
interpretation because (S1) and (S2) are consistent with (S3) being false.  However, as 
I have already noted, Sedley recognizes the invalidity and still thinks that this is the 
argument we ought to attribute to Plato.  He argues that we should not assume that 
Plato was “fully alive to the nature of the particular fallacy involved” (Sedley 2007, 
81).  According to Sedley, we still should attribute this invalid argument to Plato.131 
                                                                                                                                       
Again, it is just the people relying on a mistaken belief for whom the highest mountain on Earth appears 
to be in Alaska. 
131 Some commentators attempt to provide a valid epistemological interpretation with nonveridical 
φαίνεσθαι.  Two of the best examples are from Penner and N. White.  Penner sees the argument as 
drawing the following epistemological contrast between sensible equals like equal sticks and the form 
of equality: “confusability and unconfusability with the relevant opposite number—unequal sticks and 
the unequal itself respectively” (Penner 1987, 186; also see 13-4, 75, 85-7, 100, 105-6, 121, 185-6).  
Sensible equals are confusable with their relevant opposite number, sensible unequals, while the form 
of equality is not confusable with its relevant opposite number, the form of inequality.  If sensibles are 
really such that they are confusable and forms are such that they are not, then the argument seems to 
involve a valid application of Leibniz’s Law.  However the argument may still be invalid, as ‘relevant 
opposite number’ seems to have a different meaning as applied to sensibles and to forms (Bostock 
1986, 84; and N. White 1987, 202-3).  The form of inequality is the relevant opposite number of the 
form of equality, in being its contrary, but sensible unequals (which Penner takes to refer to particulars) 
are not contraries of sensible equals.  The premises of the argument seem to be that the form is 
unconfusable with its contrary, while sensible equals are confusable with sensibles exhibiting the 
property contrary to equality.  And from these premises it does not seem one can validly conclude that 
forms and sensibles are distinct.  Another weakness of this interpretation is that it involves premises that 
seem to be ones Plato rejects: does Plato think that sensibles are confusable with their relevant opposite 
number and forms are not?  Might forms sometimes be confused with their opposites in cases in which 
they are only grasped hazily?  Penner seems to anticipate this criticism by clarifying the argument by 
saying that forms are unconfusable “when they are presented clearly to the mind in the appropriate 
way”, but sensibles are confusable “even when [they] are presented clearly to our mind in the 
appropriate way” (Penner 1987, 185).  But it seems as if, in ideal conditions, both forms and sensibles 
may be unconfusable, and in less than ideal conditions, they may both be confusable—so the relevant 
epistemological contrast does not seem to hold.  (Continued on next page…) 
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 I do agree with Sedley that we cannot simply assume that Plato never presents 
a fallacious argument.  Showing that this argument is fallacious is not sufficient to 
show that it was not Plato’s own.  However, I do think we have a stronger reason to 
reject the Sedley/Svavarsson interpretation, a reason that, as far as I can tell, has not 
been discussed in the extensive literature on the argument.  Although Plato may have 
argued fallaciously at times, we ought not to attribute to Plato an argument that 
involves premises that he clearly rejects at the very time he is presenting the argument.  
But, I think, this is exactly what Sedley and Svavarsson do, because Plato rejects (S2).  
Plato thinks that there are some cases in which the form of F will be opposite-F, or in 
other words, will be an instance of its opposite form.  Since these forms are opposite-
F, and at least some people are aware of this, these forms will appear opposite-F to 
some people.  Some of the examples of such forms are ones that are only discussed in 
dialogues other than the Phaedo, such as the forms of the same (ταὐτὸν) and the 
different (θάτερον), the forms of likeness (ὁµοιότης) and unlikeness (ἀνοµοιότης), and 
the form of change (κίνησίς).  The form of the same will be different from other forms, 
and as this Phaedo argument would show in the case of the form of the same, the form 
of the same will also be nonidentical or different from sensible sames—sensible 
instances of the form of the same.  The form of the different will be the same as itself.  
                                                                                                                                       
N. White provides a related interpretation of the argument (N. White 1987, 203): The form of 
equality is “incapable of appearing, from any point of view, indistinguishable from inequality”, but if it 
were identical to one (or more) sensible equals, it would be (“in the relevant way”) indistinguishable 
from inequality.  Therefore, the form and sensibles must be distinct.  The argument seems to be valid, 
but faces a familiar objection.  Does Plato really think that the form of F is incapable of appearing 
indistinguishable from the form of opposite-F?  White clarifies that this holds at least when the form is 
“had in mind” (N. White 1987, 208), but this clarification does not seem to help.  Plato seems 
committed to the view that even when the form of F is had in mind, it can appear indistinguishable from 
the form of opposite-F, to someone who has the form in mind but is confused about its nature.  Further, 
the argument may be invalid on White’s interpretation.  The argument according to White suggests that 
if the form of equality were identical to sensible equals and the form of inequality were identical to 
sensible unequals, then the two forms would appear indistinguishable “in the relevant way”.  But how 
does this follow?  Even if both forms appear equal and unequal (which is the relevant point that White 
takes to follow), it is unclear how they would be indistinguishable from one another in any relevant 
way.  Even if they both appear equal and unequal, it could be the case that they always appear 
distinguishable when they are (sufficiently) had in mind. 
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The form of likeness will be unlike other things in numerous ways and the form of 
unlikeness will be like other forms, for instance, in numerous ways.  And the form of 
change will be at rest and unchanging, because this is true of all forms (Phaedo 78e, 
79d).  These are all examples of forms for which (S2) will be false, but the argument is 
intended to generalize to all forms. 
 One might respond that, since these are forms that Plato only discusses in later 
dialogues, perhaps he is not committed to their existence in the Phaedo, or is not 
aware of such a commitment.  Perhaps (S2) will be true for all of the forms that Plato 
explicitly recognizes at the time of the Phaedo.  (Note however that it seems very 
unlikely for Plato to posit the existence of the forms of equality and inequality and yet 
not to recognize the existence of the closely related forms of sameness and difference.  
Since equality is sameness of measure (Parmenides 140b7-8) and inequality is 
difference of measure, it seems unlikely that Plato would posit the existence of one set 
of forms and not the other.) 
However, there are two forms discussed explicitly in the Phaedo itself that will 
be instances of their opposite forms.132  I have in mind here the form of the even133 (ἡ 
τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέα) and the form of plurality (τὸ πλῆθος).134135  In the middle dialogues, 
and later as well, Plato holds that every form is one and a unity.136  Vlastos argues that 
every form in Plato’s system must be “unitary” (Vlastos 1981, 259) and that Plato 
would have found it absolutely unacceptable for a form not to have “unity” and so not 
to be “one Form, one number, one being, and so forth” (Vlastos 1981, 337).  In the 
                                                
132 Much of what I say in this section is repeating points discussed in Chapter One, Section III. 
133 Plato clearly discusses this form in the Phaedo at 104b3-e9, 104d14, e1, and 105a6. 
134 The form of plurality is discussed at 101b6.  Plato argues there that ten is more numerous than eight 
on account of numerousness or plurality. 
135 Plato discusses the form of the whole (τὴν τοῦ ὅλου) at Phaedo 105b2.  If Plato accepts that all 
forms are wholes, then the opposite form, perhaps the form of parthood, would seem to be another 
example of a form posited at the time of the Phaedo that is an instance of its opposite form.  If all forms 
are wholes, then the form of parthood will also be a whole. 
136 See Republic 476a3-7, 507b5-6, Phaedo 78c1-9, Timaeus 35a1-2, Philebus 15a1-b8. 
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Phaedo, Plato argues that all forms are noncomposite (ἀσύνθετον) (Phaedo 78c1-9) 
and uniform (µονοειδὲς) (Phaedo 78d5).  In the Republic, he asserts that the beautiful 
and the ugly are each one (ἓν), and he immediately generalizes this claim to all forms 
(πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν) adding that each of them is itself one (ἓν) (Republic 476a3-7).  At 
another point later in the Republic at 507b5-6, Plato again claims that each form is one 
(µίαν).137 
Now, there is some question as to what exactly Plato means when he claims 
that all forms are one.  But for our purposes, we only need that Plato thinks every form 
is one in number—and he does appear to be committed to this claim in the middle 
dialogues, even if he thinks there are additional ways in which every form is “one”.  
What follows from all this is that the form of the even will itself be one in number.  
Plato argues in the Phaedo at 101c2-7, that whatever is one must share in oneness 
(µονάδος).  It follows that since the form of the even is one, it shares in oneness.  
Further, Plato claims that oneness (µονάς) is such that it always brings with it oddness 
(περιττὸς) (Phaedo 105c4-5).138  So, since the form of the even shares in oneness and is 
one in number, it follows that the form of the even is odd in number.  This result also 
follows from how Plato defines evenness and oddness in the Euthyphro.  There he 
suggests that something is odd in number if it has a number that is not divisible into 
two equal parts or whole numbers (Euthyphro 12d).  Anything that is one in number, 
like the form of the even, will therefore be odd in number because its number is not 
divisible into two equal whole numbers.  Since the form of the even is odd in number, 
it is another counterexample to (S2), and one that Plato explicitly talks about and is 
committed to in the Phaedo. 
                                                
137 Also see Philebus 15a1-b8, where Plato suggests that forms are unities (ἑνάδων and µονάδας) and 
repeatedly suggests that they are one (ἓν).  And see Timaeus 35a1-2, where Plato suggests that forms 
are indivisible (ἀµερίστου). 
138 See O’Brien 1967, 224-5, on this point, who takes Plato to be asserting here that “oneness entails 
oddness”. 
163 
This point is even more direct and obvious in the case of the form of plurality 
(or multitude or numerousness), which Plato contrasts with its opposite, the form of 
one (Parmenides 129d).  Since Plato is committed to the claim that every form is one, 
the form of plurality will also be one.  So the form of plurality will be an instance of 
its opposite form, is discussed explicitly in the Phaedo at 101b6, and is another 
counterexample to (S2).  And it hardly seems possible for Plato to have explicitly 
posited the existence of the form of plurality and to have explicitly held that all forms 
are one, and yet not to have recognized that it would follow that the form of plurality 
is one.  No, we should not attribute such carelessness to Plato, unless we are forced 
somehow to do so.        
Since it is reasonable to claim that Plato rejects (S2) in the Phaedo, in the case 
of a number of forms, we ought not to attribute an argument to Plato that relies on 
(S2).  Note that there seems to be evidence in the Phaedo that Plato also rejects (S1).  
Remember (S1) holds that sensible Fs appear F and opposite-F.  But, for example, 
Plato holds that fire always brings with it the hot, and will never admit the cold, but 
will withdraw or perish at the approach of cold (Phaedo 103d).  Plato seems 
committed to the view that sensible instances of fire will always be hot and will never 
be or even appear cold.  Plato’s argument in our passage is supposed to generalize to 
the forms of the hot and the cold, but not all sensible hots will be or appear cold (and 
not all sensible colds will be or appear hot).  It seems Plato rejects (S1) as well as (S2) 
in the Phaedo, and we ought not to attribute them to him.  So the Sedley/Svavarsson 
interpretation is unsatisfactory.  Again, we should try to find an interpretation of the 
argument according to which it does not involve premises that Plato clearly rejects.  Is 
such an interpretation possible that will be consistent with the text? 
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IV. The Ontological Interpretation with Veridical φαίνεσθαι  
 
Irwin, partly in an effort to avoid uncharitably attributing a fallacious argument 
to Plato, argues for an interpretation that involves the veridical rather than the 
nonveridical use of the verb φαίνεσθαι or “appear”, and an ontological contrast being 
drawn between forms and sensibles.  This way, we will avoid the problems that follow 
from the introduction of an intentional context.  So Plato’s point in the argument is 
that sensible equals do not merely appear equal and unequal, but they are manifestly 
or evidently equal and unequal, and so they are equal and unequal.  On the other hand, 
the form of equality is never manifestly or evidently unequal, because it is not 
unequal.  But there are some further intricacies of Irwin’s interpretation.  He argues 
that Plato does not think that all particular sensible Fs are in fact both F and opposite-
F (Irwin 2000, 156-63), and so the first premise of the argument is a bit more 
complicated than it might at first seem.  For instance, there are particular cases of 
justice that are simply just—a particular case of someone returning what he has 
borrowed might simply be just and in no way unjust.  And so, when Plato talks about 
sensible equals or sensible Fs in the first step of the argument, Irwin takes him to be 
referring not to particular F things, but to properties—and types and not tokens of 
these properties.  Returning what one has borrowed is both just and unjust, while a 
particular case of this might simply be just.  And bright color, for instance, is both 
beautiful and ugly.  But there is one additional feature of Irwin’s interpretation.  He 
argues that Plato “seems to mean the same by saying” that bright color is both 
beautiful and ugly and that bright color makes things beautiful and ugly (Irwin 2000, 
163).  So Irwin seems to suggest that within the argument, Plato uses ‘is F’ in a special 
manner to somehow mean the same thing as “is F-making” or “makes things F”.  As 
we have seen, our EP provides an explanation of the way Plato may be doing just this.  
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According to EP, Plato sometimes uses ‘is F’ simply as shorthand for “is F-
explaining” or “is F-making”. 
So on Irwin’s interpretation, Plato’s point in his argument is that “sensible 
equals” or certain sensible properties are equal-making and unequal-making, whereas 
the form of equality is never unequal-making (and perhaps is always equal-making).  
For example, being three inches in length is a property that sometimes makes things 
equal, as in the case of two sticks that are both three inches in length, but sometimes 
makes things unequal, as in the case of one stick that is five inches in length and 
another that is three inches in length.  Because of this distinction in their explanatory 
roles, the form of equality and the sensible properties are not identical.  Once 
generalized, the argument on Irwin’s interpretation can be formalized as follows: 
 
Irwin – Argument from Explanatory Compresence of Opposites  
(I1) Sensible Fs (where this refers to sensible properties)139 are F-
making and opposite-F-making. 
(I2) The form of F is never opposite-F-making. 
(I3) Therefore, the form of F and sensible Fs are not the same. 
Although this interpretation of the argument succeeds in avoiding the fallacy 
that we found in Sedley/Svavarsson, I think it is still not a correct interpretation of 
Plato’s argument.  The strongest reason for rejecting this interpretation is that Plato is 
clear in the Phaedo that he rejects premise (I1).  In the Phaedo, Plato provides a 
sketch of his view of what it is that explains things’ being F.140  At least in those cases 
of an ‘F’ for which Plato posits a form, the unique explanation of things’ being F is 
participation in the form of F.  Plato argues that “if any other thing is beautiful except 
the beautiful itself, it is not beautiful on account of another single thing than because it 
shares in that beautiful” (Phaedo 100c4-6).  And Plato quickly generalizes this claim 
                                                
139 Examples of sensible beautifuls would be bright color and symmetry.  What (I1) says is not that 
bright color is bright-color-making and dull-color-making for example, but that bright color is 
beautiful-making and ugly-making.  Therefore, it is different from the form of beauty, which is never 
ugly-making. 
140 A more detailed discussion of what follows is in Chapter Three, Section V. 
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to all forms.  In addition, he claims that beautiful things become beautiful by the 
beautiful (Phaedo 100e2-3), larger things are larger by and on account of largeness 
and smaller things are smaller by and on account of smallness (Phaedo 101a1-5).  He 
argues that there is no other way of something becoming F than by participating in the 
particular reality (οὐσίας) corresponding to each, and so for instance, there is no other 
explanation (αἰτίαν) of something becoming two than by participation in the form of 
two (Phaedo 101c2-5).  Finally, he claims that no other thing makes (ποιεῖ) something 
beautiful than participation in that beautiful (Phaedo 100d4-6).  Plato simply does not 
think that sensible properties actually make things the way they are or explain their 
being that way.141  Being three inches in length neither makes things equal nor does it 
make things unequal.  Having a bright color neither makes things beautiful nor 
                                                
141 It is absolutely crucial to note that I mean something special by “sensible properties”, “sensible Fs”, 
and “sensibles”, here and throughout the rest of this chapter.  I argued in Chapter Two, Section II, that 
some form-particularizations might be perceivable, and I used this as at least one reason for 
distinguishing form-particularizations from forms.  But it was important to my arguments in Chapter 
Three, Section V, and Chapter Five, Section IV, that form-particularizations are explainers in addition 
to forms.  It seems to follow that some sensibles are capable of being explainers, and I seem to be 
arguing the exact opposite in this chapter.  The crucial thing to note is that I do not intend to be 
counting form-particularizations as what I am calling “sensibles” or “sensible property-tokens” here, 
even if they might be perceivable.  What I mean by “sensible properties” here are things like having a 
bright color in relation to beauty, or being three inches in length in relation to equality.  Having a bright 
color might be considered a “sensible beautiful” in the sense that it is a sensible property that 
sometimes constitutes beauty and sometimes constitutes ugliness.  An F-ness-particularization, on the 
other hand, never constitutes opposite-F-ness, and so it would not be included as what I am calling a 
“sensible” throughout this chapter, even if it turns out to be perceivable.  (Notice that by saying that an 
F-ness-particularization never constitutes opposite-F-ness, I am assuming that an F-ness-
particularization-in-x is not identical to a “sensible property”-instance that might constitute F-ness in x.  
For instance, I assume that the-being-three-inches-in-length-in-that-stick is not identical to the-equality-
in-that-stick, even if the-being-three-inches-in-length-in-that-stick (partly or even completely) 
constitutes equality in that stick.  The stick’s equality is always distinct from its being three inches in 
length.  If the-being-three-inches-in-length-in-that-stick were taken to be identical to the-equality-in-
that-stick, then the-equality-in-that-stick could also constitute inequality, since the-being-three-inches-
in-length-in-that-stick does.  But in my view, F-ness-particularizations themselves only constitute F-
ness.)  “Sensible property-tokens” will then be tokens of these kinds of properties, like having a bright 
color, and not perceivable tokens of any properties whatsoever.  Tokens of forms themselves, even if 
they may be perceivable, are not included in the “sensibles” that are being distinguished from forms in 
the argument at 74b7-c6.  The argument here is not intended to distinguish forms from their form-
particularizations—that would require a different argument.  Here Plato seems to be distinguishing the 
form of F from what might be some combination of F particulars, sensible properties that constitute F-
ness and its opposite, and perhaps the property-instances of these properties.        
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ugly.142  It is only the form of equality that makes thing equal and the form of 
inequality that makes thing unequal (and their corresponding form-
particularizations).143  And it is only the form of beauty and ugliness that make things 
beautiful or ugly (and their corresponding form-particularizations).  So Plato rejects 
(I1) because he does not think that sensible properties can be F-making and opposite-
F-making.  Sensibles properties cannot be “makers” or explainers at all. 
 But perhaps there is a way to rescue Irwin’s interpretation, by weakening the 
reading of “is F” in the argument such that (I1) will be true.  Although Plato thinks 
that sensible properties such as being three inches in length do not make things equal 
or explain their being equal, he surely must think that the sensible property has 
something to do with the equality of two three-inch-long pieces of chalk.  Although 
sensible properties will not explain things’ being F, as Irwin points out, they certainly 
can be present in F things and can be connected with their being F (Irwin 2000, 161).  
Being three inches in length certainly appears to be connected to the fact that those 
two three-inch-long pieces of chalk are equal in length.  But how exactly is being 
three inches in length connected to those pieces of chalk’s being equal?  It seems that 
in the case of two pieces of chalk that are both three inches in length, being three 
inches in length expresses, realizes, or constitutes the equality of the pieces of 
                                                
142 Fine appears to recognize this point.  Initially, she writes that “endurance is courageous and not 
courageous in so far as it explains why some things are courageous and why other things are not” (Fine 
1993, 52).  However, she clarifies in a note: 
 
More precisely, Socrates believes that endurance no more explains why one thing is 
courageous than why another thing is not.  For in his view the only real—or, at least, 
the ultimate—explanation of anything’s being F is the one thing by which all Fs are F.  
But it will be convenient to speak as I do in the text. (Fine 1993, 270 n. 36) 
 
Admittedly, this leaves open the possibility that other things might be explainers and just not “real” or 
“ultimate” explainers.  But Plato does seem to emphasize that participation in the form of F is the only 
adequate explanation of things’ being F.  Strictly speaking, sensible properties cannot be explainers at 
all. 
143 Forms and form-particularizations make things F because they play key roles in the explanation of 
things’ being F, namely participation in the form of F, which involves the possession of form-
particularizations (Chapter Three, Section V).  They are suitable as makers or explainers, and sensible 
properties are not, because they nontrivially escape explanatory compresence. 
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chalk.144  However, in a case in which we have one three inch and one five inch piece 
of chalk, being three inches in length (at least partly) seems to express, realize, or 
constitute the inequality of the two unequal pieces of chalk. 
 So we may have found a way of rescuing Irwin’s interpretation.  Perhaps we 
can read “is F” throughout the argument, not as “is F-making”, but rather as “is F-
constituting”.  The argument would be that, while a sensible property such as being 
three inches in length constitutes equality and constitutes inequality, the form of 
equality never constitutes inequality.  Therefore, the sensible property and the form of 
equality must be distinct.  Once generalized, the argument can be formalized as 
follows: 
 
Argument from Compresence of Opposite Constituting  
(I1') Sensible Fs (where this refers to sensible properties) are F-
constituting and opposite-F-constituting. 
(I2') The form of F is never opposite-F-constituting. 
(I3') Therefore, the form of F and sensible Fs are not the same. 
It seems we have now resolved the difficulties faced by the original (I1).  The first 
premise no longer asserts that sensible properties make things F or explain their being 
F, but just that they constitute F-ness in particular cases. 
However, there is a new difficulty, now concerning the second premise.  It is 
often thought that although Plato only explicitly makes the negative claim, in the 
second step of the argument, that the form of equality “is not unequal”, he also intends 
a positive claim about the form.  He means to point out that the form of equality also 
“is equal”.  And there is good evidence for this view, which I will examine in more 
detail shortly, right after the argument at 74d5-7: here Plato sums up the argument by 
saying that there is a difference between how sensible equals “are equal” and how the 
                                                
144 Fine suggests such a view: 
 
Beauty, for example, is not identical or reducible to any sensible properties such as 
bright colouring or circular shape.  Though such properties might constitute or realize 
beauty in a particular case, none is what beauty is. (Fine 2003, 283, my emphasis) 
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form of equality “is equal”.  Since Plato intends to say that the form of equality both 
“is equal and is not unequal”, these two claims need to receive “the same reading”.  
While (I2') seemed true, the reading in this premise is false when applied to the 
positive claim about the form.  The form of equality does not constitute equality in 
particular cases of equal things—rather it is equality.  This “constituting” reading then 
cannot be correct because Plato would not accept the implied point in the second 
premise.145  The form of F is not the sort of thing that constitutes F-ness in particular 
cases.146 
It is difficult to see how we could possibly tweak the Irwin-style interpretation 
such that Plato would accept both of the premises.  And in addition to the question of 
whether Plato accepts the premises, there are some other reasons for doubting Irwin’s 
interpretation of the argument.  First, it seems very unlikely to take “sensible Fs” in 
the argument to be restricted only to sensible properties.  If we look at Plato’s text 
itself, he claims that it is stones and sticks which are (or appear) equal and unequal, 
and these seem to be clear cases of sensible particulars as opposed to properties such 
as being three inches in length and having a bright color.  It is very unlikely that Plato 
is referring to the properties of being a stone or being a stick, since it would be strange 
to say that the property of being a stone is equal or makes things equal.  Instead, one 
would expect the relevant sensible properties to be things like being three inches in 
length or weighing five pounds.  Second, the nonveridical interpretation of φαίνεσθαι 
                                                
145 Perhaps it seems that the form of equality might constitute equality in particular cases?  Maybe 
sameness of measure trivially constitutes equality in every instance, since it is equality.  A further 
difficulty with the “constituting” interpretation is that Plato may reject (I1') in the case of some sensible 
properties.  Would Plato accept that being fire is a sensible property that constitutes hotness in some 
cases?  If so, then this will be a counterexample to (I1'), since Plato clearly thinks being fire will never 
constitute coldness.  But presumably, being fire is not going to count as a sensible property at all.   
146 One might think that we should just weaken our reading even further to “connected with”.  Sensible 
properties are connected with things’ being equal and connected with things’ being unequal.  This 
seems true, but then the second premise is rendered false.  It seems that the form of equality will be 
connected with things’ being unequal.  The fact that those two pieces of chalk are equal in length is 
connected with the fact that they are unequal in length to some third piece of chalk. 
170 
seems more natural, especially given the fact that the “appearances” are indexed to 
observers.  (However, I think Irwin and Fine are correct to point out that the masculine 
datives do not entail the nonveridical reading (Irwin 1995, 374 n. 13; and Fine 1993, 
332 n. 26).  Plato’s point could be, for example, that equal sticks are manifestly equal 
to one person focusing on their length and are manifestly unequal to another person 
focusing on their width.)  But there is also textual evidence right after this passage that 
strongly supports the nonveridical reading.  Shortly after the argument, at Phaedo 
74d5-8, in what Sedley calls the “resumption” of the argument (Sedley 2007, 81 n. 
26), Plato reiterates that there is a difference between how the sensible equals “appear 
equal” to us and how the form of equality “appears equal” to us.  But here Plato uses 
φαίνεσθαι with an infinitive (εἶναι) (along with a masculine dative ἡµῖν), which is strong 
evidence that he intends the nonveridical use of φαίνεσθαι here (ἆρα φαίνεται ἡµῖν οὕτως 
ἴσα εἶναι ὥσπερ αὐτὸ τὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἴσον, ἢ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνου τῷ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἢ 
οὐδέν; Καὶ πολύ γε, ἔφη, ἐνδεῖ).  This is strong evidence that he intends the nonveridical 
use in the argument as well, when he talks about the sensible equals and the form of 
equality appearing equal and unequal.  So apart from the fact that Plato seems to reject 
one or the other of the premises of the argument on the Irwin-style reading, we have 
some further reasons for rejecting this sort of interpretation: the argument does not 
seem to be only about sensible properties, and Plato does not seem to be using 
φαίνεσθαι according to its veridical use. 
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V. An Ontological Interpretation with Nonveridical φαίνεσθαι 
 
 So how should we take the argument?  If we do favor the nonveridical reading 
of φαίνεσθαι, are we forced to understand the argument as being fallacious, as Sedley 
does?  In fact, I do not think this is the case, as long as we understand some tacit 
points in the argument to which Plato is obviously committed in the Phaedo, and 
points which Plato does hint at in the argument.  I do think Irwin is correct to take 
Plato to be using ‘is F’ in the argument in a special manner to refer to explanatory 
power, rather than simply to the feature of being F.  And EP provides us with an 
account of this: Plato uses ‘is F’ in special contexts as shorthand for “is F-making” or 
“is F-explaining”.   
Now Plato rejects Irwin’s first premise because sensible properties are not in 
fact explainers—they do not in fact make things F or opposite-F.  However, Plato does 
think that lovers of sights and sounds and other non-Platonists mistakenly believe that 
these sensible properties are explainers.  For instance, average folks who have not 
done Platonic philosophy do believe that bright color or symmetry can sometimes 
make things beautiful.  So Plato will accept a premise very much like (I1), but 
according to the nonveridical reading of φαίνεσθαι.  Sensible Fs appear to one average 
person to be F-making and appear to another average person to be opposite-F-making, 
because they do not realize that sensibles are not suitable for being makers or 
explainers at all.  And Plato has spent a lot of time in the Phaedo, prior to this 
argument, claiming that truth and explanation cannot be found in sensibles (Phaedo 
65a-ff, b1-2, c2-3, d4-e1, d7-66a8, 73a7-10), and he goes on to argue later in the 
Phaedo why it is that sensibles cannot be explainers (Phaedo 96a-101c). 
Then Plato continues in the next step of the argument: The form of F, however, 
never appears opposite-F-making (and obviously always appears F-making) to you 
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Simmias.  Interpreters of this argument have not really been able to explain the shift 
from generic perceivers at the outset of the argument to Simmias as the perceiver later 
on in the case of the form.  They have often treated Simmias as acting simply as a 
representative of all humankind.147  In my view, the shift to Simmias in particular as 
perceiver is important, and it sheds light on how we ought to understand the argument.  
Plato has just told us before the argument that Socrates and Simmias have 
“knowledge” of equality (ἐπιστάµεθα αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν) (Phaedo 74b2).148  It is because 
Simmias has knowledge of the form of equality, which (for Plato) includes knowledge 
of its explanatory role149, that we are licensed to move from nonveridical appearance 
to actuality in the argument.  We can move from an intentional context to a 
nonintentional context.  Since the form of equality appears equal-explaining to 
Simmias, and he has knowledge of the form, it follows that the form actually is equal-
                                                
147 For instance, see Mills 1958, 50; and Sedley 2007, 78, 79. 
148 One difficult issue of interpretation is whether Plato is actually attributing knowledge to Simmias 
here at 74b2.  One reason for this difficulty is that Plato shortly goes on to argue that knowledge 
requires being able to give an account, and he suggests that after Socrates’ death no one will be alive 
who is capable of doing this (Phaedo 76b5-c3).  This might be taken to suggest that Simmias is unable 
to give an account of equality and therefore lacks knowledge of it.  However, Plato has just noted that 
his argument about equality applies not merely to this form but to all forms including the beautiful, the 
good, the just, and the pious (Phaedo 75c10-d4).  And then Plato suggests that only Socrates “is able to 
give an account concerning the things we were mentioning just now” (ἔχειν διδόναι λόγον περὶ τούτων 
ὧν νυνδὴ ἐλέγοµεν) (Phaedo 76b8-12).  Plato’s point, which he seems to make only hesitantly—see the 
‘πολὺ µᾶλλον φοβοῦµαι’ at 76b10-2—is that Socrates may be the only one with knowledge of all these 
things.  The possibility is left open that Simmias and others may have knowledge of perhaps some 
forms that are easier to know, such as equality. 
With all that being said, note that I do not need 74b2 to be attributing knowledge to Simmias as 
opposed to true belief, (which may be fairly well-justified but which Plato thinks falls short of 
knowledge).  Strictly speaking, Simmias may only have the true belief that equality is sameness of 
measure, and that it is having sameness of measure that makes things equal.  These are fairly 
straightforward points in the case of equality, which I think is why Plato chooses this example as 
opposed to something like the beautiful, the good, the just, or the pious, which are certainly more 
difficult to grasp.  True belief is sufficient for the argument on my interpretation, as we can move from 
the claim that Simmias has the true belief that the form of equality is equal-making to the claim that the 
form of equality is actually equal-making.  The requirement is only that Simmias’ mental state is a 
factive one.  I use ‘knowledge’ terms in what follows, but these could be interpreted as (perhaps well-
justified) true belief that is short of actual knowledge. 
149 See the Euthyphro 6d-e for example, where one of the most basic features of the form of F is that it 
is the one and the same thing in all cases of Fs that makes them F. 
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explaining.150  Since sensible equals are not equal-explaining, we can validly conclude 
that the form of equality and sensible equals are not the same.  Let us look at a 
formalization of the argument on this interpretation: 
 
Argument from Explanatory Role  
(R1) Sensible Fs appear F-making and opposite-F-making to average 
folks.151 
(R2) But these average folks are unaware of the fact that sensible Fs 
are neither F-making nor opposite-F-making, since sensibles 
cannot be makers or explainers. 
(R3) The form of F never appears opposite-F-making and always 
appears F-making to you Simmias. 
(R4) So the form of F is F-making, since you Simmias have 
knowledge of the form of F and its explanatory role. 
(R5) Therefore, the form of F and sensible Fs are not the same. 
                                                
150 If x knows that a stick is straight, it doesn’t follow that how the stick appears to x is true.  For 
instance, if the stick appears bent to x (in water), it doesn’t follow that it is bent.  But I seem to be 
moving here from the claim that the form appears F to someone with knowledge of it to the claim that it 
is F.  The case of the form is different from that of a stick (and the case of the property of being F-
making is different from the property of being bent), because the only way the form can “appear” (or 
that something can “appear” to have the property of being F-making) to people is in thought.  So if the 
form appears F-making to Simmias, what this means is that Simmias thinks or believes that it is F-
making—since he has knowledge, his belief must be true. 
151 In my interpretation of lines 74b7-9 here, I appear to take Plato to use ἴσος in two different senses 
within the same sentence.  I take Plato to be using the predicate ‘ἴσα’ as shorthand to refer to the 
property of being equal-making, but I do not think Plato intends the ‘ἴσοι’ of the ἴσοι λίθοι καὶ ξύλα  
to refer to them as being equal-making.  It is the “equal sticks and stones” which appear equal-making 
and unequal-making, and not the “equal-making sticks and stones”, since these sensibles are not truly 
equal-making.  Does the text here involve an intrasentential shift in the sense of ‘ἴσος’, in such a way 
that would violate something like the B-requirement from Chapter Two?  There I proposed that we 
should avoid taking Plato to be shifting the sense of the predicate within a single statement, because 
such a shift would be highly misleading.  But is this what I am taking Plato to be doing here?  In fact, I 
do not think so.  I have argued that we should not take Plato to be immediately switching the sense of 
the predicate in a statement (without any indication of doing so).  But, on my interpretation, this 
sentence at 74b7-9 does not involve a shift in the sense of a predicate.  Plato often uses adjectives 
modifying subjects in special ways: for instance, ‘ἴσον’ in ‘αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον’ is being used in a special way 
to refer to the nonsensible form of equality.  Likewise, I take it that ‘ἴσοι’ in ἴσοι λίθοι καὶ ξύλα is being 
used in a special way to refer to “sensible equals”, which perhaps includes equal particulars, sensible 
properties that constitute equality and its opposite, and property-instances of these sensible properties.  
Plato can use, and does seem to use, an adjective modifying the subject of a sentence in a different way 
from how he uses that adjective in the predicate of the sentence.  This is different from a shift in the 
sense of a predicate, which is what the B-requirement prohibits.  In short, there does seem to be two 
different uses of ἴσος in this sentence, but this does not violate something like the B-requirement, since 
there is no shift in the sense of a predicate—the instance of ἴσος in the subject is being used to refer to a 
special set of entities, while the instance of ἴσος in the predicate is being used to refer to the property of 
being equal-explaining.        
174 
This interpretation of the argument has numerous strengths.  Perhaps most 
importantly, unlike the other interpretations, according to this interpretation, the 
argument does not involve any premises that Plato clearly rejects—in fact, he is 
committed to all of the premises.  He holds that many people think that sensibles are 
explainers, but that they are mistaken in their beliefs.  And he holds that forms avoid a 
sort of compresence of opposites in that the form of F makes things F but never makes 
things opposite-F.  Another strength of this interpretation is that, according to it, 
Plato’s argument is a valid one, which is not the case as Sedley and Svavarsson 
understand the argument.  Further, contrary to Irwin’s interpretation, this interpretation 
involves understanding φαίνεσθαι according to its nonveridical use, which is the most 
natural reading of the verb in this context, and for which there is textual evidence 
shortly after the argument.  Also, one weakness of Irwin’s interpretation was that he 
takes “sensible Fs” in the argument only to refer to property-types, and not to 
property-tokens or to particulars.  Another strength of my interpretation is that it 
allows for “sensible Fs” to be understood more broadly.  The “sensible Fs” in the 
argument might include any combination of sensible property-types, sensible 
property-tokens, or sensible particulars, and the argument will still be valid and have 
premises that Plato accepts.  Some people might mistakenly think that bright color 
makes things beautiful, or that the particular bright color of a particular Chagall 
painting makes the painting beautiful…or someone might even mistakenly think that 
the Chagall painting itself accounts for its own beauty. 
A final strength of my interpretation is that it does a nice job of explaining the 
shift from the generic perceivers in the case of sensible Fs, to Simmias in the case of 
the form of F.  The key point is that Simmias has the relevant knowledge about 
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explanation that average folks lack.  As far as I can tell, no other interpretation that has 
been offered succeeds in explaining this shift in perceivers in the argument.152 
 What might be thought to be the main weakness of my interpretation is that it 
requires supplying certain points in the argument that are not explicit here in Plato’s 
text.  Plato does not explicitly say here that the appearances in (R1) are misleading.  
However, given that Plato has already discussed at length the fact that truth and 
explanation cannot be found among sensibles, it is reasonable to take this point as 
implied here in the text of the argument.  Although sensible Fs appear to make things 
F and opposite-F to non-Platonists, Plato holds that these appearances are obviously 
misleading. 
Plato also does not explicitly claim in the argument that the form of F always 
appears F-making to Simmias, which is the operative point in (R3).  But Plato’s point 
here that the form of F never appears opposite-F-making seems intended to bring to 
mind the positive point that the form always appears F-making.  And Plato asserts, 
immediately after the argument, the operative point that the form of F appears to us 
(Platonic philosophers) to be F-making (Phaedo 74d5-7).  So again it is reasonable to 
take this point as implied in the text of the argument. 
Finally, Plato does not explicitly remind us within the argument that Simmias 
is in a privileged position with respect to the form of equality, but the point that 
Simmias knows the form is crucial to my interpretation.  However, it is certainly 
                                                
152 According to my interpretation, the shift in perceivers in the argument, between the third person at 
74b8 (to refer to average folks) and the second person at 74c1 (to refer to Simmias), is very important.  
But in the “resumption” of the argument at 74d4-8, which I discussed above, Plato uses the first person 
plural when he says that there is a difference between how the sensible equals and the form of equality 
“appear equal” to us.  How can we explain this shift to “us” as perceivers?  It seems clear that “us” here 
refers at least to Simmias and Socrates, and perhaps to any other Platonists who have the requisite 
knowledge that the average folks lack.  Plato’s point here, in line with my interpretation of the argument 
at 74b7-c6, is that the sensible equals do not appear to us Platonists in the same way as the form of 
equality appears to us.  Sensible equals never appear equal-making to us because we know that 
sensibles cannot be makers, while the form of equality does appear equal-making to us because we have 
knowledge of the form and its explanatory role. 
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reasonable to take this point as implied in the argument.  Plato has just mentioned a 
few lines before the argument that Simmias has knowledge of the form.  So while my 
interpretation does require reading into the argument important points that Plato does 
not make explicit within the very text of the argument itself, they are all obvious 
points with textual evidence for them surrounding the argument.  It is no stretch to 
suppose that Plato is relying on these points in his condensed argument here. 
 One might consider it a weakness of my view that, according to my 
interpretation, one is required to read between the lines somewhat in order to 
understand the argument.  However, relative to the other possible interpretations, mine 
seems by far to be the best alternative.  At the very least, it is good to find an 
interpretation of the argument that is consistent with the text, that involves premises 
Plato accepts, and that takes the argument to be valid.  Perhaps now we have found a 
satisfactory interpretation of Plato’s notoriously opaque argument for forms at Phaedo 
74b-c. 
One may be inclined to ask whether, according to my construal of the 
argument, it is a good argument for the existence of forms.  Well, the quick and 
perhaps obvious answer seems to be that it is not.  And this is the case because it 
seems like no one who is not already a Platonist would accept the premises.  Why 
would someone who is not a Platonist accept that sensibles cannot be explainers and 
that forms actually have this explanatory role?  The argument seems to simply beg the 
question against the non-Platonist.  But note that this is not a difficulty for my 
interpretation alone.  The other interpretations also appear to beg the question, as it 
seems that a non-Platonist would never accept (S2) or (I2).153  However, I think this is 
not problematic, once we understand what Plato is actually doing in this passage. 
                                                
153 One point is that, as I have argued, the second premise involves the tacit point that the form of F “is 
always F”, which the non-Platonist would reject.  Also, a nominalist who thought that equality was 
177 
I do not think the argument is as bad as it might appear.  Plato’s point in this 
quick argument itself is not really to convince the non-Platonist to believe in forms, 
but rather to set out one of the main reasons why he thinks that forms exist.  In his 
view, sensibles cannot be explainers and forms can.  These are controversial 
assumptions that require further argument, but this is exactly what Plato sets out to 
argue for later in the Phaedo, when he examines what is required for something to be 
an adequate explanation.  If Plato’s later arguments are successful in showing that 
sensibles cannot be explainers and that forms could be, then he has a pretty good 
argument for the existence of forms for anyone who thinks that explanation is 
possible.  If one assumes that explanation is possible, then, Plato argues, one had 
better accept the existence of forms, since forms and not sensibles are capable of being 
explainers. 
 
 
VI. The Inferiority of Sensibles at 74d4-75b9 
 
 Notice that, on the interpretation of the argument at 74b7-c6 that I have 
defended, the argument provides no evidence for SP.  The argument relies on the view 
that, unlike sensible Fs, the form of F makes things F.  However, the argument is silent 
with respect to self-predication.  While it involves the claim that the form of F makes 
things F, it takes no stand on whether the form of F is itself an F thing.  Therefore, if 
my interpretation of the argument is correct, it provides no evidence for attributing SP 
to Plato. 
                                                                                                                                       
somehow identical with sensibles, would not accept that there is this distinction between how forms and 
sensibles appear. 
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 But in addition to taking this main argument as evidence for SP, commentators 
have often focused on Plato’s claims concerning the inferiority of sensibles, 
throughout 74d4-75b9, as evidence for SP.  In this passage, Plato argues that although 
sensible equals “want” (βούλεται—74d10, προθυµεῖται—75b7) and “strive” (ὀρέγεται—
75a2, b1) to be “like” (οἷον—74d7, e1, 75a2, b8) the form of equality, they “fall short” 
(ἐνδεῖ—74d6, 74e1, ἔχει ἐνδεεστέρως—74e4, 75a2-3, b2) and are “inferior” 
(φαυλότερα—74e2, 75b8).  Again, this passage comes right before Plato generalizes 
his claims to all forms (Phaedo 75c10-d4).  So Plato seems emphatic in affirming that 
sensible Fs are deficient when compared with the form of F.  But how are we to 
understand what is meant by the claims that sensibles fall short and are inferior?  Plato 
has been taken to mean that sensible Fs are F deficiently while the form of F is F non-
deficiently.154  If this is a correct interpretation, then it would seem that the passage 
provides strong evidence for SP—if the form of F is F non-deficiently, then it would 
be an F thing. 
 Perhaps, taken in isolation, this passage would seem to provide convincing 
evidence for attributing SP to Plato.155  However, as some commentators have noticed, 
                                                
154 For instance, Sedley holds that “the equal sticks and stones do fall short of the Equal in terms of 
likeness, because, whereas the Equal itself is a model of pure unadulterated equality, they are only 
imperfectly or unstably equal” (Sedley 2006, 312).  Sedley supposes that sensibles might then not fall 
short in the relevant way: “there might in principle be a participant in the Form which in no way fell 
short of it in terms of likeness” (Sedley 2006, 312).  For instance, there might be two equal sticks (or 
one stick considered in relation to itself) that really are perfectly equal in length, (although perhaps we 
would not be able to tell as much with perfect accuracy).  But then Sedley’s interpretation of the 
relevant way in which sensibles “fall short” here seems incorrect (and not only for the reason I go on to 
emphasize, that the contrast drawn here is the same as the one in the argument at 74b7-c6).  Plato is 
clear in this passage that, in the relevant way in which sensibles “fall short” they cannot fail to fall short 
(ἐνδεῖ δὲ καὶ οὐ δύναται τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον ἐκεῖνο) (Phaedo 74e1).  In the relevant way, sensibles must 
always fall short.  Since, as Sedley admits, sensible equals might not fall short in being perfectly equal, 
being perfectly equal cannot be the relevant property that the form of equality has and that sensible 
equals fall short in having.     
155 J. Gosling seems for the most part to consider the contrast drawn between sensibles and forms at 
74d4-75b9 in isolation from the argument at 74b7-c6, and still thinks that the inferiority of sensibles 
here does not imply (although it is compatible with) the self-predication of forms (Gosling 1965, 160-
1).  On his view, the inferiority of sensibles here consists in the sensibles lacking “some further property 
which would be needed for total resemblance” to forms (Gosling 1965, 161).  For instance, sensible 
equals “may, in the ordinary sense, be perfectly equal, but they must in some respect be unlike the 
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this passage ought to be interpreted in light of its context.  For instance, Penner 
expresses the point as follows: 
 
It seems to me that whatever falling short is at 74D6, D9-10, E1-4, 
75A2-3, B1-2, 7-8, the shortcomings of equal sticks and stones by 
comparison with the Form of equality cannot plausibly be represented 
as anything other than the respects in which equal sticks and stones are 
said to differ from the equal itself at 74B6-C2….  In the present 
context, the only respect in which equal sticks and so forth are 
contrasted with the equal itself is what we see at 74B6-C2….  It is not 
clear to me how any other reading can be got from the actual text. 
(Penner 1987, 185-6)156 
Now I disagree with Penner’s interpretation of what the contrast involved in the 
argument actually is, but nevertheless Penner puts the point well that our interpretation 
of the inferiority of sensibles intended in this passage should be informed by the 
contrast drawn in the argument at 74b7-c6. 
Bostock also makes the point about the importance of context for a 
determination of the respect in which sensibles are said to fall short here.  He 
considers different possibilities of how one might interpret the claim that sensibles fall 
short of forms, but his response is as follows: 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
forms: they are not, say, eternally and immutably equal” (Gosling 1965, 160).  Sensibles will always 
fall short of forms and be inferior to them because they lack some property or properties that forms 
have but which sensibles must always lack, such as, Gosling suggests, having the properties that they 
have eternally or immutably.  Gallop appears to favor a similar view, that sensible Fs fall short of the 
form of F simply because the form is distinct from sensible Fs and has properties that sensible Fs lack 
entirely (Gallop 1975, 128-9).  In many ways, their interpretations are friendly to my own.  I take 
sensible Fs to fall short because they always lack a property that the form of F has—but I think in the 
context of the passage from 74d4-75b9, right after the argument at 74b7-c6, Plato is not making the 
general point that there is some property or other of the form (or properties) that sensible Fs lack.  
Although there may be (and would seem to be) many properties that forms have and that sensibles must 
lack, Plato means to draw attention here to the property of being F-explaining in particular.  His point is 
that sensibles must fall short of forms because forms have the property of being explainers and 
sensibles cannot have this property. 
156 And Penner writes elsewhere that “the ‘falling short’ in this passage can hardly be other than what 
differentiates equal sticks and stones from the equal itself in our argument at 74BC” (Penner 187, 54). 
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But to any such suggestion we can always be sure that we have at least 
this objection: it is not in the text.  Our text supplies no further 
argument to show that perceptible things always do fall short of forms, 
and it supplies no further elucidation of what this claim might mean.  
One looks in vain for any further hint of what the supposedly new point 
might be.  The obvious moral to draw from this is that the point is not 
actually meant as a new point at all: it must be just a repetition of 
something we have had already, but now re-expressed in a more 
picturesque way. (Bostock 1986, 88) 
And Bostock goes on to argue that Plato’s point is to re-express the main premises of 
the argument at 74b7-c6 (Bostock 1986, 88-94), although, as with Penner, I disagree 
with his particular interpretation of what those main premises say.  Regardless of their 
particular interpretations of the argument at 74b7-c6, Penner and Bostock seem correct 
that our interpretation of the inferiority of sensibles in the passage following the 
argument should be influenced by our interpretation of that argument.  Although there 
may be other ways in which Plato thinks sensibles are inferior to forms, what Plato has 
in mind at 74d4-75b9 should be seen as the same contrast he has drawn in the 
argument that immediately preceded this passage. 
 So what is the contrast drawn in this argument, and what does the inferiority of 
sensibles consist in here?  Well if my interpretation of the argument defended in 
Section V is correct, then Plato’s point in this passage is to emphasize the failure of 
sensibles to be F-makers.  When Plato writes in clearly metaphorical language that 
sensibles “strive” to be like forms but fall short and are inferior, what he means is that 
sensibles Fs are simply inadequate as explainers of things’ being F.  On the other 
hand, forms are non-deficient explainers.  Sensible Fs might merely appear to some 
people to make things F, and perhaps they can be said to constitute F-ness in certain 
cases, but they will always fail to be true F-makers. 
 Again, the inferiority of sensibles and the corresponding non-deficiency of 
forms discussed repeatedly in this passage should be seen as referring back to the 
contrast drawn in the argument at 75b7-c6.  And if my interpretation of the argument 
181 
is correct, the contrast involved in it is silent with respect to the self-predication of 
forms.  Therefore, we should see the non-deficiency of forms at 74d4-75b9 as also 
having nothing to say concerning whether the form of F is an F thing.  This passage 
then, like the important argument preceding it, seems to provide no evidence of a 
commitment to SP. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
PLATO’S RESPONSE TO THE REGRESS PROBLEM OF THE TMA 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 I have argued that commentators are wrong to find a commitment to SP in 
Plato’s resemblance talk throughout numerous dialogues and in his discussion of a 
contrast between forms and sensibles in Phaedo 74-5.  In addition to the passages that 
I have discussed, commentators have often seen the Third Man Argument (TMA) at 
132a-b in the Parmenides as evidence of Plato’s commitment to SP in the middle 
dialogues.157158  One might wonder how textual evidence from the Parmenides, an 
unmistakably late dialogue, can provide evidence of Plato’s commitments in the 
middle dialogues.  The reason for this is that, in the first part of the dialogue, Plato 
presents a discussion between Parmenides and a young Socrates, in which Parmenides 
challenges Socrates’ views concerning forms.  And these views of young Socrates at 
least seem to be ones expressed by Plato in the middle dialogues.  As Meinwald 
writes: 
 
The utterances of Socrates are reminiscent of statements that are widely 
regarded as constituting Plato’s theory of Forms, as presented in the 
Republic and the Phaedo. (Meinwald 1992, 366)  
Because of the unmistakable resemblance of Socrates’ views here to 
those expressed by the Socrates of the middle dialogues, this passage 
has traditionally been regarded as a comment by Plato on the status of 
the so-called middle theory…. (Meinwald 1992, 372) 
                                                
157 Plato did not in fact refer to this argument as a or the “Third Man argument”.  This argument has 
often been called the Third Man Argument by commentators because Aristotle makes note of an 
argument which he calls the Third Man (Alexander, Metaphysica, 84.23-85.3, 93.1-7; also Aristotle 
Metaphysics, 990b17=1079a13, 1039a2, and Sophistici Elenchi, 178b36-ff.), and most commentators 
take this argument in the Parmenides at 132a-b to be (roughly) identical to Aristotle’s Third Man 
argument (Fine 1993, 203).  
158 I will also briefly discuss the argument in the Parmenides from 132d-133a, which is often taken to 
be another version of the same argument.  See e.g. Vlastos 1965, 242; and Fine 1993, 215. 
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In particular, commentators have seen the TMA at 132a-b as involving SP as a 
premise and therefore as evidence of Plato’s commitment to SP in the middle period.  
Later in this chapter, I will argue that even if SP is involved as a premise in the TMA, 
this should not be taken as evidence of a commitment to SP in the middle dialogues.  
The TMA, I will argue, is consistent with the view that Plato is committed to EP in the 
middle dialogues and so not SP.  First, however, I will examine the structure of the 
argument, the main difficulty it presents, and whether it truly involves SP as a 
premise. 
The TMA has received considerable attention.  There are two reasons for this.  
First, Plato does not make explicit what premises he relies on in the argument, which 
makes it difficult to determine its actual intended structure.  More importantly, the 
conclusion of the TMA, which follows from premises which it at least at first seems 
Plato does accept, is problematic for the theory of forms.  The TMA seems to show 
that if there is one form of F, then there are infinitely many forms of F.  But Plato 
appears to be committed to the existence of forms and the view that in cases in which 
a form of F exists, there is only one unique form of F. 159160  The conclusion that there 
are even two forms of F, let alone infinitely many, conflicts with the uniqueness 
assumption.  And the conclusion that there are infinitely many forms of F seems to be 
problematic for Plato’s epistemology.  At least in many important cases of knowledge, 
such as the knowledge that x is just, Plato believes that one can only know that x is F 
if one knows the form of F.  But it seems that one can only have knowledge of the 
                                                
159 Here I adopt Fine’s construal of the uniqueness assumption (Fine 1993, 205).  I take uniqueness to 
be the view that, in those cases in which a form exists, there is only one form of F.  Uniqueness itself 
does not take a stand on whether there are forms for all or only some predicates. 
160 Plato argues for uniqueness in the Third Bed Argument (TBA) in the Republic, which I briefly 
discuss below.  Also, Plato sets out the TMA by suggesting that at least one of the underlying reasons 
for accepting uniqueness (along with other commitments) leads to the opposing conclusion that there 
are in fact infinitely many forms in each case in which a form exists.  Here Plato seems to imply that at 
least prior to the TMA he was committed to uniqueness.  In this case, we have the TBA as evidence that 
Plato was indeed committed to uniqueness.  And there is other evidence which might suggest a 
commitment to uniqueness, e.g. Euthyphro 5d, 6d-e, Meno 72c, Republic 507b, Symposium 211b-212a.    
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form of F if one knows the form of F over it, which (according to the assumptions of 
the TMA that I will soon discuss) explains its being F.  And knowledge of that form 
will require knowledge of the form over it, and so on.  So according to the TMA, it 
seems impossible to know that x is F, at least in cases of knowledge in which 
knowledge of the form is required.161162      
 In this chapter, I will first present a translation of the passage in the 
Parmenides in which we find the TMA.  Then I will examine Vlastos’ formulations of 
the TMA in his influential paper “The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides”.  I 
will focus not on the premises which he claims are explicit in the text, but on two 
premises which he takes to be implicit in the argument.  Vlastos argues that these two 
premises must be understood in the argument, if the argument is to be valid.  I will 
argue, along with Fine and S. Marc Cohen, that while these premises are sufficient to 
bring about the regresses of the TMA, they are not necessary.  There is good reason 
for altering at least one of the premises, and for adding an additional premise.  One of 
these key premises which Vlastos presents is the Self-Predication Assumption 
(SPV163), and I agree that it or some premise very much like it is at work in the 
                                                
161 See Fine for a longer account of why the TMA is problematic for the theory of forms (Fine 1993, 
203-4), and Vlastos’ discussion of these issues (Vlastos 1965, 240 n. 1). 
162 It seems that this problem about the possibility of knowledge might be skirted by Plato.  Perhaps one 
can know the form of F without knowing the form of F above it which makes it F—for instance, being 
F might be an unimportant or accidental feature of the form.  Roughly, I might know what justice is by 
knowing it is “doing one’s own”, even without knowing the thing which explains the fact that the form 
of justice is itself just.  Whether the form of justice is itself just (and what makes it just if it is) might be 
irrelevant to the knowledge of what justice is, and this is what is required to know that something is 
just.  Another possibility might be that one could have knowledge of all of the forms of F in the infinite 
string of forms of F.  This might be possible because of the fact that the only difference between the 
form of F and the form of F over it seems to be that one is ontologically distinct from the other, and that 
the one which is above the other explains the lower one’s being F.  Although there is an infinite series 
of ontologically distinct forms of F, they are the same with respect to the features that are important for 
knowledge.  So perhaps it would not be impossible to know them all.  If this is right, then the infinite 
regress would not seem to pose a problem for knowledge.  But the problem for uniqueness still remains, 
regardless of what we say here about knowledge. 
163 I use SPV throughout to refer to Vlastos’ formulation of the self-predication assumption of the 
TMA, which I will soon present.  I use SP in this chapter and throughout the rest of the dissertation to 
refer more generally to any universal genuine self-predication assumption.  To ask whether Plato is 
committed to SP is to ask whether he is committed to the view that any form of F is an F thing.  Even 
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TMA.164  But there are notoriously many different possible interpretations of Plato’s 
apparent statements of self-predication, his language suggesting that “the form of F is 
F”.  If Plato does intend to rely on a genuine self-predication assumption (SP165) in the 
TMA, what exactly is the nature of this assumption?  I will discuss a few different 
suggestions, but my goal in this chapter will not be to definitively establish which 
version of SP Plato actually intends in the argument.  Instead, I will argue for two 
main claims: (1) Plato does not and cannot respond to the TMA by focusing on a 
rejection of whatever SP assumption is involved in it, and (2) Plato responds to the 
TMA by rejecting a different premise altogether, the Non-Self-Explanation (NSE) 
premise. 
To defend (1), I will argue that regardless of the particular interpretation of 
self-predication that Plato intends in his presentation of the TMA, the Regress 
Problem of the TMA, that there is at least one form for which there is an infinite 
regress, cannot be avoided through a rejection of the self-predication assumption.166  
This view is directly contrary to Owen, who suggests that it is the self-predication 
                                                                                                                                       
though I use “SPV” here, not “SP”, to refer to Vlastos’ formulation, I see his formulation of the self-
predication assumption of the TMA as a general statement of any universal genuine self-predication 
assumption.  In other words, Vlastos’ self-predication assumption just is SP.  Fine does not take 
Vlastos’ SPV in this way—she takes SPV to posit more than SP (Fine 1993, 206-7), but this does not 
seem to be Vlastos’ intention.  When Vlastos says that “Any form can be predicated of itself”, he seems 
to mean that any form of F is itself an F thing, and this is just SP.  In this chapter, I will discuss what I 
consider to be different versions of Vlastos’ self-predication assumption which may be at work in the 
TMA, such as NSP and genuine self-predication assumptions involving Pauline and broad self-
predication. 
164 I do examine whether there might be some premise at work in the argument which is similar to SPV 
but which is not itself a genuine self-predication assumption.  While I suggest (contrary to some 
commentators) that such a premise could function in a valid TMA-style argument, I admit that in the 
TMA itself in the Parmenides, Plato seems to intend a genuine self-predication assumption of some 
sort. 
165 Again, a genuine self-predication assumption is the view that any form of F is indeed an F thing. 
166 Throughout this chapter, I call this result, that there is at least one infinite regress of forms, “the 
Regress Problem” of the TMA.  As I admit below, this is not Plato’s expressed conclusion of the TMA.  
However, I refer to this result as “the Regress Problem” of the TMA to emphasize a philosophical 
rather than textual point, that a serious problem will remain for Plato as long as there is even one 
infinite regress of this type.  The fact that there is a regress for all of the forms and not just one or a few 
of them is not the crucial philosophical issue at hand.  An adequate response to the TMA must rule out 
there being even one infinite regress of this type. 
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assumption itself that is Plato’s mistake which leads to the regresses of the TMA, and 
that Plato ought to respond to the TMA by rejecting SP.  In “Notes on Ryle’s Plato”, 
Owen writes that in this argument in the Parmenides: 
 
Plato brings out a fallacy that had pervaded his earlier statements of the 
theory of Forms….  [H]e now proves, by ascribing largeness to itself, 
that [this] generates a regress, in this case a regress of largenesses that 
turns the supposedly single Form into an unlimited class….  Plato was 
able to isolate the mistake which lies at the root of this and other 
troubles…. (Owen 2000, 320, my emphasis). 
Owen highlights SP as the culprit that generates the regresses of the TMA.  Similarly, 
Meinwald argues that Plato can “say good-bye” to the TMA because of his rejection 
of SP.  According to Meinwald, because Plato does not hold that the form of F 
“displays the feature” common to Fs, he is not subject to the regresses of the TMA 
(Meinwald 1991, 155-7).  Contrary to Owen and Meinwald, I will show that Plato 
cannot hope to avoid the Regress Problem by rejecting SP.  Plato will not avoid the 
main problem presented in the TMA by rejecting some form of a self-predication 
assumption, and instead he will reject some other premise or premises.  I will go on to 
argue for (2), that Plato does in fact respond to the TMA by rejecting NSE.  Unlike 
with SP, the rejection of NSE constitutes a successful response to the Regress 
Problem, and there is ample textual evidence to show that Plato does reject this 
premise.  
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II. Formalizing the Third Man Argument 
 
 Plato presents the TMA as follows at Parmenides 132a-b: 
 
I suppose you think that each form 
is one because of something of this 
sort: whenever many things seem to 
you to be large, perhaps, when you 
have looked at them all, there appears 
to be some one and the same idea167, 
from which you believe that the large 
is one. 
True, he said. 
What then about the large itself and 
the other large things?  If you look at 
all of them in the same way with the 
soul, won’t some one large appear 
again, by which all these appear large? 
It seems so. 
Then another form of largeness will 
make an appearance, having come 
about beside the large itself and the 
things sharing in it.  And in addition to 
all these, there will be another in turn, 
by which all these will be large.  And 
so each of the forms will no longer be 
one for you, but the number of each 
will be infinite. 
 Οἶµαί σε ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦδε ἓν ἕκαστον 
εἶδος οἴεσθαι εἶναι· ὅταν πόλλ’ ἄττα 
µεγάλα σοι δόξῃ εἶναι, µία τις ἴσως 
δοκεῖ ἰδέα167 ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα 
ἰδόντι, ὅθεν ἓν τὸ µέγα ἡγῇ εἶναι. 
Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φάναι. 
Τί δ’ αὐτὸ τὸ µέγα καὶ τἆλλα τὰ 
µεγάλα, ἐὰν ὡσαύτως τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ 
πάντα ἴδῃς, οὐχὶ ἕν τι αὖ µέγα 
φανεῖται, ᾧ ταῦτα πάντα µεγάλα 
φαίνεσθαι; 
Ἔοικεν. 
 Ἄλλο ἄρα εἶδος µεγέθους 
ἀναφανήσεται, παρ’ αὐτό τε τὸ µέγεθος 
γεγονὸς καὶ τὰ µετέχοντα αὐτοῦ· καὶ 
ἐπὶ τούτοις αὖ πᾶσιν ἕτερον, ᾧ ταῦτα 
πάντα µεγάλα ἔσται· καὶ οὐκέτι δὴ ἓν 
ἕκαστόν σοι τῶν εἰδῶν ἔσται, ἀλλὰ 
ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος. 
 Vlastos begins his discussion of the argument by presenting formulations of 
two explicit steps (Vlastos 1965, 232-3): 
                                                
167 Cornford takes ἰδέα here to refer to “the character supposed to be possessed both by the Form and by 
the things which partake of the Form”, while he sees only εἶδος here as referring to the form itself 
(Cornford 1957, 88 n. 1).  However, I take Plato in this passage to be using ἰδέα and εἶδος both to refer 
to the form.  In the context of the argument, he seems to use the terms interchangeably.  For instance, he 
refers to that which is “over all instances” (ἐπὶ πᾶσιν) as an ἰδέα (Parmenides 132c4), and then right 
away as an εἶδος (Parmenides 132c6).  And in the argument that forms are unknowable, Plato seems to 
have forms in mind when he says that “the ideas (ὅσαι τῶν ἰδεῶν) which are what they are in relation to 
each other have their being in relation to themselves but not in relation to things that belong to us” 
(Parmenides 133c8-d1).  Perhaps most clearly, right after Plato writes that the beautiful itself and the 
good (αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὃ ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν) are unknowable, when obviously referring to forms, he 
generalizes that also unknowable are “all the things, indeed, which we take to be ideas themselves” 
(πάντα ἃ δὴ ὡς ἰδέας αὐτὰς οὔσας ὑπολαµβάνοµεν) (Parmenides 134b14-c2).  Here, in text following 
shortly after the TMA, it seems undoubtable that Plato is using the term ‘ἰδέα’ to refer to forms 
themselves. 
188 
 
(A1) If a number of things, a, b, c, are all F, there must be a single 
Form F-ness, in virtue of which we apprehend a, b, c, as all F.  
(A2) If a, b, c, and F-ness are all F, there must be another Form, F-
ness1, in virtue of which we apprehend a, b, c, and F-ness as all 
F. 
As Vlastos points out, A2 does not follow from A1 alone (Vlastos 1965, 233-6).  A1 is 
consistent with F-ness not being itself F, but A2 takes it for granted that F-ness is itself 
F.  And even if it is assumed that F-ness is F, A2 adds that there must be a distinct 
form in virtue of which it is apprehended as F—this too does not follow from A1.  So 
there must be some implicit premises in the argument to justify the move from A1 to 
A2. 
Vlastos proposes that we consider, as implicit premises in the argument, those 
premises which are the “simplest” ones that “would have to be added” in order to 
make the argument valid (Vlastos 1965, 236).  And Vlastos claims that we “need” the 
two following premises, the Self-Predication Assumption (SPV) and the Non-identity 
Assumption (NIV168) (Vlastos 1965, 236-7): 
 
(SPV) Any Form can be predicated of itself. Largeness is itself large. 
F-ness is itself F.  
(NIV) If anything has a certain character, it cannot be identical with 
the Form in virtue of which we apprehend that character. If x is 
F, x cannot be identical with F-ness. 
Why does Vlastos think that these premises are required in order to make the TMA 
valid?  First, in the antecedent of A2, Plato considers what follows if a, b, c, and F-
ness are all F.  If F-ness is not itself F, then there certainly is no need for there to be 
another form which emerges over and above the many Fs and F-ness.  So it seems 
unavoidable that a self-predication assumption or something very much like one is 
understood in the argument.  But, even if the form of F is F, it does not follow that 
there must be another form over and above the many Fs and the form of F, in virtue of 
                                                
168 I use NIV throughout this chapter to refer to Vlastos’ formulation of the Non-identity Assumption. 
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which they are all F.  Merely from A1 and SPV, it could be the case that the form of F 
and the many Fs are all F in virtue of the form of F itself.  This is why Vlastos posits 
NIV as another implicit premise which is required for validity.  Since the form of F is 
itself F, it cannot be identical to that form “in virtue of which we apprehend that 
character”.  So, there must be some further form in virtue of which the many Fs and 
the form of F are F.  
 Vlastos points out that a peculiar feature of these premises is that they are 
inconsistent.  According to Vlastos, the inconsistency of these implicit premises 
reveals that Plato was not aware of these “necessary” premises (Vlastos 1965, 241).  
However, as Cohen and Fine have argued, while these premises are sufficient to bring 
about the regresses of the TMA, they are not necessary (Cohen 2000, 279-80; Fine 
1993, 206).  They are not the simplest premises which are needed for the TMA to be 
valid.  Certainly, the infinite regresses in the TMA do follow trivially from Vlastos’ 
premise set, because anything can be derived from a contradiction (Cohen 2000, 279; 
Fine 1993, 206).  Fine provides an account of how Vlastos thinks the regresses might 
be produced in a non-trivial way from his premise set, or how Plato may have thought 
the regresses were produced (Fine 1993, 205-6). 
But there is good reason to hold that Vlastos is incorrect about the implicit 
premises which are required for the TMA.  First, Cohen points out that the conclusion 
of the TMA is not itself a logical inconsistency and so it cannot be the case that it can 
only be derivable from an inconsistent premise set (Cohen 2000, 279-80).  Second, 
Vlastos’ NIV is not required for the regresses in the TMA.  In the argument, once it is 
assumed that the form of F is F, (and once a one-over-many premise, which I will 
soon discuss, is added), the regresses follow as long as the form of F is not F in virtue 
of itself.  If the form of F cannot explain its own being F, then its being F must be 
explained by a form of F distinct from it.  (Again, this relies on the one-over-many 
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premise that I will soon discuss in detail.)  That distinct form of F will itself be F and 
will not be able to explain the fact that it is F, and so another form of F will be 
required, and so on.  So the regresses will be initiated even if we reject NIV and hold 
that x can be F and can be identical to (an) F-ness.  The key here is that NIV, the 
premise which directly conflicts with SPV, is not necessary, but rather the following 
premise, Non-Self-Explanation (NSE), will do: 
 
(NSE) If anything has a certain character, it does not have this 
character in virtue of itself.  If x is F, x is not F in virtue of 
itself.169 
First, NSE is clearly true for Plato in the cases in which a form of F exists and x ≠ the 
form of F.170  If something other than the form of F has the certain character F, it does 
not have this character in virtue of itself, but in virtue of the form of F.171  But NSE is 
only sufficient (along with other premises) for generating the TMA regresses because 
it applies to forms as well.  By SPV we have that the form of F is F, and by NSE it 
                                                
169 This formulation is the same as Peterson’s non-self-explanation premise (Peterson 1973, 453) and 
Fine’s NI premise (Fine 1993, 206).  It is similar to Sellars’ NI', but his premise requires that each F 
thing has such a thing as “the F-ness by which it is F”, which will be insufficient to generate the exact 
regresses found in the TMA (Cohen 2000, 281 n. 14).  This is the case, for instance, because an F thing 
turns out not to be F by virtue of sharing in one F-ness alone, but rather by virtue of sharing in an 
infinite string of F-nesses.  Peterson claims that her non-self-explanation premise “fills the gap in the 
Parmenides argument which Vlastos’ ‘non-identity premiss’ fills” (Peterson 1973, 453 n. 6).  She does 
not mention that the non-self-explanation premise is crucially different from NIV in that it is consistent 
with the other premises in her formulation of the argument, and in particular with her self-predication 
premise, whereas NIV conflicts with SPV and her own statement of the self-predication premise.   
170 It is controversial whether Plato is committed to there being forms corresponding to every property.  
Perhaps there are some properties for which no form exists, and with regard to these properties, perhaps 
non-forms (and even forms) can have them in virtue of themselves.  For my purposes here, it is not 
crucial to determine whether Plato does posit forms for all properties.  I go on to argue that the TMA is 
problematic for Plato even if there is one instance of an infinite regress.  In addition, all of the 
formulations of the premises of the TMA could be rewritten so as to account for there only being forms 
concerning some limited range of properties.  For instance, NSE could be rewritten as follows: If 
anything has a certain character for which there exists a corresponding form, it does not have this 
character in virtue of itself.  If x is F and there exists a form of F, x is not F in virtue of itself.  For the 
sake of simplicity, I assume in my formulations that there are forms corresponding to every property or 
predicate.     
171 Peterson takes NSE as obviously true in the case of non-forms (Peterson, 454 n. 6).  She seems to be 
correct, at least with regard to those properties for which there exists a form.  If a non-form is F, and 
there exists a form of F, the non-form is not F in virtue of itself, but rather in virtue of the form of F.  As 
I just noted, NSE could easily be amended to account for a limited range of forms such that it is true as 
applied to non-forms. 
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follows that the form of F is not F in virtue of itself.  There must (once a one-over-
many premise is added) be some further thing in virtue of which the form of F is F.  If 
NSE in place of NIV is sufficient (along with some other premises) to get the 
regresses of the TMA going, then it is preferable to NIV because it does not conflict 
with SPV.172  NSE and SPV can consistently both be true. 
 As I have noted, NIV and SPV, even on their own, are sufficient for generating 
the regresses in the TMA (in a trivial way).  But what about NSE and SPV?  NSE has 
the advantage over NIV of being consistent with SPV173, but are NSE and SPV 
sufficient for generating the regresses of the TMA?  Suppose we assume that there are 
particular Fs and there is a form of F.174  By SPV, we know that the form of F is F.  By 
NSE, we know that the form of F is not F in virtue of itself, and that the particular Fs 
are not F in virtue of themselves.  But according to these premises alone, we do not 
know what it is in virtue of which the particular Fs are F (or that there is any such 
thing).  Let us take it as an obvious Platonic assumption that particular Fs are F in 
virtue of the form of F.175  Still, according to these premises alone, we do not know 
what it is in virtue of which the form of F is F (or that there is any such thing), but we 
                                                
172 NSE also seems to be simpler than NIV in that NIV may imply NSE while NSE does not imply NIV.  
It seems to follow from NIV that if x is F, then x is not identical to F-ness and so x does not explain 
anything’s being F.  (But note that this is not quite right in light of my discussion in Chapter Three, 
since form-particularizations are not identical to forms and yet are still explainers of things’ being F.)  
And NSE is the view that if x is F, then x does not explain its own being F.  But then NIV would entail 
NSE, but NSE would not entail NIV.  If something does not explain anything’s being F, then it does not 
explain its own being F.  But if something does not explain its own being F, it might still explain some 
other things’ being F. 
173 NSE leaves open the possibility that the (or a) form of F is F, while NIV rules this out.  NIV says 
that if x is F, x cannot be identical with F-ness.  NSE allows that F-ness can be F, just not in virtue of 
itself. 
174 These in themselves would count as additional premises to NSE and SPV, but they are minimal.  
Below, I argue that it is only necessary for the TMA to assume as an additional premise (to NSE, SPV, 
and OM-TMA-R) that there exists at least one F thing. 
175 This may not be true for every property F, if Plato believes that there are only forms for some limited 
range of properties.  But I began here by assuming that there is a form of F, so I am considering a case 
in which Plato thinks a form does exist.  And Plato is committed to the view that in the cases in which 
forms do exist, the particular Fs are F in virtue of the form of F. 
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only know that it is not F in virtue of itself.  To initiate an infinite regress of higher 
and higher forms, it is clear that at least one additional premise will be required. 
 What is required to engender the regresses of the TMA is some version of a 
one-over-many premise.  Although I will not rehearse the arguments for this version 
here176, I take it that the best candidate for the one-over-many premise in the TMA is 
the following: 
 
(OM-TMA-R) For any maximal set of Fs at level n, there is exactly one 
form of F at level n+1 over it (where ‘over’ means 
“participated in by all the members of”).177178 
                                                
176 Among other considerations, OM-TMA-R is preferable to other versions of a one-over-many 
assumption because it is consistent with SPV and NSE, and it is sufficient to generate the regresses of 
the TMA when it is taken together with SPV and NSE (and the assumption that there is at least one F 
thing).  This formulation is also “an exactly one” assumption rather than “an at least one” assumption 
(Fine 1993, 211).  OM-TMA-R posits exactly one form over a particular maximal set of Fs.  One reason 
why this is preferable to an assumption which posits at least one form over some set of Fs, is that an 
exactly one assumption might incline one toward the acceptance of the uniqueness of forms.  And Plato 
begins his discussion of the TMA by outlining a one-over-many premise which might make “you think 
that each form is one”.  (In my next note, I point out that my OM-TMA-R is different in an important 
respect from Fine’s version of the one-over-many assumption involved in the TMA, OM-TMA, but all 
of these considerations I have just mentioned equally support both construals.  In other words, my OM-
TMA-R does not differ from Fine’s OM-TMA with respect to consistency or the “exactly one” 
consideration.  Below, I will discuss why I favor my OM-TMA-R over Fine’s OM-TMA.)       
177 The formulation of the one-over-many assumption that I am using here is similar to Fine’s OM-
TMA (Fine 1993, 210), but my version says that ‘over’ means ‘participated in by all the members of’ as 
opposed to ‘participated in by all and only the members of’.  OM-TMA-R itself is consistent with the 
view that the form of F is F only in virtue of itself.  But this is not the case with Fine’s OM-TMA, 
because since the form of F at level 1 is “over” the maximal set of Fs at level 0, and this set does not 
contain the form of F at level 1, the form of F is participated in by all and only the members of that set, 
and so it cannot be participated in by itself.  My OM-TMA-R itself says that all of the members of the 
maximal set of Fs at level n are F in virtue of participating in the form of F at level n+1, but the form of 
F at level n+1 might also be F in virtue of participating in itself, even if it is not in the set at level n.  
Fine also takes the “levels” referred to in her OM-TMA to be different levels of reality (Fine 1993, 
210).  She assumes that only sensibles can be at level 0 and that something at level n must be distinct 
from something at level n+1, because they are on different ontological levels.  But OM-TMA-R itself 
leaves open the question of whether an object at level n+1 is distinct from every object at level n.  OM-
TMA-R does not entail NSE (or SPV, and it is in fact consistent with uniqueness), and so by rejecting 
NSE, one does not thereby reject OM-TMA-R.  Below, I will discuss in more detail exactly how my 
OM-TMA-R differs from Fine’s OM-TMA, and how the TMA can be avoided through a rejection of 
NSE while OM-TMA-R is retained.    
178 Some conditions for understanding OM-TMA-R and how it functions (Fine 1993, 210):  Sensible F 
particulars (and all other Fs that are not a form of F) are assumed to be at level 0, and taken together 
compose a maximal set of Fs at level 0.  A maximal set of Fs at level n is a maximal set of Fs because it 
contains all of the Fs at level n and below—it leaves no Fs at level n or below out.  All the Fs in the 
maximal set at level n are F in virtue of the single form at level n+1.  If SPV is assumed, then all the Fs 
in the maximal set at level n, together with the form at level n+1 in virtue of which they are F, compose 
193 
This one-over-many assumption, along with NSE and SPV and the assumption that 
there are some F things (or at least one F thing), are sufficient for generating the 
regresses in the TMA.  Take the set of all sensible Fs (and all other Fs which are not a 
form of F).  These together compose a maximal set of Fs at level 0.  By OM-TMA-R, 
there is one form of F at level 1, in virtue of which the Fs at level 0 are F.  By SPV, 
the form of F at level 1 is itself F.  By NSE, the form of F at level 1 is not F in virtue 
of itself.179  The set of Fs at level 0 along with the form of F at level 1 (which is itself 
F) compose a maximal set of Fs at level 1.  Therefore, by OM-TMA-R, there is 
exactly one form of F at level 2, in virtue of which all of the Fs in the maximal set at 
level 1 are F.  (What follows from this is that, for instance, Fs at level 0 are F in virtue 
of participating in the form of F at level 1, 2, 3, etc.)  This reasoning can be carried out 
ad infinitum, so given these assumptions, there are infinitely many forms of F at 
higher and higher levels. 
 
 
III. The Regress Problem of the TMA 
 
 So far I argued that NIV is not necessary for producing the regresses in the 
TMA, because NSE is sufficient along with SPV and OM-TMA-R, and NSE is 
preferable to NIV because it is consistent with SPV and OM-TMA-R.180  But what 
                                                                                                                                       
a maximal set of Fs at level n+1.  A maximal set of Fs is itself at the level of the highest-level member 
of the set. 
179 I will explain below how, with my OM-TMA-R, this application of NSE is required for generating 
the regresses of the TMA.  OM-TMA-R does not imply NSE, and OM-TMA-R and SPV alone are not 
sufficient for generating the regresses of the TMA.  
180 To be precise, another necessary premise of the TMA is that there exists at least one F thing, where F 
is any property for which Plato believes a form is necessary.  For consider justice, which is a property 
for which Plato believes a form is required for explanation.  If we do not assume the existence of one 
just thing, including the form of justice itself, then no regress in the case of justice will follow from 
NSE, SP, and OM-TMA-R.  If there is no just thing, there will be no requirement for the existence of a 
form of justice over it, in which it will participate.  However, if we assume that the form of justice 
exists (and so a just thing exists by SPV) or that one just thing other than the form of justice exists, then 
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about SPV itself?  Is SPV necessary for bringing about the regresses in the TMA?  
According to SPV, it is true of every form of F that it is genuinely an F thing.  I have 
not yet examined how exactly this premise ought to be understood.  However, at this 
point I want to suggest that, although a version of SP may be involved in the explicit 
formulation of the TMA in the Parmenides, nothing as strong as SP is required for 
Plato to be confronted with the Regress Problem of the TMA, that at least one infinite 
regress of forms exists. 
According to Peterson, in the Parmenides at 132a-b, Plato claims that “the 
third man argument will go through for any form…” (Peterson 1973, 456).  Here she 
is apparently relying on Plato’s assertion that it will follow from the reasoning of the 
TMA that each of the forms will be unlimited in number (Parmenides 132b1-2).  So 
the TMA is intended to apply to all forms.  If this is correct, which appears reasonable 
based on the text, then the TMA as stated does rely on some version of SP (or some 
other similar universal premise).  The point I want to make clear is that Plato would 
still be presented with the Regress Problem if he merely rejected SP (according to any 
particular interpretation of it).  There will be problematic consequences for Plato as 
long as there is an infinite regress in the case of at least one form.  Suppose that Plato 
rejects SPV, but instead holds a Minimal-Narrow-Self-Predication (MNSP) premise: 
 
(MNSP) There is at least one form of F, such that the form of F is 
an F thing in the same way as the many sensible Fs.181 
                                                                                                                                       
a regress will follow if we also assume NSE, SPV, and OM-TMA-R.  If we assume that there exists at 
least one F thing in the cases in which a form would be required, along with NSE, SPV, OM-TMA-R, 
then regresses in the case of all existing forms will follow (regardless of whether or not Plato thinks that 
there are some properties for which there are no forms).  NSE is consistent with SPV, OM-TMA-R, and 
this additional premise, while NIV is not, since it conflicts with SPV. 
181 Note that MNSP is not a version of SP, since I reserve SP to refer to a universal genuine self-
predication assumption, or one which makes a claim about all forms.  MNSP is a restricted premise 
based on the Narrow Self-Predication assumption (NSP), which is a version of SP that I discuss later in 
this chapter and that I discussed in depth in Chapter One.  NSP is the view that any form of F is an F 
thing in the same way as sensible Fs.  Now it is usually the case that one can specify many different 
(“narrow”) ways in which sensible Fs are F.  For example, sensible equals are equal in many different 
ways, by having a certain length, width, weight, etc.  But for Plato, as I argue in Chapter One, at a 
higher level of abstraction it is possible to specify one way in which all sensible Fs are F, which covers 
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If Plato accepts even the more modest assumption MNSP and he rejects the particular 
SP assumption which is at work in the TMA itself (which asserts genuine self-
predication in the case of all forms), then he will still face the Regress Problem.  And 
this is the case because there will be at least one form such that the regress is initiated 
for that form.  But as we see in the TMA itself, any infinite regress of this kind will be 
disastrous to Plato.182  For Plato to avoid the Regress Problem of the TMA altogether, 
he needs to prevent there being even one case of an infinite regress of forms.  An 
adequate response to the TMA must deal with the Regress Problem and not merely the 
expressed conclusion of the TMA in the Parmenides.  And again, the Regress Problem 
of the TMA is: There is at least one form for which there is an infinite regress.  For an 
adequate response to the TMA, the rejection of SP is not sufficient.183  Plato might be 
                                                                                                                                       
all of the more specific ways.  So for equal sensibles, there is one way (which I call “the general narrow 
way”) in which they are all equal, namely by having sameness of measure.  NSP in the case of equality 
would say that the form of equality is equal in this same way, by having sameness of measure.  As I 
argue in Chapter One, we have good reason not to attribute NSP to Plato (in the middle dialogues).   
182 See the beginning of this chapter for an explanation of why an infinite regress of forms in general 
seems to be problematic for Plato, with respect to uniqueness and knowledge.  If there are any forms for 
which there is an infinite regress, then the uniqueness assumption will be violated in those cases.  Also, 
knowledge would seem to be impossible in cases of forms for which there is an infinite regress.  For 
instance, if there is an infinite regress in the case of the form of beauty, it seems that knowledge that 
something is beautiful would be impossible, which is a result Plato would want to avoid. 
183 A similar point has been made independently by Bryan Frances, in “Plato’s Response to the Third 
Man Argument in the Paradoxical Exercise of the Parmenides” (Frances 1996).  Frances focuses on 
Meinwald’s solution to the TMA, which, as I discussed in Chapter Four, holds that Plato responds to 
the TMA by distinguishing between two kinds of predication, pros heauto and pros ta alla, and 
thereupon rejects that forms self-predicate such that the regresses are generated.  Frances accepts 
Meinwald’s account of Plato’s distinction of the two kinds of predication, but argues that this will not 
be a sufficient response to the TMA because pros ta alla self-predication must hold for Plato in the case 
of certain forms, and this self-predication is sufficient (along with other premises) to get the regresses 
going in these problematic cases.  I agree with Frances that because of these special cases, which I 
examine in more detail shortly, an adequate response to the TMA cannot consist merely in the rejection 
of a universal self-predication assumption.  But there are some important ways in which I differ from 
Frances:  First, he thinks, along with Meinwald, that Plato does distinguish between these two kinds of 
predication, which I argue against in Chapter Four.  Second, Frances claims that one of the necessary 
conditions for generating these regresses is that there is a set of things other than the form of F that 
participate in the form and are F (Frances 1996, 57).  But as I explain shortly, on my construal of the 
argument, no such assumption is required.  Third, while Frances suggests that Plato rejects NSE to 
adequately respond to the TMA, he provides absolutely no textual evidence for this claim.  As I argue 
shortly, there is textual evidence from the Republic and Sophist to suggest that Plato does not accept 
NSE either before or after the TMA, and so we have good reason to think that Plato responds to the 
TMA by rejecting this premise to which he is never committed.                     
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able to avoid the Regress Problem if he were to reject MNSP, but MNSP is quite 
plausible and follows from the barest assumptions about forms, assumptions to which 
Plato is deeply committed both before and after the Parmenides.184  It is not 
reasonable to suppose that Plato responds to the Regress Problem by rejecting MNSP, 
because he can respond adequately by rejecting a different premise, one to which he is 
never committed (namely, NSE).  Below, I will return to an explanation of why the 
rejection of MNSP is not a reasonable option for Plato.  Briefly, a rejection of MNSP 
would be tantamount to the claim that forms have no properties which they all share, 
or if there are properties which they do share, there are no forms of those properties.  I 
will argue that Plato is deeply committed to there being properties shared by all forms, 
and to there being forms in the cases of (at least some of) those properties.  So to avoid 
the Regress Problem and to adequately respond to the TMA, Plato looks to reject some 
other premise than whatever SP assumption is involved. 
 
 
IV. Versions of SP and Non-SP Premises in the TMA 
 
 Before I examine why I think Plato cannot reasonably reject MNSP, I will 
consider whether there might be some assumption, which is not a genuine self-
predication assumption, involved in the TMA in place of a version of SP.  I will argue 
that even though some non-SP premise could take the place of SP in a valid TMA-
style argument, the TMA as stated does appear to rely on a version of SP.  Next, I will 
consider some different ways of interpreting the specific self-predication assumption 
                                                
184 For instance, if Plato believes that the form of being exists, which he appears to do in the Republic 
and Sophist for example, then MNSP will follow regardless of whatever other commitments Plato might 
have about the nature of forms.  Plato seems to continue to hold in the Sophist that there is a form of 
being and that it is a being (see e.g. Sophist 249d, 254d, 256e).  And this alone is sufficient to commit 
him to MNSP.       
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involved in the TMA, and I will question whether each of these different 
interpretations of self-predication might be the one intended by Plato in the TMA.  I 
will show that although Plato may not be committed to these self-predication 
assumptions, he cannot reasonably respond to the TMA by rejecting any of them.  
More generally, Plato cannot adequately and reasonably respond to the TMA by solely 
rejecting any self-predication assumption whatsoever, because of his commitment to 
MNSP and because of MNSP’s plausibility. 
 I have argued throughout this dissertation that Plato is not committed to any 
version of SP (in the middle dialogues), that is, any universal genuine self-predication 
assumption, or the view that for all forms, the form of F is itself an F thing.  Instead, 
when Plato suggests that “the form of F is F” in a context in which he intends to 
generalize this claim to all forms, what he intends to express is merely that any form 
of F is F-explaining, or explains things’ being F.  In these contexts, he intends these 
apparent statements of self-predication to be understood as “explanatory predications”.  
Again, by “explanatory predications”, I do not mean to suggest here that Plato is using 
a different kind of predication.  My point is that he is predicating something different 
of the form of F than that it is an F thing.  Instead, he is predicating of it that it is an F-
explaining thing.  In my view, he intends these explanatory predications without being 
committed to the view that every form of F is actually an F thing (in any way).185  But 
could Plato possibly intend a premise involving these explanatory predications in the 
TMA, instead of SP?  Such a premise is as follows: 
 
(EP-TMA) Any form of F is F-explaining (or explains things’  
being F).  
Could EP-TMA be at work in the TMA in place of a version of SP? 
                                                
185 Note that my view allows for exceptions.  There may be—in fact there certainly are—some 
exceptional cases in which the form of F is an F thing (in the same way as sensible Fs). 
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Peterson argues that the one-over-many premise involved in the TMA “is 
supposed to generate a common form of Φ things only for a plurality of things which 
are Φ in the same sense” (Peterson 1973, 464, my emphasis).  If the plurality of things 
are not Φ in the same sense, then the one-over-many premise would only be applied 
illegitimately and the regresses would not be initiated (Peterson 1973, 464).  Fine 
makes a similar point when she argues that “both NSP and BSP are adequate as self-
predication assumptions for the TMA” precisely because they “involve the claim that 
any form of F is a member of the class of F things” (Fine 1993, 207).  EP-TMA, by 
contrast, does not involve this claim.  According to EP-TMA, it does not follow that 
any form of F is a member of the class of F things (although it is consistent with EP-
TMA that there may be some cases in which the form of F is such a member).  Both 
Peterson and Fine seem to be arguing that the TMA will be invalid without a genuine 
self-predication assumption, because the one-over-many assumption only generates a 
form over a set containing only things which are F in the same sense.  For example, 
take the maximal set of all large things at level 0, which contains all large things that 
are not a form of large.  All these large things are large in the same sense of ‘large’.  
OM-TMA-R can be applied to this maximal set, and so we have a form of large at 
level 1 over this set, in virtue of which all those things are large.  Now by EP-TMA 
rather than SPV, we have that the form of large at level 1 is large-explaining.  But now 
the many large things at level 0 and the form of large at level 1 cannot be taken 
together to compose a maximal set of large things at level 1, because we do not have 
that the form of large at level 1 is a large thing.  A version of SP appears to be required 
in order to get the regress going.  According to EP-TMA alone (and the EP view from 
which it is derived), (in general) the form of F and particular Fs will not form a 
maximal set of Fs, because (in general) the form of F is not an F thing (at all, and so 
not in the same sense as the many Fs).  But if there is no maximal set of Fs containing 
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the form of F, then the infinite regress of forms will not be initiated, because OM-
TMA-R cannot be applied to a set containing the form of F.  So it seems as if the 
TMA cannot possibly be valid if one tries to take EP-TMA as the assumption at work 
here in place of SPV. 
 However, this is a bit too quick.  It is correct that according to NSE and OM-
TMA-R as stated above, the TMA will not be valid with the SPV assumption replaced 
with EP-TMA.  But NSE and OM-TMA-R could be adjusted as follows to account for 
the use of EP-TMA186: 
 
(NSE')                         If x is F or x is F-explaining, then x is not F in 
virtue of itself, nor is x F-explaining in virtue of 
itself.  
(OM-TMA-R') For any maximal set at level n containing Fs and 
those things that are F-explaining, there is 
exactly one form of F at level n+1 in virtue of 
which all things in the maximal set at level n are 
F or are F-explaining.187 
Now, EP-TMA, NSE' and OM-TMA-R' together are sufficient for validly leading to 
an infinite regress for all forms.  SPV can be replaced with an assumption like EP-
TMA, which does not hold that all forms are members of the class of F things, and the 
result can be a valid TMA-style argument, as long as NSE and OM-TMA-R are 
                                                
186 Note that these are not ad hoc adjustments to NSE and OM-TMA-R.  Instead, these adjustments are 
developed from an interpretation of the TMA according to EP.  According to EP, Plato uses ‘is F’ 
sometimes to express that the subject is an F thing and sometimes to express that the subject is an F-
explaining thing.  If we attempt to take EP-TMA in place of SPV in the TMA and we try to see the 
premises of the TMA as consistent with EP, we can read NSE and OM-TMA-R such that they reflect 
that Plato sometimes uses ‘F’ as shorthand for ‘F-explaining’.  EP-TMA along with NSE and OM-
TMA-R will validly entail the regress for all forms as long as one takes NSE and OM-TMA-R such that 
the ‘F’ in these very premises might be used as shorthand for ‘F-explaining’.  NSE' and OM-TMA-R' 
are formulations of NSE and OM-TMA-R in which this dual usage of ‘F’ is made explicit. 
187 The set at level n which contains Fs together with those things that are F-explaining might appear to 
be a gerrymandered set, and it might be unclear how it can be a maximal set.  However, this is not a set 
composed of two sorts of random and unrelated things.  The set contains all things which are related by 
a certain predicate ‘F’—it contains those things which are Fs and those things which are explainers of 
things’ being Fs.  So the Fs and the explainers of F are related, and are reasonably considered together 
in a set.  The set at level n containing these things is a maximal set, because it does not leave out any Fs 
or explainers of F which are at level n or below.  The maximal set at level n containing Fs and those 
things that are F-explaining is maximal, because it contains every single F and F-explaining thing, 
which is at level n or below.     
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adjusted to account for the use of EP-TMA.  And suppose that Plato intends EP-TMA, 
NSE' and OM-TMA-R' in his formulation of the TMA in the Parmenides.  If these are 
his intended premises, then Plato cannot reasonably respond to the TMA by rejecting 
this assumption which is used in place of SPV, for two reasons: First, to reject EP-
TMA, Plato would have to hold that the form of F does not explain things’ being F, 
yet this is a deeply entrenched feature of the theory of forms.  But of course, it is 
possible for Plato to reject a view to which he was at some time deeply committed.  
But Plato appears to be committed to EP-TMA both before and after the 
Parmenides188, and I will explain later how Plato can adequately respond to the TMA 
by rejecting a premise to which he is never committed.  As we will see, Plato rejects 
NSE because he holds (both before and after the Parmenides) that forms can be self-
explainers.  For the same reason (and perhaps others as well), Plato could easily 
respond to this new formulation of the TMA by rejecting NSE'.  Second, even if Plato 
did reject EP-TMA, this would not constitute an adequate response to the TMA, 
because the Regress Problem would still follow as long as Plato accepts NSE', OM-
TMA-R', and MNSP.  Regresses would be validly generated from these premises in 
those cases in which MNSP is true.  Since at least one problematic regress of forms 
would follow from NSE', OM-TMA-R', and MNSP, Plato cannot adequately respond 
to this formulation of the TMA by rejecting merely EP-TMA. 
 But even if it is true that EP-TMA could be used in place of the SP assumption 
in a valid TMA-style argument, there are some reasons to think that this is not Plato’s 
intention in the TMA itself.  First, it might be argued that OM-TMA-R' is much less 
plausible than OM-TMA-R.  According to OM-TMA-R, there is some one explanation 
                                                
188 For instance, he appears to be committed to EP-TMA at least in the Euthyphro, Meno, Phaedo, 
Republic, Symposium, and Sophist.  See e.g. Euthyphro 6d, Meno 72c, Phaedo 100c-102b, Republic 
505a, 508e, Symposium 211b, and Sophist 256d-e, although some of these are perhaps controversial.  I 
have discussed the Euthyphro, Meno, and Phaedo passages in some detail in earlier chapters.  See 
Section VI of this chapter for a discussion of the passage in the Sophist. 
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of things’ being F.  Things are F in virtue of participating in the form of F which is 
over them.  But OM-TMA-R' asserts that there is some one explanation of both things’ 
being F and of their being F-explaining.  In other words, OM-TMA-R' (taken together 
with EP-TMA) assumes that there is some one explanation of the truth of the claims 
that “those two sticks are equal” and that “the form of equality is equal”, where the 
first says that two things are equal and the second instead says that the form explains 
things’ being equal.  It seems reasonable to claim that contrary to this, there must be a 
different explanation of these very distinct claims.189  Second, a quick look at what 
Plato actually asserts here in the Parmenides suggests that this reading is not a correct 
interpretation of Plato’s intentions in the TMA.  At 132a, Plato asserts that when one 
looks at the set of large things, they all have one and the same idea (ἰδέα) in common.  
Plato goes on to assert that one can look with the soul (τῇ ψυχῇ) and in the same way 
(ὡσαύτως) at the set containing the form of largeness and the other large things, and 
one will recognize another form of largeness that they all share.  Here Plato seems to 
suggest that the way in which those particulars are large is the same as the way in 
which the form of large is large.  This seems to rule out an interpretation of the 
passage involving OM-TMA-R' and EP-TMA, according to which there are very 
different accounts of how the particulars and the form “are large”.  And therefore, it 
seems that an interpretation of the TMA involving a genuine self-predication 
assumption is more likely to capture Plato’s actual intention in the TMA.  According 
to a genuine self-predication assumption, the particular Fs and the form of F are both F 
                                                
189 Actually there is a reasonable response to this worry.  According to OM-TMA-R' and EP-TMA, the 
fact that “those two sticks are equal” and the fact that “the form of equality is equal” are both true in 
virtue of the form of equality.  OM-TMA-R' need not exactly say that the precise way in which the form 
of equality explains these facts is the same—all OM-TMA-R' asserts is that the form explains the truth 
of these facts.  So OM-TMA-R' leaves open the possibility that there may be distinct accounts of the 
way in which the form of equality explains things’ being equal and things’ being equal-explaining.  For 
instance, those two sticks might be equal in virtue of participating in the form of equality, while the 
form of equality might “be equal” (understood according to EP) in virtue of being related to the form in 
some other way. So OM-TMA-R' is not quite susceptible to the charge that it posits the same exact 
explanation for x’s being F and for x’s explaining things’ being F.      
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things.  So such a self-predication assumption is more consistent with Plato’s claim 
that the particular Fs and the form of F are F in the same way (ὡσαύτως). 
 I have suggested that if Plato did intend EP-TMA in the TMA then it is not 
reasonable to think that Plato responds to the TMA by rejecting EP-TMA, since it is a 
central feature of the theory of forms and there is at least one other premise to which 
he is never committed.  Also a rejection of EP-TMA would not constitute an adequate 
response to the TMA because the Regress Problem would remain (as long as Plato 
accepts MNSP).  But I have argued that it seems unreasonable to claim that Plato did 
intend EP-TMA in his formulation of the TMA.190 
Does this show that I am wrong to maintain that in general Plato intends his 
apparent statements of self-predication as explanatory predications and that Plato is 
not committed to a universal genuine self-predication assumption?  No it does not.  It 
is reasonable to see the TMA as Plato’s presentation of a difficulty that follows from 
one or more premises which he is not and perhaps never was committed to, premises 
which one might easily mistakenly attribute to Plato and which have often been 
mistakenly attributed to him.191  So even if it is true that a genuine self-predication 
                                                
190 It could also be noted that my arguments in this section concerning EP-TMA could also in general be 
applied to readings of the TMA which see the apparent self-predications involved as identity statements 
(whether tautologous or not).  For instance, if the SP assumption in the TMA is replaced with a 
tautologous identity assumption (i.e., the form of F is identical to the form of F) rather than a genuine 
predication assumption, then Plato could not respond by rejecting this assumption, since it is trivially 
and obviously true.  But the arguments I have just suggested concerning EP-TMA would apply here as 
well.  Considerations of plausibility and textual evidence suggest that Plato did not intend the 
tautologous identity interpretation, or any other interpretation which sees the apparent self-predications 
as identity statements.  
191 Fine seems to favor the view that Plato did not present the TMA as an objection to his actual 
commitments in the middle dialogues—therefore, one should not conclude that Plato was committed to 
one of the premises of the TMA in the middle dialogues solely because it is one of the premises of the 
TMA.  Fine writes: 
 
[P]erhaps Plato does not offer the TMA either as a record of honest perplexity or as a 
fatal objection to his theory.  Perhaps he offers it in order to force us to clarify what 
sort of self-predication, non-identity, and one over many assumptions he actually 
accepts. (Fine 1993, 237-8) 
 
(Continues on next page…) 
203 
assumption is intended by Plato in the TMA, this alone does not show that he is or was 
ever committed to such an assumption.  Even if a version of SP is involved as a 
premise in the TMA, this is not sufficient evidence to show that Plato was actually 
committed to such an assumption in the middle dialogues. 
 If Plato did intend a version of SP in the TMA, what exactly is the nature of 
this assumption?  As I have explained in Chapter Four, both Peterson and Fine argue 
for attributing different non-narrow genuine self-predication assumptions to Plato.  
Both of them distinguish narrow ways in which a form might self-predicate, from 
other “broad” or “expansive” ways.  Peterson introduces a Pauline way (Peterson 
1973, 461-2), while Fine introduces a different “broad” way (Fine 1993, 62).  Suppose 
that “the form of equality is equal” is understood as an instance of Narrow Self-
Predication (NSP).  What this means is that the form of equality is itself an equal thing 
in the same way as the many equals—by having sameness of measure.  However, if 
the sentence is taken according to Peterson’s view, it would mean that the form of 
equality is itself an equal thing in the Pauline way, namely by having its instances 
being equal in the narrow way (Peterson 1973, 461).192  So Peterson holds that having 
one’s instances being F (in the narrow way) is another way in which a thing can itself 
be F.193  And if the sentence is interpreted according to Fine’s view, it would mean 
that the form of equality is an equal thing in a broad way, namely by explaining why 
particular sensible things are equal (Fine 1993, 62).  So Fine holds that explaining why 
things are F is another way (namely, a “broad” way) in which a thing can itself be F.  
Fine and Peterson argue that Plato’s statements of the form “the form of F is F” can (in 
                                                                                                                                       
Also see Penner, who argues that we cannot assume that Plato was committed to a certain SP 
premise in the middle dialogues solely on the basis of its presence in the TMA (Penner 1987, 
265-6, 298). 
192 Also see Peterson 1975, 96. 
193 Throughout this section, I am presenting Peterson’s Pauline Predication view according to the 
“expansive reinterpretation” rather than the “conservative reinterpretation”.  It is only according to the 
former that Peterson thinks the TMA will be valid.  
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general) be read according to these interpretations.  They both argue that in these 
cases, the form of F is genuinely an F thing, and F in the same sense as the many Fs.  
According to their views, forms (in general) differ from the many Fs in the way they 
are F, but not in the sense of ‘F’.  The form of F can be considered with the many Fs 
as forming a set of things which are genuinely F, in the same sense of ‘F’.     
Peterson argues that if the SP premise in the TMA is understood in terms of 
Pauline predications, then the regresses in the TMA are still brought about (Peterson 
1973, 463-70).  Fine argues, analogously, that if the SP premise in the TMA is taken 
to assert that forms self-predicate in a broad way, the regresses in the TMA still arise 
(Fine 1993, 207, 225).  Both Peterson and Fine seem to think that Plato’s commitment 
(in the middle dialogues) to SP according to their interpretations, is evidence that this 
is what Plato intends in the TMA.  But I have argued in Chapter Four, Section II, that 
Plato’s apparent statements of self-predication (in the middle dialogues) ought not to 
be understood according to either of their views.  Plato never held that all forms self-
predicate in Pauline or broad ways.  If my arguments are successful, then Peterson and 
Fine would at least be wrong to use Plato’s earlier commitments as evidence for their 
interpretations of the SP premise in the TMA.194 
The textual evidence in the Parmenides itself might also count against their 
views.  Again, Plato suggests that one can consider, with the soul, the form of F and 
the many Fs as being F “in the same way” (ὡσαύτως).  This might be taken to show 
that Plato intends a self-predication assumption in the TMA according to which the 
form of F and the many Fs are F not merely in the same sense of F, but in the same 
                                                
194 But remember that we ought to be very skeptical about claiming that Plato was at some point 
actually committed to whatever SP premise is at work in the TMA.  Therefore, it must be admitted that 
even if Plato was never committed to the premises defended by Peterson or Fine, this on its own does 
not show that he did not intend their versions in the TMA.  He might have used their versions in the 
TMA to show what follows from premises to which he was never committed, but which might be 
mistakenly attributed to him. 
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way as well.  Since the many Fs are F in the narrow way, the form of F would be F in 
the narrow way as well (and not merely the Pauline or broad way).  However, here I 
will not insist on the claim that Plato did not intend, in the TMA, a version of SP 
understood according to the interpretations of Peterson or Fine.  If Plato did intend a 
version of SP involving Pauline predication, he might reject this SP on the basis of 
holding that not all forms are F things, but he could not reasonably deny this version 
of SP by claiming that there is any form of F for which the instances of the form are 
not F.  Likewise, Plato might reject a version of SP derived from Fine’s view, on the 
basis of holding that not all forms are F things, but he could not reasonably reject this 
SP by claiming there is some form of F that does not explain things’ being F.  This is 
the case because Plato is deeply committed to the view that for all forms, something 
which is an instance of the form of F and participates in it is F, and that the form of F 
explains’ things being F.  However, Plato might reject these versions of an SP 
assumption, if he denies that all forms are F things.  But here is the key point: even if 
Plato rejects an SP assumption like Peterson’s or Fine’s, and such an assumption is at 
work in the formulation of the TMA, Plato will not avoid the Regress Problem 
through a rejection of this SP premise.  And this is the case because of his relatively 
deep commitment to MNSP (both before and after the Parmenides) and because of its 
plausibility, which I will soon discuss.  
Before moving on to a discussion of MNSP, let us consider whether Narrow 
Self-Predication (NSP), rather than Peterson’s or Fine’s version of SP, could be the 
intended version of SP in the formulation of the TMA.  NSP is the view that every 
form of F is an F thing in the same way as sensible Fs.195  Could NSP be the intended 
version of SP in the TMA?  As Fine notes, “[i]t is sometimes thought that NSP is 
                                                
195 Again, in Chapter One, I discuss this view in detail and argue that Plato was not committed to it in 
the middle dialogues and especially in the Phaedo. 
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necessary as the self-predication assumption of the TMA” (Fine 1993, 225).  Even if 
this is incorrect, and NSP is not necessary as the SP premise, perhaps this was Plato’s 
intention.  Fine argues that if NSP were the intended SP premise in the TMA, then 
“Plato would not be vulnerable to the TMA, since he is not committed to NSP” (Fine 
1993, 225).  Because Plato explicitly asserts in the TMA that the argument is 
applicable to each of the forms, Fine is correct in this claim.  However, as I have 
argued above, Plato would still be susceptible to the Regress Problem of the TMA if 
there were an infinite regress of forms even in the case of one form.  If Plato intends 
NSP as the SP premise in the TMA, then he would not be faced with the TMA as it is 
stated here in the Parmenides, because since he rejects NSP, there are some forms for 
which the regress would not arise.  And so there would not be infinitely many forms 
for each of the forms.  However, even if we suppose that NSP is the intended SP 
premise in the TMA, the Regress Problem would remain for Plato as long as he held 
MNSP.  Regardless of the intended SP premise in the TMA, if it is true that there is at 
least one form that is F in the same way as sensible Fs, then the argument in the TMA 
could be applied to engender a regress in the case of this form, and this would be 
sufficient to cause problems for Plato, at least with regard to uniqueness.  Perhaps 
Plato can avoid the TMA as stated if he can reject the intended universal SP 
assumption, but if he holds MNSP along with OM-TMA-R and NSE (and that there 
exists one F thing in a case in which the form of F is F in the same way as sensible 
Fs), then he is susceptible to the Regress Problem.  At least one instance of a 
disastrous regress will come about as long as Plato affirms these premises. 
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V. Plato’s Commitment to MNSP 
 
 It might look like the best alternative for Plato is to reject MNSP.  In fact, as I 
will argue, this is not the case.  If Plato did want to possibly196 avoid the Regress 
Problem, while retaining OM-TMA-R and NSE, he would have to reject MNSP.  
Focusing on a rejection of the SP assumption alone, Plato could only possibly avoid 
all instances of infinite regress if he rejected MNSP.  To reject MNSP, Plato would 
have to claim that there is no form of F, such that it is an F thing in the same way as 
sensible Fs.  And Plato seems to hint at a rejection of MNSP at 132e, in the midst of 
the Resemblance Regress.197  He argues that in order to avoid the regresses we must 
assert that “nothing can be like the form, nor can the form be like anything”.  Now if 
we suppose, for instance, that there are many beautiful things, then Plato’s assertion 
here suggests that, since the form “cannot be like anything”, the form of beauty will 
not itself be like the beautifuls—it will not be beautiful.  In this passage, Plato is not 
discussing any form in particular but is making a claim about all forms.  As long as we 
assume that there are many Fs in each case, then it seems that Plato is claiming that 
the form in virtue of which an F thing is F, is not itself F (at least in the same way as 
                                                
196 I say “possibly” here because I have left open the possibility that some non-narrow SP assumption, 
such as Peterson’s or Fine’s, along with OM-TMA-R and NSE, could be sufficient for generating the 
regresses of the TMA.  If so, then a rejection of MNSP would not itself lead to the avoidance of the 
Regress Problem.  My point is that as long as Plato accepts MNSP along with OM-TMA-R and NSE, 
he cannot avoid the Regress Problem of the TMA. 
197 Fine argues that the first presentation of the TMA in the Parmenides (P-TMA) and the Resemblance 
Regress are logically the same argument, but they highlight different premises of the argument which 
one might reject in order to avoid it (Fine 1993, 214-5).  According to Fine, the P-TMA suggests that 
one could avoid the TMA by rejecting the one-over-many assumption involved and the Resemblance 
Regress suggests that one could avoid the TMA by rejecting the self-predication assumption involved.  
But in the “ἄρα” clause at 132e6 within the Resemblance Regress, Plato seems to assert the rejection of 
self-predication in a more explicit way than he suggests that one might reject the one-over-many 
assumption in the P-TMA.  One might take this to hint at the fact that Plato is leaning towards avoiding 
the TMA by rejecting SP, here in the Parmenides.  But as I argue, Plato cannot avoid the Regress 
Problem of the TMA by rejecting SP, and in the Sophist, Plato shows that he avoids the Regress 
Problem by rejecting NSE instead.  Plato also suggests a commitment to a rejection of NSE in the TBA, 
when (unlike the Parmenides) he is more clearly presenting his own positive view. 
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the sensible Fs)—and so no form of F is F (in the same way as the sensible Fs).  He 
seems to be rejecting MNSP.  And as I have argued, Plato would have to reject MNSP 
if he wanted to possibly avoid the Regress Problem while retaining OM-TMA-R and 
NSE. 
 However, instead of supposing that there are many beautifuls or many Fs, 
perhaps Plato wants to assert that the form of F is F (in the narrow way), but since 
“nothing can be like the form”, particular Fs are not in fact F and there are no Fs other 
than the form.198  However, this is a quite implausible reading because it does not 
seem that Plato would avoid the TMA if he posited NSP along with the claim that, for 
any form of F, there is nothing other than the form of F which is F.  For suppose that 
there is nothing other than the form of F which is F, but the form of F is indeed F.199200  
Since there is nothing other than the form of F which is F, the form of F itself 
composes a maximal set of Fs.  Let us suppose that this form is at level 1.  By NSE, it 
is not F in virtue of itself.  And so by OM-TMA-R, there will be one form of F at level 
2, in virtue of which it is F.  The form of F at level 1 along with the form of F at level 
2 compose a maximal set at level 2, and by OM-TMA-R there will be a form of F at 
level 3.  This reasoning can continue ad infinitum.201  Here Plato intends to suggest a 
                                                
198 This move would conflict with what seems to be a central Platonic view, that there are many Fs other 
than the form of F which are F in virtue of participating in the form of F (at least for some range of 
properties).  However, one who held the Approximation View would attribute to Plato the view that 
nothing other than the form of F is actually or really F, but other things only approach being F.  
However, I reject this view, as I think that Plato is committed to there being sensible Fs which are truly 
F, although these sensibles do (at least often) suffer the compresence of opposites.  Plato is also 
committed to there being numerous cases in which forms other than the form of F can be truly F.  For 
instance, all forms are really beings even though they are not all identical to the form of being.  So 
things other than the form of being are really beings. 
199 Now in Plato’s presentation of the TMA itself he does assert that there are many large things.  My 
point here is just that even if Plato assumed NSP (along with NSE and OM-TMA-R) and held that for 
all forms, only the form of F is F, he would still face the regresses of the TMA for all forms. 
200 Here I assume that a form of F can exist even if there are no Fs other than the form of F.  So I take it 
that forms are ontologically independent from any participants—they can exist regardless of whether 
they have any participants, which is perhaps a controversial view. 
201 If my suggestion here is correct, then Fine is not correct to argue that OM-TMA, NSE, and SP are 
sufficient to generate the regress of the TMA only if they are taken “together with the assumption that 
there are some F things…” (Fine 1993, 210, my emphasis).  If there is at least one F thing, the form of 
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way out of the regresses of the TMA, so he cannot mean that the form is F but the 
particulars are not F, because then the regress will still be generated.  It is more likely 
that he means to suggest that the regresses of the TMA could be avoided if, while 
particulars are F, no form is taken to be F.  As I have argued, Plato can only possibly 
avoid every instance of the devastating TMA regresses if he rejects MNSP, OM-
TMA-R, or NSE, or some combination of these. 
 Although Plato might be taken to hint at the rejection of MNSP in the 
Resemblance Regress, I do not think that it is reasonable to take this to be an option 
which he truly considers, given his other deep commitments and the plausibility of 
MNSP itself.  I discuss Plato’s commitment to MNSP (in Chapter Two, Section IV) 
when I argue against the views of Allen and Cherniss, who hold that all apparent 
statements of self-predication ought to be read as tautologous identity statements and 
that Plato is committed to the view that no forms genuinely self-predicate.  I will only 
briefly review the point here.  Plato is committed to the view that there are forms of 
formal properties (or at least explicitly forms of some of the formal properties).  By 
‘formal properties’, I mean those properties which are shared among all forms—these 
are meant to include some properties which are shared among non-forms as well.  For 
instance, he seems committed to the view that there is, to name a few, a form of rest, 
unity, being, sameness, and intelligibility.  All of these forms are forms of properties 
which Plato attributes to all forms.  Since they are themselves forms, they also have 
these properties.  The form of unity, for instance, is itself a unity (in the same way as 
sensible unities).  So, whether or not Plato accepts NSP for all forms (which is 
unlikely), he is certainly committed to the view that narrow self-predication is true in 
the case of some forms.  For, narrow self-predication will be true in the case of all of 
                                                                                                                                       
F itself for instance, then the regress will be generated.  Of course, once the regress is generated it will 
follow that there is more than one F thing, but the point is that this need not be assumed at the outset. 
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the forms of formal properties.  Since Plato seems deeply committed to the relatively 
plausible MNSP assumption both before and after the Parmenides202, it is 
unreasonable to think that he responds to the TMA by rejecting MNSP.  And as long 
as there are some forms for which narrow self-predication is true, OM-TMA-R and 
NSE can be used to show that there will be an infinite regress in the cases of these 
forms.  And this is true regardless of the universal SP (or similar) assumption that 
Plato actually intends in his formulation of the TMA in the Parmenides. 
 
 
VI. Plato’s Response – The Rejection of NSE 
 
MNSP appears to be a plausible premise, and it is one that Plato could not 
reject without making radical changes to central features of his metaphysics.  It is 
reasonable to suppose that Plato will seek to avoid the TMA by rejecting OM-TMA-R 
or NSE or both of them, rather than MNSP, especially if it turns out that at least one of 
these additional premises is never part of his metaphysics.  It is more reasonable to 
suppose that Plato responds to the argument by rejecting a premise to which he is 
never committed, than by rejecting one which is central to the theory of forms.  In my 
view, Plato responds to the TMA by rejecting NSE and not by rejecting OM-TMA-R or 
SPV203, and there is textual evidence both before and after the TMA of Plato’s 
rejection of NSE. 
While Fine agrees that Plato ought to respond to the TMA by rejecting NSE, 
she claims that he would thereby reject OM-TMA as well, which is her version of the 
                                                
202 As I noted earlier, Plato seems committed to MNSP in the Sophist simply because he holds that the 
form of being is a being (see e.g. Sophist 249d, 254d, 256e). 
203 It also seems to be the case that Plato rejects SPV, as I have argued in this dissertation.  But this is 
not part of his response to the TMA.  As I have shown in this chapter, a rejection of SPV does not 
constitute an adequate response to the TMA.  Alternatively, a rejection of NSE does. 
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one-over-many assumption involved in the TMA (Fine 1993, 366 n. 62).  This is the 
case because, according to her OM-TMA, it seems to imply NSE (Fine 1993, 350 n. 
40).  However (as I noted above), my OM-TMA-R is distinct from Fine’s in a subtle 
but important way, such that it clearly does not imply NSE.  Again, here is my 
formalization of OM-TMA-R, followed by Fine’s OM-TMA (Fine 1993, 210): 
 
(OM-TMA-R) For any maximal set of Fs at level n, there is exactly one 
form of F at level n+1 over it (where ‘over’ means 
“participated in by all the members of”).  
(OM-TMA) For any maximal set of Fs and level n, there is exactly 
one form of F at level n+1 over it (where ‘over’ means 
“participated in by all and only the members of”). 
According to OM-TMA-R (and OM-TMA), there is exactly one form of F at level 
n+1 over a maximal set of Fs at level n.  For instance, suppose that the form of F at 
level 1 is over a maximal set of Fs at level 0 which does not contain the form.  Fine’s 
OM-TMA itself entails that the form of F at level 1 is not F in virtue of itself—this is 
because her OM-TMA says that since the form of F at level 1 is “over” the set at level 
0, all and only the members of that set are F in virtue of the form of F at level 1.  Since 
the form of F at level 1 is not in that set, it is not F in virtue of itself.  But OM-TMA-
R, on the other hand, merely says that if the form of F at level n+1 is over the set of Fs 
at level n, all of the Fs in that set are F in virtue of the form at level n+1.  OM-TMA-R 
itself leaves open the possibility that the form at level n+1 is also F in virtue of itself. 
Another difference between our two interpretations of the one-over-many 
assumption involved in the TMA is that, on my interpretation, it is left as an open 
question as to whether an object at level n+1 is ontologically distinct from every 
object in the set of Fs at level n which it is “over”.  According to both of our one-over-
many assumptions, the form of F at level n is F (by SPV) in virtue of the form of F at 
level n+1 which is over the maximal set that contains the form of F at level n.  But 
Fine understands OM-
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different ontological levels.  Fine reads OM-TMA itself as involving the claim that: 
the form of F at level n+1, which is over the maximal set containing the form of F at 
level n, must be ontologically distinct from the form of F at level n.  NSE would then 
seem to follow directly from OM-TMA because if the form of F at level n is F in 
virtue of the form of F at level n+1, and the form of F at level n+1 cannot be identical 
to the form of F at level n, then the form of F at level n is not F in virtue of itself.204 
However, according to my understanding of OM-TMA-R, the mere fact that 
the form at level n+1 is at level n+1 and is “over” the maximal set of Fs at level n does 
not imply that the form at level n+1 is ontologically distinct from the form at level n.  
What it means for the form of F at level n+1 to be “over” the maximal set of Fs at 
level n is just that all the members of this maximal set are F in virtue of (participating 
in) the form of F at level n+1.  According to my OM-TMA-R, there is no reason 
without NSE why an object at level n+1 must be considered as ontologically distinct 
from every object at level n.  Once NSE is added to OM-TMA-R, then it follows that 
the form of F at level n+1 is ontologically distinct from the form of F at level n, and 
the infinite regresses of forms are generated.  This is the case because if the form of F 
at level n+1 were not ontologically distinct from the form of F at level n, then the form 
of F at level n would explain its own being F, which is ruled out by NSE.  OM-TMA-
                                                
204 In fact, it seems wrong for Fine to claim that her OM-TMA entails NSE.  Suppose that we only 
assume SPV and OM-TMA.  It follows from OM-TMA alone that the Fs at level n are F by 
participating in the form of F at level n+1 which is ontologically distinct from any of the Fs at level n.  
It also follows from OM-TMA that (all and) only the members of the maximal set at level n are F by 
participating in the form of F at level n+1—since the form of F at level n+1 is not itself in this set, it is 
not F by participating in itself.  What follows is that no form of F (and trivially no non-form F) is F by 
participation in itself.  But this is not quite NSE, that nothing is F in virtue of itself.  Even if it follows 
that nothing is F by participation in itself, the possibility remains open that a form of F is F on account 
of itself in some way other than by participation.  On Fine’s OM-TMA, the form of F at level n would 
be F by participating in the distinct form of F at level n+1, but it might also be F in virtue of itself (in 
some way other than by participation).  If so, then Fine’s OM-TMA does not imply NSE.  Perhaps OM-
TMA together with a rejection of overdetermination, would imply NSE—but Plato appears committed 
to the possibility of overdetermination in his formulation of the TMA.         
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R alone does not include the further claim that objects at level n+1 must be 
ontologically distinct from all objects at level n. 
Instead, OM-TMA-R asserts in general that there is exactly one form of F at 
level n+1 in virtue of which all the members of the maximal set of Fs at level n are F, 
but OM-TMA-R by itself leaves it as an open question as to whether the form of F at 
level n is identical to the form of F at level n+1.205  And so, according to OM-TMA-R, 
by itself it leaves open the possibility that the form of F at level n is F in virtue of 
itself.  One benefit of this interpretation is that according to it, OM-TMA-R together 
with SPV is consistent with uniqueness.  But Fine’s OM-TMA together with SPV 
rules out uniqueness.  OM-TMA-R has the advantage of being consistent with 
uniqueness, regardless of whether or not SPV is also assumed.  Plato begins his 
presentation of the TMA by outlining a one-over-many assumption which might 
reasonably lead one to accept uniqueness.  So it is preferable if we use a version of a 
one-over-many assumption which will be sufficient (along with SP and NSE) for 
generating the regresses of the TMA, but which is also consistent with uniqueness 
when taken together with SPV.  My OM-TMA-R is such a version. 
Another benefit of OM-TMA-R is that it helps to isolate and explain how it is 
crucially NSE that gets the regresses of the TMA going.  For OM-TMA-R along with 
SPV are not sufficient for generating the TMA regresses.  It is the addition of NSE to 
OM-TMA-R and SPV from which it follows that the form of F at level n+1 “over” the 
maximal set of Fs at level n cannot be identical to the form of F at level n.  For 
suppose that the form of F at level n+1 were identical to the form of F at level n.  The 
form of F at level n is in the maximal set of Fs at level n (by SPV), and so (by OM-
                                                
205 According to OM-TMA-R and OM-TMA, the Fs in the maximal set at level n are F in virtue of 
exactly one form of F at level n+1.  But both OM-TMA-R and OM-TMA leave open the possibility that 
the members of this maximal set are also F in virtue of some distinct form or forms of F, which is 
required for the regresses of the TMA. 
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TMA-R) this form of F at level n is F in virtue of participating in the form of F at level 
n+1 “over” it.  But by hypothesis, the form of F at level n+1 just is the form of F at 
level n, so the form of F at level n is F in virtue of itself.  But this is explicitly ruled 
out, not by OM-TMA-R, but by NSE.  And so it is NSE which precisely requires that 
the form of F at level n+1 over the maximal set of Fs at level n is ontologically distinct 
from the form of F at level n.  In my view, we ought not to conceive of the one-over-
many assumption involved in the TMA in such a way that it implies NSE, and we 
should see it and SPV as together consistent with uniqueness and insufficient to 
generate the regresses of the TMA without NSE. 
Once the one-over-many assumption is construed in this way and is isolated 
from NSE, it is more plausibly considered as part of the theory of forms in the middle 
dialogues, at least insofar as it is consistent with uniqueness.206  If there is evidence 
before and after the Parmenides that Plato is never committed to NSE, then it is 
reasonable to suggest that Plato would choose to adequately respond to the TMA by 
rejecting NSE rather than OM-TMA-R.  And as I argued above, because of the 
plausibility of MNSP and Plato’s apparent commitment to it both before and after the 
Parmenides, it is not reasonable to suggest that he will adequately respond to the TMA 
and deal with the Regress Problem by focusing solely on a rejection of a self-
predication (or similar) assumption.  So if Plato intends to provide an adequate 
response to the TMA, it is only reasonable to suppose that he does so through a 
rejection of NSE.  Plato can avoid all instances of the TMA-style regresses by 
rejecting NSE and by claiming that if a form of F is F, it is F (only) in virtue of itself. 
                                                
206 Note again that OM-TMA-R could be restricted such that it applies only to some limited range of 
predicates, and perhaps only according to this restricted formulation, would OM-TMA-R truly be part 
of the theory of forms.  But from this restricted formulation of OM-TMA-R along with NSE and 
MNSP, at least one instance of an infinite regress would follow, and the Regress Problem of the TMA 
would remain.  So Plato would respond adequately to the TMA and deal with the Regress Problem by 
rejecting NSE, a premise to which he is never committed, rather than some other premise. 
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And there is good reason to think that Plato rejects NSE both before and after 
the Parmenides.  In the Third Bed Argument (TBA) at Republic 597c1-d3, which is 
found within Plato’s expression of his own positive view in Book X, Plato relies on a 
rejection of NSE and holds that true forms have at least one of their properties in 
virtue of themselves.  Plato argues that two “forms” of bed would not be the real form 
of bed because they would both have a certain property or εἶδος of the real form, which 
they have in virtue of that form and not in virtue of themselves.  For my present 
purposes, it is not necessary to determine the exact nature of this εἶδος of the true form.  
The key point here is that the true form must have this εἶδος in virtue of itself and not 
in virtue of any further form.  The two forms of bed are not the real form of bed 
because they have this εἶδος in virtue of some further form.  The real form must 
explain its own possession of this εἶδος—it must have this εἶδος in virtue of itself.  
Since Plato relies on the claim that forms must have one of their properties in virtue of 
themselves, he rejects NSE and is at least open to the view that in those cases in which 
forms genuinely self-predicate, they do so in virtue of themselves. 
The form of the good in the Republic also seems to provide a counterexample 
to NSE, as it explains its own possession of certain features.  For example, in the 
analogy of the sun at 506e-509d, the sun is responsible for making things in the visible 
realm visible.  Since the sun is itself in the visible realm and is a visible object, it is 
responsible for making itself visible.  Likewise, the good is responsible for making 
things in the intelligible realm intelligible.  But the good is in the intelligible realm and 
is an object of knowledge (Republic 508e).  And the good is responsible for making 
the objects of knowledge knowable (Republic 509b).  It follows that the form of the 
good is knowable in virtue of itself.  And so Plato rejects NSE in his discussion of the 
good in the Republic.  Plato holds that forms can be self-explainers of the properties 
that they have. 
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Plato is more explicit in the later dialogue of the Sophist in not merely 
rejecting NSE, but in affirming that the form of F can be F in virtue of itself.  At 
Sophist 256d11-e4, Plato writes: 
 
So it must be possible for that which is 
not to be, in the case of change and 
according to all the kinds.  For 
according to all of them, the nature of 
the different makes each of them not 
be, making each of them different 
from being.  And indeed, it is correct 
for us to say that all of them are not in 
this same way, and on the other hand, 
that they are beings, because they 
share in being. 
 Ἔστιν ἄρα ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ µὴ ὂν ἐπί τε 
κινήσεως εἶναι καὶ κατὰ πάντα τὰ γένη· 
κατὰ πάντα γὰρ ἡ θατέρου φύσις 
ἕτερον ἀπεργαζοµένη τοῦ ὄντος 
ἕκαστον οὐκ ὂν ποιεῖ, καὶ σύµπαντα δὴ 
κατὰ ταὐτὰ οὕτως οὐκ ὄντα ὀρθῶς 
ἐροῦµεν, καὶ πάλιν, ὅτι µετέχει τοῦ 
ὄντος, εἶναί τε καὶ ὄντα. 
Here Plato argues concerning all the kinds or forms (referring to those things which he 
has just called the most important forms or εἴδη at 254c-d), that it is the form of the 
different which is responsible for making every one of them different, and that all of 
the forms are beings because they share in the form of being.  Both the form of the 
different and the form of being are clearly forms that Plato includes as two of the most 
important forms or εἴδη.  So Plato suggests that the form of the different is different in 
virtue of itself and the form of being is a being in virtue of itself.  Narrow self-
predication is true of both the form of the different and the form of being, and they 
both self-predicate in virtue of sharing in themselves.  So by the time that Plato has 
written the Sophist, he has expressly rejected NSE and has explicitly adopted the view 
that if a form self-predicates (at least in the narrow way), it does so (only) in virtue of 
itself.  Although Plato may not have earlier asserted exactly what it is in virtue of 
which a form of F is F, in my view, he was never committed to NSE, and this is 
apparent at least in the rejection of NSE in the TBA and in the role of the good in the 
analogy of the sun.  Plato uses the TMA to stress, to those willing to think through the 
issues involved, that NSE ought not to be accepted into the theory of forms. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
As we have seen, for Plato at least in the middle dialogues, it seems that all 
forms are such that “the form of F is F”.  But, as Allen warns, “this thesis does not, by 
itself, imply self-predication; for that, an auxiliary premiss is required” (Allen 1965, 
44).  I have argued that we should not take Plato to be committed to any such auxiliary 
premiss.  For, on my interpretation, he simply is not committed to Self-Predication. 
I have argued that we have good reason to doubt all of the most influential 
interpretations of Plato’s apparently self-predicational language.  Further, the textual 
evidence most often thought to commit Plato to Self-Predication in the middle 
dialogues does not seem to adequately reveal any such commitment.  But what does 
Plato mean then by his view that for all forms “the form of F is F”?  I have pointed to 
textual evidence, from the Hippias Major 286d-91d and Phaedo 74, suggesting that 
Plato sometimes writes “is F” when he means to convey that something “is F-
explaining”.  Perhaps this is what he is doing in his generalizable apparently self-
predicational language.  But that alone is not yet the Explanatory Predication view.  
For this does not yet say how he uses ‘is F’ to convey “is F-explaining”. 
My solution to the puzzle of self-predication in Plato is to take Plato to be 
simply using, in special contexts within the middle dialogues, ‘F’ as shorthand for the 
property of being F-explaining rather than the property of being F.  This interpretation 
ought to be favored, I think, because it is fairly straightforward and does not involve 
any weighty underlying philosophical assumptions, and because it is consistent with 
the textual evidence and Plato’s expressed commitments in the middle dialogues. 
When Plato suggests that for all forms, the form of F “is F”, he only means that 
the form is an F-explainer and not that it is a self-exemplifier.  While the form of 
equality is equal-explaining, it simply is not equal.  
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